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*** NP Foresees Victory in Nonracial Election**

91AF0394A Johannesburg VRYE WEEKBLAD
in Afrikaans 16 Nov 90 p 7

[Commentary by Hennie Serfontein: "NP [National Party] Propaganda: It's Clean and Fresh and CP [Conservative Party]-Less"; first paragraph is VRYE WEEKBLAD introduction]

[Text] Hennie Serfontein has had a look at the National Party [NP] propaganda publication issued this week as an advertising supplement in daily newspapers. It is completely different from NP publications in the past, he feels, and he sees a new self-confidence glimmering through.

In sharp contrast to the recent past, when the NP vehemently attacked the CP [Conservative Party], the CP and the right wing threat are almost completely ignored in the NP publication.

The publication focuses attention on various new facets and emphasizes the NP's strategy, policy, and thinking.

State President F.W. de Klerk says in an interview that right wing radicalism is not the greatest threat to stability in South Africa because it has no particular potential for growth.

"I have too much confidence in the good sense and piety of whites, which is the target group of the whites, for that."

Dawie de Villiers, the Cape Province leader of the NP makes the only other brief mention of the CP: "The only way in which the CP can be fought is through the truth of South Africa: that people in this country are dependent on each other and intertwined with each other. The unworkability of CP policy must be brought home."

Otherwise, there is no mention of the CP.

Nor is there any attempt to deceive whites through ambiguous statements—something that has been one of the characteristics of NP propaganda up to now.

Hemus Kriel, minister of planning and provincial affairs, acknowledges that if the Group Areas Act is repealed, coloreds, Indians, and blacks will move into "traditionally" white areas.

He says that nowhere in the world is there a law that defines someone's domicile on the basis of the color of his skin. But more important than color is the preservation of the norms and standards of communities.

Kriel explains with a mundane example: "For some time I have lived alongside people with whom I have no community life, because on Sunday morning the man takes his car's engine out with a block and tackle and clanks around on it all day long.

"But with a nonwhite who also goes to church on Sunday and observes Sunday as I am accustomed to doing, I

have a better community life than with the man living near me who works on the car all day and revs and charges it."

A new self-confidence shines forth from the publication—a confidence and belief that the NP, in an alliance with others, will in fact be able to win a future election for all citizens. At the beginning of the year, Gerrit Viljoen unexpectedly acknowledged that the NP would no longer be the government by the turn of the century.

In the Groote Schuur and Pretoria talks between the government and the ANC, government spokesmen openly declared that the NP will sit in the opposition under a new constitutional order.

But it is clear that the NP is encouraged by rumors of problems in the ANC and the results of opinion polls indicating unexpected and surprising support for de Klerk among blacks.

De Klerk said in his interview in the publication that the NP "wants to go to the voters with a winning plan." Not only the white voters; he also wants to win the vote of the majority of all South Africans.

He emphasizes that the NP "wants to bring together those who belong together due to internal conviction. Be it in the form of coalitions, alliances, or in broad political movements.

"Our goal is a winning coalition. I think that this is completely feasible," says de Klerk.

Stoffel van der Merwe, the NP head of intelligence, emphasizes that the NP is clearly not planning to negotiate from a position of power if its negotiation plans do not succeed.

*** ANC's Suttner Views Continuing Violence**

91AF0595D Cape Town NEW ERA in English
Oct/Nov/Dec 90 pp 3-6

[Article by Raymond Suttner, Dept. of Political Education (ANC [African National Congress]): "Do We Continue the Talks?" Quotation marks as published]

[Text] The decision of the ANC to suspend the armed struggle has been difficult for many of our supporters to accept. It has also been seized upon by 'radical' critics as a sign of betrayal. All the more so when it appears that the leading liberation movement has given this up unilaterally and apparently without corresponding concessions on the side of the apartheid regime. How do we understand this? Is this a setback?

Subsequent to the signing of the Pretoria Minute, a massive onslaught has been unleashed against communities on the reef leaving some dead. There is a clear evidence of police and SADF [South African Defense Forces] involvement, connivance and condoning of acts

of terror against our people. It does not appear to be coincidental that these attacks coincided with the launch of the large number of ANC branches in the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] region. What this means for the future of the talks will be considered in a final section. It is necessary first to understand the reasons behind the adoption of the Pretoria Minute.

When the ANC and its allies initiated the process leading to the adoption of the Harare Declaration, it was a strategic initiative with a particular purpose. It was known that governments like that of Thatcher were preparing their own initiatives, whose purpose would have been to sideline the ANC and other democratic forces and create a favourable climate for continuing white minority rule.

The ANC did not want to have to respond to such an initiative and instead set its own process in motion, which, through its unanimous adoption in the OAU and the cogency of its arguments, became accepted as the authoritative road to a negotiated settlement in South Africa.

The ANC wanted to ensure that the possibility of achieving their ultimate goal, a non-racial, democratic South Africa, through peaceful means should be fully explored. The Declaration was constructed in a manner that sought to map out a fair process which would not, as in other plans, put the democratic forces at a disadvantage.

It was envisaged, at the present stage, that the government should take steps, unilaterally, to create a climate for negotiations, identifying amongst others, some six obstacles in the way of the onset of negotiations.

While we have initiated the present process, we do not automatically retain the initiative. We need at any particular moment to evaluate whether or not our action or inaction may lead us to lose the initiative and in fact endanger the achievement of our fundamental purpose. This can only be adequately addressed if we consider the state of the process at this point in time, not only in relation to the Harare Declaration, but within the context of our overall strategic perspective, of the national democratic struggle.

It is clear that the adoption of the Pretoria Minute does not strictly follow the wording of the Harare Declaration. The ANC has unilaterally suspended the armed struggle without there being a climate for negotiations, without the removal of the obstacles listed in the declaration nor that of other obstacles that have gained greater prominence in recent times, e.g., the right wing violence and that in Natal.

Does the failure to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Harare Declaration mean that we have made an unacceptable compromise?

It is crucial that we negotiate with a proper climate and that we eliminate all the obstacles that have been identified. But we need to ask whether the precise sequence of events laid down in the Harare Declaration must necessarily be followed, irrespective of conditions. In particular, we need to answer this within the context of the logjam that had developed in the process.

Do we want there to be a permanent blockage? Do we want the process to be in a permanent stalemate? Or do we have a way of unblocking the process? If we do and this entails deviating from the precise formulation of the Harare Declaration, we need to weigh this against the purpose of the Declaration.

The object of the Declaration was not to have precise words adhered to (though deviation from these provisions cannot be done lightly). The object was to make speedy progress towards peace in a democratic, non-racial, unitary South Africa. The means chosen to achieve this were laid down in the Declaration.

Just as the Harare Declaration has a specific and larger purpose at every phase of this process we need to assess how we are moving towards this main goal, that is, whether what we are doing or not doing helps or retards progress towards a new, democratic constitution.

We have to ask how we are to achieve our strategic objectives while moving with tactical flexibility. We need all the time to ask whether or not the positions we adopt are advancing our goals or not.

The ANC's main strength is political. The opening up of the mass terrain creates possibilities that we need to utilise fully. The armed struggle had been conceived as a political weapon in a situation where open, legal political action was virtually impossible. The re-opening of the legal terrain has meant that the possibilities and need for action in this area have become much greater than ever before.

The government sought to have the ANC go further than a suspension of armed struggle and wanted a demobilisation of the people, an end to consumer boycotts, strikes and a wide variety of mass actions.

We rejected this because the ANC is a product of and accountable to the people. Its strength lies in this link. This is not a time for demobilising the people, but heightening the struggle on the ground, as an adjunct to that at the talks or negotiating table. [It may well be asked whether suspension of the armed struggle could not have been avoided if the level of mass struggle had been higher, if that could not have been used to break through the blockage delaying the peace process.]

The ANC has faced hard choices and has chosen to make tactical adjustments. We need to understand what the choices were and what considerations came into play when the choices were made.

Until now we have driven hard bargains and have achieved many victories, some going further than the

obstacles listed in the Harare Declaration (e.g., the return of exiles which is not mentioned). But at any moment, we have to be flexible with regard to our response and broad in our vision of what we are prepared to concede, if in so doing we can advance our goals.

At a particular stage we may facilitate our future gains by conceding more than the opposing forces. Up to now, as mentioned, we have mainly had unilateral concessions from the side of the government. To take this further has required a concession on our side. That concession was judged necessary in order to facilitate the achievement of our long-term strategic goals.

But we need to keep the momentum going and in fact ensure that we put the democratic forces in command, dictate the pace of struggle from the streets, townships, workplaces, etc.

The political terrain is where we are strong. While we have engaged the regime militarily, that is not our most powerful area. In this time we need to focus very strongly on the mass struggle and remove obstacles in the way of its becoming an irresistible force, felt very much at the negotiating table itself.

We have tried to speed up the process, but we need to ensure that we are equipped by our organisational activities, to use this speed to our advantage.

An important question that needs to be addressed is whether we have not made a unilateral suspension, while the state remains free to perpetuate aggression against the people. Realistically, we are not in a position to secure the disarming of the SADF and SAP [South African Police] at this stage. But serious steps must be taken to monitor and curb their repressive acts. The state has identified some 96 officers at various places, as contact people who should be informed of corresponding ANC people, to liaise with one another over situations which threaten to erupt into dangerous conflagrations leading to the shedding of further blood of our people.

We have been accused of delay in naming corresponding contact people on our side. Recent evidence indicates however, that many of our people on the ground are very dissatisfied with the system because the contact people are very often, in their view, those members of the police who are responsible for the violence.

Clearly, as the NEC [National Executive Committee] has demanded, much more thoroughgoing steps need to be taken to identify and charge the perpetrators of the current terror, and the need to see a visible disbanding of the various killer squads.

Our main job now is to interpret this Minute to the people and explain that it is essential that all of our members and the masses in general are involved in the process of negotiations. The release of Mac Maharaj and other political prisoners, the return of indemnity to Ronnie Kasrils and Maharaj are not matters for the

leadership alone. It is for the people to open the jails and take decisive action—under the leadership of the ANC—to end the violence.

We need to make the people focus on our political and organisational tasks, to ensure that our branches and regions can raise demands which will provide our representatives at future negotiations with clear ideas of the thinking of the people and also proper structures from which a mandate can be obtained and to whom the leaders are accountable.

The suspension of the armed struggle is a compromise. But whether or not one compromises is not an abstract, purely logical decision. If a compromise is necessary in order to advance our struggle, we must compromise. If a compromise is necessary to prevent a serious defeat, we compromise. If a compromise is necessary to raise the level of struggle and create new conditions which may take us further in the realisation of our ultimate goals, we must compromise.

We do not enter this process with a view to compromising. But we cannot cater for a changing situation if we allow ourselves to be frozen into one response: 'no compromise'. To refuse to compromise is not a principle in itself. It is not an issue subject to no variation. It is in the main a tactical question and how one relates to compromise is a combination of the conditions existing at a particular time and their relation to our ultimate goals.

Anything we do now must relate to the present and the future, to our present conditions and our ultimate objectives. The question of compromise is justified or unjustified by the effect of any action on the obstacles in the way of the realisation of our aims. Does such a compromise assist in the removal of such obstacles or not, is the question we need to answer.

The Pretoria Minute is a justified compromise, ensuring the release of political prisoners, all of them, whether on death row or serving sentences; secures the return of exiles and, in the spirit of the Minute, serious steps ought to be taken towards the repeal of security legislation and the resolution of the National conflict.

If we want a negotiated settlement, if we want our brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers in jail to be released, if we want an end to the aggression against our people, we have at this time to adopt the type of approach found in the Pretoria Minute. Ideally, only the apartheid regime should make concessions, but in real life, politics does not operate that way. Even though we initiated the process leading to the Harare Declaration, we do not control all aspects of the way it unfolds in South Africa. The suspension of armed struggle is a bold step, seeking to ensure that we retain or regain the initiative, that we have the moral high ground and that there is no legitimate reason for the government to delay the process towards a just settlement.

It is important, nevertheless, to clarify what has not been agreed on. The armed struggle has not been ended. It has been suspended, with the proviso that it would be revived if the government fails to meet its obligations. The forces of Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation] have not handed in their weapons or identified arms caches. Umkhonto remains in existence, until such time as a cessation of hostilities, consequent on a total settlement is reached.

We certainly hope that it will not be necessary to resume armed activity. We want a peaceful solution and we need every democrat to demand, with us, their speedy movement towards the creation of a democratic South African state.

After the Signing of the Minute

The recent violence on the reef raises new questions about the future of the talks. The controversiality of both the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, amongst many of our supporters has been compounded by the revocation of the indemnities and the massive war against ordinary people and the ANC on the reef.

Many people fear that we are in a reversal of the Dingane/Retief encounter, where the enemy now takes advantage of our suspension of armed struggle and interprets agreements as it wishes.

It is important to remember that the interpretation and implementation of agreements arising from both Minutes is not merely the examination of wording. While the Pretoria Minute, in particular, commits the government to specific time scales for releases and the return of exiles, it is not clear as to what is required from security forces. We interpret the spirit, as opposed to specific wording, as supporting our view that the state has an obligation to step in and stop the carnage.

But how successful we are in achieving this is a matter of struggle. We need in particular to take more determined steps to win the propaganda battle as to the meaning and cause of the violence. We need to step up this campaign until it reaches a point where massive pressure can be exerted by all peace-loving people, to force the government to end the war.

Another thing to remember is that we need also to talk a different type of language. Mass action such as stayaways costing R750 [rands] thousand in the case of that over the Natal violence, often have strong persuasive powers.

The ANC needs, now, to take a bold lead in showing its muscle, ensuring that the government is forced to listen and act decisively to bring the killers to book.

Do We Continue Talking?

If we pull out of the peace process we risk the continued incarceration of comrades who have a right and a duty to play their part in the transition to a free South Africa.

The same goes for comrades who have spent up to three decades building the movement abroad, struggling on the international terrain, or in training cadres for work inside the country. We want all of these people back. They are entitled and must be allowed to play their full part in the rebuilding of the ANC as a legal mass organisation, building the new South Africa.

This does not mean, as Comrade Deputy President Mandela has emphasised, that we will continue this process no matter what is done to our people. Crimes are being committed against ordinary, innocent people. If this is not stopped, the government will be responsible for derailing a process that could transform this country into a place of peace and democracy.

We initiated this entire process because the ANC, since its inception, has worked for peace. Its members have hungered for peace, peace that can only be brought about with the end of apartheid and the creation of a democratic South Africa.

But we are not prepared to delude ourselves, if the government continues to meet this commitment with acts of war, or the toleration or connivance in such acts performed by others. We are taking steps to defend our people.

The scale of recent violence has however been so great that we cannot pretend to be able to provide a defence umbrella that can repel this. If we are forced to return to the armed struggle, the responsibility lies squarely on the government.

We are confronting a counter-revolutionary attack, an attempt to return us to the pre-February 2nd situation, to renew all the obstacles in the way of negotiations. This should alert us to the need to deploy all our forces to defend our gains and ensure that our strength is felt.

We hope that we can bring the government to its senses. We will, as suggested, not only use the power of reasoning to achieve this. We still rely on our main strength, the power of the people, the power of mass action, which can often achieve more than countless debates and arguments.

* White Fears of New Dispensation Rising

91AF0340F Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English
9 Nov 90 p 9

[Text] The ANC [African National Congress] racial tolerance is genuine. There are whites on its national executive, white marshals frisk people for weapons at its rallies, white researchers write its policy pamphlets.

When Molly Blackburn, a white civil-rights campaigner, died in a road accident in 1986, 20,000 blacks turned out at her funeral.

Yet whites, even liberal whites, are worried. At first they idolised Mr Mandela. He was the father of the nation,

not the leader of the ANC. He would emerge from prison to reconcile South Africans, like a priest absolving sins.

It was too much to expect. Mr Mandela has tried to reassure whites, but then he has also spoken fondly of Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Quadhafi and Yasser Arafat. He has not been able to control township anarchy. He has stuck to the ANC's alliance with the Communist party. Where else in the world, sighed a liberal sympathiser at an ANC rally, would you still see the hammer and sickle so proudly displayed?

Whites are understandably apprehensive at becoming part of Africa.

The Government's propaganda has embellished the continent's awful post-independence record; denied visas, white South Africans have had to take much of it on trust. Whites in Southern Africa often refer to themselves as "Europeans."

Alien Africa is already invading South Africa. The shops in central Johannesburg sell more to blacks than whites, which means they are as likely to stock crude hotplates as fancy stoves. Just to the north, white suburbs have given way to bohemia: multi-racial honky-tonk, cut-price stores and women.

Most whites do their shopping and aerobics in the politer suburbs farther north. The nightmare, laughs one white Johannesburger, is that even the northern suburbs' arty cinemas will start showing kung-fu films in Zulu.

The jokes mask more serious fears: of whether there will be decent schools for their children, decent hospitals to soften their old age.

Most serious of all is the violence, which spills from the townships more and more. Whites talk fearfully of Lebanon. They defend their gardens with big fences and rotweilers.

The vice-chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg's English-speaking university, recently felt obliged to rule that guns should not be carried on campus.

Restaurants get held up: the guests surrender watches, wallets, occasionally their shoes. The violence breathes truth into Archbishop Desmond Tutu's jibe: "In this country we have so many people who want to change so long as things remain the same."

Racial conflict and the violence that comes with it have another, more insidious effect.

In a curious way, English-speaking whites suffer from the same denigration of self-improvement that affects black South Africans. They feel they have to apologise if they are not engaged in the struggle. Many who leave the country do so at least partly in search of uncomplicated yuppiedom.

But yuppies are exactly the people that South Africa's economy needs. The National Manpower Commission talks of a shortage of 228,000 graduates by the turn of the century.

Add in falling earnings, and South Africa's chances of keeping its yuppies look slim. A local consultancy reckons that South African managers earn 27 percent less than their British counterparts, after having been 12 percent ahead in 1986.

The Government's emigration, figures pooh-pooh the danger; they suggest that more whites are coming in than moving out. The truth is less comforting: many leave the country without telling the Government. One survey found that in a single year 4,500 students (about a quarter of the country's annual output) deserted the country the moment they graduated. Of 47 MBA students at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1982, only five are still in the country.

For the moment, few are leaving; pretty certainly not as many as in the mid-1980s, when ungovernability first reared its head. But people are hedging their bets. Money seeps out of the country. Johannesburg barristers sit American bar exams. Embassies receive more visa applications.

The Afrikaners won't be leaving. They have been there for generations and have nowhere else to go.

Just as English-speakers feel for European culture, so Afrikaners are obsessed with being white Africans, a people tough enough to stake everything on the dark continent and survive.

Their sense of encirclement is nurtured by the image of the protective circle of ox-wagons, by the stories of English and African betrayal. Now it is Mr de Klerk who stands accused of treachery.

With their sense of biblical self-righteousness, right-wingers tried in February to present him with 30 pieces of silver in a child's coffin. They have since taken to spraying National party meetings with tear-gas.

But the old Afrikaner tribal cohesion is crumbling, and with it the sense of history and betrayal. National Party gatherings are more likely to entertain the faithful with displays of model aircraft than of ox-wagons.

In August the leader of the far-right conservative party addressed his people in Pretoria's city hall, from a stage decorated with pot plants. The high-point of anti-reform militancy came when another speaker asked the delegates to stop paying their television licences, because the ANC was getting too much air time. He had to assure his audience that it was still okay to watch videos.

These days the Afrikaners have become civil servants with life-insurance policies, not the rednecked farmers of old. Many of their children go to university, where they are more likely to join left-wing than right-wing groups.

On 26 May, the day the Conservative Party organised a grand demonstration against Mr de Klerk's reforms, a rival gathering of Afrikaners assembled to commemorate Houtstok, as the Woodstock rock festival is locally known.

Even in the Northern Transvaal, supposedly the heart of red-neck country, white families go to steakhouses on Sundays, with balloons and soft drinks for the kids.

When Mr de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC, the Conservative Party vowed to make his job impossible. It has since thought better of its threats to call white workers out on strike. It has shrunk from an open alliance with the wild gunmen to its right. It has not even had the guts to precipitate a mini-general election by ordering its 39 members of Parliament to resign.

Like the ANC's left-wing fringe, the Conservatives compare Mr de Klerk to Kerensky, soon to be shed aside by Mandela-Lenin in the name of the new RSA—the Republic of Socialist Azania. They do not compare their own party to the impotent (white) Russian aristocracy.

Perhaps, just perhaps, they are right not to. Even if the mass of Afrikaners is too comfortable to consider armed revolt, there is a fringe that is ready for it. The assassin's bullet is a worry. So is mutiny within the police.

There have been bomb attacks on reformist politicians and newspapers, and probably some provocation of township violence. Things could grow much nastier if Afrikaners start losing their jobs.

Zimbabwe achieved white-black reconciliation despite a war of independence that killed 30,000 people; despite the election victory of an avowed Marxist; despite the fading of a liberal tradition among the country's whites.

Yet in a sense Zimbabwe had it easier.

Its white population never amounted to more than 6 percent of the total; thanks to white emigration and a high black birth rate it is now nearer to 1 percent. It has therefore been easy for President Robert Mugabe to be nice to whites while still seeing to it that his people get jobs—and particularly that the visible face of the state (post-office clerks, railway conductors) turns black.

In South Africa whites are more numerous (about 17 percent of the population). Worse, many are barely skilled. Stripped of racial favouritism, Zimbabwe's whites have kept their jobs because of their superior skills.

The Afrikaner railway conductors are much more vulnerable. They have more in common with the unskilled Portuguese settlers in Mozambique, who left en masse at independence, destroying whatever they could not take with them. Since Afrikaners have nowhere to go, they will stay.

South Africa should get a decent constitution reasonably soon. But at present it is poised between white acquiescence and anger, between a tradition of black tolerance and an ungovernable youth.

In part, its destiny hangs on politics: Mr de Klerk's skill in taking whites with him; Mr Mandela's determination to discipline the comrades.

But the economy is crucial. It will be easier to leave Afrikaners in their jobs if growth opens opportunities elsewhere for blacks; easier to hang on to yuppie skills; easier to tame the comrades with training schemes and jobs.

* ANC Views Hopes for Negotiated Solution

91AF0345A Lusaka SECHABA in English
Nov 90 pp 11-16

[Article by Zola Skweyiya]

[Text] The negotiations initiated by ANC [African National Congress] Vice President Nelson Mandela from Victor Verster Prison have ushered in a new era in the struggle for national liberation in South Africa. They have led to the unbanning of the ANC and other people's organisations, and have presented all democrats in this country with a unique opportunity to contribute towards the creation of a new and just democratic order in our country.

All men and women of good will have been presented with an opportunity of participating in the constitution-making process, and to contribute in the moulding of the basic law of a post-apartheid South Africa. All peace-loving forces of this country, irrespective of their political affiliation or ideological leanings, have been presented with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to take part in the process towards the promulgation of the fundamental law of a post-apartheid South Africa. The constitution-making process presents all our people with a challenge to stand up and be counted in the new phase of struggle that has emerged. The constitution would be an instrument through which the will of the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of colour, gender and class, long checked and suppressed by apartheid tyranny, would be lodged in their will to power.

It has been a long way from the first actions of Umkhonto We Sizwe [Spear of the Nation-MK], in December of 1961 to the present phase of our struggle. Many a heroine and many a martyr has paid the supreme sacrifice, towards this phase. We say this because negotiations are also part of the struggle.

The ANC has never rejected negotiations. This is no new phenomenon in the long history of our struggle. Even after the adoption of the armed struggle, the ANC repeatedly expressed the hope that the first military acts would persuade the government of this country to discuss the peaceful solution of the apartheid problem.

Over the years, the ANC has many a time stated categorically that, if a serious possibility presented itself, it would take part in negotiations.

With the change in the situation, especially after the uprising which engulfed South Africa from 1984-1986, the option of negotiations became central in the resolution of the crisis. It was at this time that the ANC saw the need to state its positions more clearly, especially when it came to the position of a new constitutional order and the question of negotiations. It was at this time that the ANC appointed its Constitutional Committee and instructed it to draw the broad outlines of a democratic constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa. To take advantage of the victories which the democratic forces had won internally and internationally, the ANC had to clarify its vision of a future South Africa, and elaborate more on the principles set out in the Freedom Charter.

This process resulted in the drawing up of the ANC Constitutional Guidelines. These guidelines were never meant to be a constitution, but broad outlines of what a post-apartheid constitution should contain. They are meant for discussion by all South Africans, who can amend them, elaborate on them and criticise them in whatever way they choose.

This was the ANC's contribution to the constitutional debate which has occupied South Africa since the mid-eighties.

Further, when it became clear that negotiations were becoming the order of the day in South Africa, the ANC saw the need to state its position clearly. The ANC initiated consultations and discussions within the democratic movement in South Africa, and in the countries of the sub-continent of Southern Africa and in Africa as a whole. This led to the adoption of the Harare Declaration on Southern Africa. These positions were broadly accepted by the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and the United Nations. They are enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on South Africa.

The central principles behind the ANC approach to the negotiations mechanism are:

- Negotiations should not take place behind the backs and above the heads of our people. They should be among delegated representatives with a clear mandate from their constituencies.
- There should be a specific time frame within which negotiations should take place.
- The process must not be unduly protracted. The faster we reach an agreement the better.
- To supervise the transitional process, there will have to be an impartial interim government. Negotiations cannot be carried out within and through the existing apartheid institutions.

There will have to be a number of phases before the new constitution is adopted. After the climate for negotiations has been created and obstacles have been removed there will have to be a suspension of hostilities between the parties involved in the armed conflict, that is the liberation movement—in this case the ANC—and the South African Government. A mutually agreed ceasefire, on the basis of terms agreed upon, will have to be acceptable to all parties involved in the armed conflict.

The whole process led to the meeting on May 2-5 1990, between the ANC and the South African Government, which adopted the Groote Schuur Minute.

The Groote Schuur Minute

The ANC's approach at the talks was in conformity with its commitment to the process set out in the Harare Declaration. Within this process, the question of suspension of hostilities is addressed to both sides, the ANC and the South African Government. Such suspension of hostilities was to be negotiated after the removal of obstacles. The obstacles referred to were factors whose removal would help in the creation of a climate for negotiations. Included here are the need for unconditional release of all political prisoners, including those on death row, lifting the State of Emergency, and the repeal of all security legislation.

While the ANC did not, at Groote Schuur, renounce any form of struggle that may advance its cause, it looked forward to the future phases of the process, when it will be possible for both sides to suspend warfare and ultimately lay down arms entirely.

In this context, how do we interpret the Groote Schuur agreement?

The preamble refers to a common commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter, as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations.

We interpret the reference to violence and intimidation as addressed, in the first place, to the forces of apartheid, and among the forces of the right, black and white. We recognise also that some of our own followers have been involved in acts of indiscipline. It is part of our duty, in establishing the ANC as a mass legal presence, to ensure that this does not continue, and that we spread understanding of our policies by reasoning and not by any form of violence or intimidation.

This is a commitment born out of confidence in our constituency and policies, and also a sense that it is both short-sighted and morally wrong to believe that followers can be won over by force or violence. This goal can only be achieved through establishing strong grassroots structures organised on a disciplined basis and with a strongly rooted political consciousness.

As far as the ANC is concerned, the commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations, is nothing new, nor is it a compromise. The entire history of our struggle and organisations is related to attempts to find a peaceful resolution of all our problems. The path to armed struggle was not chosen by us, but was forced upon us by the intransigence of the apartheid regime, its repressive policies and the banning of the ANC.

We strongly believe that the whole spirit of the agreement and the character of the exercise was dictated by a common commitment to remove all obstacles to normal political activity and the achievement of a climate conducive to negotiations. We hoped that this would soon lead to the removal of all repressive legislation, the release of all political prisoners, and the return of the exiles. Our constituency demanded that we ensure that the agreement be speedily implemented, thus bringing us to the point where obstacles to the negotiations would be removed.

The agreement did not entail any limit on our normal peaceful political activities. That is why the ANC would not relax its struggle to liberate South Africa from apartheid, and create a non-racial, non-sexist democracy. The agreement laid the basis of trust and good faith between the negotiating parties, and was fundamental in confidence-building for the future stages of the negotiations process. It led to the adoption of the Pretoria Minute.

The Pretoria Minute

By agreeing to the Pretoria Minute, the ANC wanted to ensure that the possibility of achieving its goal through peaceful means should be fully explored. The declaration is construed in a manner that seeks to map out a fair process which would not put the democratic forces in South Africa at a disadvantage.

Perhaps, for one to gauge the amount of sacrifice the ANC made in the Pretoria Minute, one has to go back to the Harare and United Nations Declarations. In both declarations, it was envisaged that the South African Government should take steps, unilaterally, to create a climate conducive to negotiations, all the obstacles to those negotiations are identified.

It is clear that the Pretoria Minute does not strictly follow the wording, procedure and phrasing of the Harare Declaration. The ANC unilaterally suspended the armed struggle without the South African Government's removing all the obstacles. Repressive legislation still exists, the State of Emergency in Natal is still fully in place. Further, right-wing violence has gained great prominence among both whites and blacks.

We should ask ourselves the question whether the failure of the Pretoria Minute to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Harare Declaration means that we have made an unacceptable compromise.

While the ANC initiated the present negotiations process, we need to evaluate at every particular minute whether our actions or inactions may lead to our losing the initiative, and, in fact, endanger the achievement of our fundamental goal.

While the sequence, as foreseen in the Harare Declaration, might have been fundamental in creating the designed climate for negotiations, we need to ask ourselves whether its precise sequence needs to be religiously adhered to and followed. In particular, we need to answer this question in the context of the logjam and dwindling of confidence that was developing.

To avoid a permanent blockage of the negotiations process, we had to deviate from the precise process and phrasing of the Declaration. The object of the Declaration is not to adhere religiously to its phrasing and words, but to make speedy progress towards peace in a democratic and non-racial South Africa. While we had to aim at achieving our strategic objectives, we had to move with tactical flexibility towards our goals.

Our main strength has always been political. Our principles are unquestionable. The Pretoria Minute would open new possibilities for mass struggle, and open the gateway towards the peaceful resolution of South Africa's problems.

The government's sought to force the ANC to go further than the suspension of armed struggle. It wanted a demobilisation of the people, an end to consumer boycotts and industrial strikes and a wide variety of actions which are judged normal in any Western democracy. This was fully repudiated by the ANC.

Until now, we have driven hard bargains and won many a victory, some going further than foreseen in the Harare Declaration—for example, the return of the exiles, which is not listed in the declaration.

While the Pretoria Minute is aimed at speeding up the process towards negotiation, we also need to strengthen our political organisation. We need to move quickly to ensure that our people participate in the monitoring of the unrest. We should use the new opportunities to our advantage.

Sometimes one wonders whether the present artificially created spell of well-orchestrated violence is not aimed at the very spirit of the Pretoria Minute. Is it not aimed at securing a place for some parties who, up till now, have seen both the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes as eroding their prestige? Is it not aimed at securing a place for some leaders whose political careers are on the wane? One wonders whether it is aimed at presenting South Africa with a choice in its constitutional models. Is it not aimed at increasing regional and ethnic differences, and thus forcing us to recognise them and so securing a place at the negotiating table and in a transitional cabinet?

The suspension of the armed struggle is a necessary compromise. It is not happening for the first time in the

history of national liberation movements. The same case can be found in the history of the Algerian war of independence, in Vietnam and other countries. Democratic international law recognises ceasefires as agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. It does not bring an end to the conflict between the parties. The negotiations between the ANC and the South African government aimed at a general ceasefire. It is a temporary arrangement. If the duration of the ceasefire is not fixed in an agreement, as in the Pretoria Minute, it continues in force for a reasonable period (Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self Defence*, 1988, Articles 36 and 51).

Despite this, the ANC looks forward to the future phases of the peace process, and the possibility for all sides to suspend war and violence, and ultimately participate in the peace process.

Despite this, it is perhaps worth while to spell out what has not been agreed on. The armed struggle has been suspended unilaterally by the ANC, with a proviso that the ANC reserves the right to revive it, should the government fall short of its obligations. The forces of Umkhonto We Sizwe have not been forced to lay down their arms or identify their armed caches. Umkhonto has been unbanned, and remains in existence until such time as a complete cessation of hostilities is announced, consequent on a total settlement, and a united South African army is established. Despite this, we hope there will be no need to take up arms again.

Despite this, the way towards full-fledged constitutional negotiations has been opened. The ANC certainly hopes that it will not be necessary to resume armed activity. We want a peaceful solution. The present stage lays the basis or foundation for unfolding the process of democratising South Africa through the process of shaping a new constitution in our country.

Constitutional Principles

When deciding on the goals and priorities which must find expression in a new constitution, the ANC bases itself on the Harare Declaration. The principles are as follows:

1. South Africa shall become a united, democratic and non-racial state.
2. All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed.
3. All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of universal suffrage, exercised through one person, one vote, under a common voters' roll.
4. All shall have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism.

5. All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights.

6. South Africa shall have a new legal system which shall guarantee equality of all before the law.

7. South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary.

8. There shall be an economic order which shall promote the well-being of all South Africans.

9. A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all countries, and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all people.

These principles reflect the thinking and spirit of co-operation and peace as stated in the ANC Constitutional Guidelines.

Drawing Up a Constitution

In drawing up constitutions, especially for the developing countries, where the percentage of illiteracy is great, one should ensure that the language of the constitution is clear and non-technical. The document must be as short and precise as possible. A constitution is meant to be read and understood by ordinary citizens. It should not be made a monopoly of supreme court judges and constitutional legalists.

A constitution should not be made an excuse for party political pronouncements. It should be neutral and open-ended in political and ideological terms. Otherwise, it may be too closely identified with the fortunes of a particular political party or pressure group, and rise and fall with it. A constitution is meant to endure, if not for ages, at least for a certain term of years.

The drafter should have a direct political mandate. It is for this reason that the ANC calls for a constituent assembly. A precondition for any viable exercise in a constitution-making process is the existence of a prior political consensus—on the part of that part of society for which the constitution is intended, or at least its dominant political elite—as to the main goal values of that society in the future. If such a political consensus does not exist, but a substantial comprehensive societal consensus is there, the drafters must operate modestly, and try to concentrate on those areas where a societal consensus exists.

The text of the constitution should have an in-built element of generality that facilitates its continually creative adaptation, through time (by judicial interpretation and administrative application, apart from formal amendment), to changing societal needs and expectations. The constitution should not be rigid and difficult to change by ordinary modes of constitution amendment, lest that may encourage the citizen to change it by extra-constitutional means and direct action, or else ignore it completely.

In conclusion, one may warn that no constitutional charter can save a sick society. One should always take into account the human element in constitutional decision-making and application. Drafting a new constitution can never be a substitute for wise political action—the exercise of the ordinary skills of political compromise, and respect for the constitutional “rules of the game.” The constitution of any democratic country should try by all means to inculcate a culture of human rights. This culture in South Africa must take into account the actual needs of the people and the extent to which a society, like the apartheid one, is based on inequalities. It should encourage tackling the problems of poverty, lack of housing, inadequate medical care, social services and education based on racial discrimination. It must also reflect the interests of workers, gender issues and the protection of children.

The principles enunciated above set out the minimum constitutional requirements, without whose implementations we are convinced apartheid would not have been eradicated. The central theme is a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa, based on one person one vote, under a general common voters’ roll and full equality, without regard to race, gender and religion.

A Constituent Assembly

The ANC insists that an elected Constituent Assembly should draw up the constitution of post-apartheid South Africa. We insist on this because such an organ would have a direct mandate from the people. The election process leading to the constituent assembly would give all parties competing in the election an opportunity to declare their policies. Further, it would give the electorate, especially the Africans, who have never voted before, a chance, once in their lifetime, to cast a vote, which would lay the basis for the foundation stone of a democratic South Africa. Further, and most important, it will spell out clearly who is who, in South Africa’s political life.

The road to a constituent assembly is long. The ANC is at present involved in consulting all parties amongst the oppressed. We are not aiming at convincing them that they should adopt our policies. What we aim at is a broad consensus which would determine the shape of the negotiating table. We are talking to everyone, including the chiefs and leaders of the Bantustans.

Perhaps some may be critical of such an approach. If so, they should take into consideration the fact that about 50 percent of our people live in the rural areas. Further, they should consider the influence which apartheid officials have on our people.

Last but not least, they should take into consideration the political changes that have taken place in these Bantustans, and further consider the fact that if we do not have them on our side—somebody will. The results of the recent meeting between F.W. de Klerk and the Bantustan chiefs point to the broad strategies of the

regime in the rural areas and Bantustans. The promise of regional government in the countryside is aimed at enticing the Bantustan leaders to the side of the National Party during the negotiation process.

The ANC further insists on an interim government to oversee the transitional process. We are convinced that the present apartheid regime, with its history of violence and intolerance, is in no position to play such a role. It can’t be player and at the same time be referee. We foresee an interim government being composed of all the parties that claim to have a following in South Africa. We hope that period of constitution-making would last at least a year, or 18 months at the most.

We hope that during this period a spirit of tolerance, understanding, mutual confidence and trust will be infused into the whole body politic of South Africa. It is a period during which the sincerity of all the parties towards the peaceful resolution of the problems of this country will be tested. The times we are going through are hard times, but also exciting. We will need each other and we must build mutual trust, if we are to achieve the development and peace we have so long sacrificed for.

*** ANC Youth League Searches for Unity**

91AF0340B Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 8-9

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] If nothing else, members of the African National Congress [ANC] Youth League will be constitutional experts by the time the league is formally launched next year. As you read this, many of them are probably grappling with the new 13-page ANC Youth League Provisional Constitution and its Code of Conduct—complete with its classification of ‘grave crimes against the struggle’ and suitable penalties.

At the beginning of this year, as members of individual youth congresses around the country, they had their own—vastly different—constitutions and programmes of action. Members of the Piketberg Youth Congress, for example, would be bound by Peyco’s own constitution and code of conduct.

All that changed in April this year, when the SA Youth Congress (Sayco) national congress resolved to change from a federal structure to an unitary structure, and individual youth congresses became Sayco branches. Peyco then became the Piketberg branch of Sayco, and had to debate and adopt a uniform draft constitution.

Then, a few weeks ago, a new ‘bible’ arrived for discussion: the ANC Youth League constitution, complete with its proposals for the establishment of a Provisional National Youth Committee (PNYC), with a Provisional National Youth Secretariat (PNYS) and Regional Youth Committees (RYCs), and the guidelines for code of conduct.

'I feel sorry for some of the younger comrades,' said more experienced Sayco activist. 'It's a lot for them to grasp. Youth congress, Sayco branch, now youth league...'

The net effect of all this debate, he pointed out, is that many youth structures have been able to do little campaign work this year. Political organisation has had to make way for political education—and the lack of activity has had a numbing effect on South Africa's 'Young Lions.'

'We are used to campaigning, building, organising. We have lost some of that. Sometimes the youth no longer roar...we have to remind them the struggle did not end with the release of Mandela.'

But Sayco members are not the only ones grappling with new concepts: the youth league's constituency stretches much wider, encompassing the high school membership of the Congress of South African Students (Cosas); the SA National Students Congress (Sansco) and National Union of SA Students (Nusas), which organise at universities; religious youth formations like the Young Christian Students (YCS) and the Catholic Students Association (Casa); and even Jeugkrug, which organises students on Afrikaans-language university campuses. Added to that are members of the ANC in exile, many of them members of Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation-MK] and the ANC Youth Section, who will join the Youth League at a slight disadvantage: as they will only be able to return home later this year, or possibly even next year, they are missing the crucial process of the next five months.

All, however, are expected to join the new umbrella youth league—although it is obvious that Sayco members will play the leading role in this new body: more than 24 of the 30 national members of the PNYC are Sayco members, as are most of the additional 14 regional youth committee leaders who sit on the 44-member PNYC.

Nobody is expecting the process to be trouble free. A recent pre-Youth League weekend workshop of Sayco and Jeugkrug members, for example, resulted in clashes over nationalisation and other economic bogeys.

The youth league has given itself just over five months to weld together these different traditions. It is to set about forming branches, zones and regions along the lines of its 'mother body,' the ANC, and come up with a formation able, as the new draft constitution says, 'to serve not only the purpose of reinforcing the ANC, but also to strive to achieve the mobilisation of the broadest sections of the youth of our country.'

The deadline set by the PNYC is 6 April 1991—10th anniversary of the hanging of MK cadre Solomon Mahlangu. One important issue which will need to be defined before then is the relationship between the Youth League and its 'senior partner,' the ANC. According to its draft

constitution, the Youth League is 'organisationally autonomous' of the ANC, but still 'liaises closely.'

The commercial media is already making comparisons between the new Youth League and its predecessor, which in the 1940s produced the 'youth rebellion' by Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and others. But it seems unlikely that the youth will be given enough leeway to actively push particularly militant positions. Rather, it will probably encourage its members to become involved in ANC branches, and to gather support for their ideas through these branches.

That, too, will not be easy. Already, some ANC branches are experiencing tension between young activists and older, more established ANC stalwarts.

Even now, five months away from that event, it is not difficult to predict some of those who will make up the leadership: current Sayco president Peter Mokaba, for example, is also chair-person of the PNYC and looks likely to continue his leadership role. The same seems likely in the case of many of his colleagues in the Sayco NEC [National Executive Committee] such as general secretary Rapu Molekane (currently in detention), Ignatius Jacobs (who also serves on the Transvaal interim leadership of the SA Communist Party) and Kgaogelo Lekgoro—all of whom are on the PNYC.

The only thing likely to prevent Mokaba's election is his age: at 32, some Sayco members feel he is 'too old' to lead the youth league. At present, the draft constitution allows for membership up to the age of 35—but some Sayco members are arguing for the age limit to be lowered to 30.

ANC members outside the country, organised into the ANC Youth Section, are also believed to be keen to see a lower age limit. But they have, to a certain extent, been unable to feed in their ideas because they were denied government indemnity and were thus unable to return home. Communication mainly took place through Youth Section leader Jackie Selebi, himself over 40 years of age and also heavily involved in organising the repatriation of exiles.

* ANC Faces Organizational Shortcomings

91AF0340A Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 5-7

[Article by Jenny Cargill; italicized words as published; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] *There will be little time for celebration at the ANC consultative conference on 16 December. There are too many serious challenges facing the organisation to allow for triumphalism, as Jenny Cargill reports.*

While the African National Congress (ANC) has downgraded its 16 December national conference to a consultative one, the gathering will be no less important.

The consultative conference will face two crucial challenges:

- to break the ANC's current organisational inertia; and
- to fill the vacuum on the key issue of strategy and tactics for the months ahead.

The movement's National Executive Committee (NEC) had perhaps little choice but to postpone a fully-fledged conference. Just two months from the scheduled date, only a handful of draft policy papers had been prepared, and still fewer had been distributed to branches for discussion. This threatened to taint the conference as undemocratic even before it started. Since the consultative conference has a more limited agenda, the distribution of papers and resolutions is more manageable, and the prospects for democratic participation by delegates, albeit around fewer issues, are improved.

Added to that, sluggish progress in negotiating the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles promised only limited representation from the two groups with the greatest experience of the movement and its current leadership. To have pushed ahead with a fully fledged national conference without their participation would have added to the growing restlessness in what is historically the ANC's inner core.

But the ANC still needs to demand of government the right to bring to the December conference a strong exile contingent. This, say one senior ANC source, will be vital to creating the necessary 'unity and trust in the build-up' to the proposed national conference next June.

The postponement of the national conference also provides the fledgling internal branches with time to get a better feel of the ANC, to form realistic opinions about individual members of the leadership, as well as to debate and test mechanisms of internal accountability and democracy.

The character of the national conference as it was initially envisaged was being shaped more by notions of the ANC being a government-in-waiting than by the challenges confronting a liberation movement still involved in struggle. Conference organiser and NEC member James Stuart said policy formulation was necessary not just to 'manage this period of transition,' but to 'prepare for a future non-racial government.'

This agenda included a long list of policy papers, covering a number of issues—such as the environment—which would not have even earned a cursory mention before.

But a number of leading ANC members feel this concentration was inappropriate. The current political climate—in particular, the violence—has necessitated a re-ordering of priorities, they argue: the issue of struggle, and its component pillars must be re-asserted—though without losing sight of the longer term goals and policies.

As such, the 16 December conference will centre more on issues of the moment, such as the political situation,

the state of ANC organisation, and strategy and tactics to guide the ANC through the current period.

The postponement of NEC elections to June is both problematic and advantageous.

A leadership whose mandate has not only run its course, but was obtained from what is now just one section of the ANC (the exiles), will be taking the organisation into a crucial political phase—negotiations proper.

To some extent, the ANC has already tried to address this inadequacy. More often than not, NEC meetings today include Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), notably Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] leaders. Usually young and well-schooled in grassroots politics, their presence necessarily changes the character of the NEC. However, this presence is discretionary, and not guaranteed.

It is still unclear whether the December conference will consider options for ensuring a more representative leadership. Options could include entrenching extended NEC meetings as an interim measure and electing a specific team for negotiations, for instance.

Currently, the ANC teams leading and facilitating talks are entirely dominated by people recently returned from exile. Should the ANC not be drawing on the immense experience of union leaders in negotiating, as well as the fine legal acumen of many home-based lawyers?

A point in favour of the postponement of elections is the extra time it gives members to get to know those in leadership positions, therefore providing the opportunity for a more rational vote in June next year.

While downgraded in status, the conference needs to kick off with an understanding that serious organisational and strategic decisions cannot be delayed until June. As one ANC source puts it: 'Six months is too long to wait.'

In his view, this means that the pervading atmosphere at the conference must be one of 'openness,' where delegates are not just voting fodder. Leadership adulation—with delegates being overawed by proceedings and 'names'—has to be avoided, he argues.

Regional conferences have already given pointers to possible pitfalls on 16 December. Specifically, from the start, the conference needs to devise and agree on procedures which ensure people vote on the issues and are not just led by personalities.

Enough has already happened in the few months since the unbanning of the ANC to get a sense of the kind of issues that are likely to dominate the proceedings. And, with the impact of negotiations unfolding, debate is already underway on the most appropriate strategy and tactics for the coming months.

A growing view in ANC ranks is that the organisation is sorely missing a coherent plan that spells out all the

elements in this current phase of struggle and how they inter-relate. Consequently, the organisation has slipped into a one-dimensional approach, with the talks having almost a monopoly on the movement's energies and resources.

Because of this, the ANC assertion that negotiations is a terrain of struggle in which the masses are involved has remained merely rhetorical.

Past ANC strategy as premised on four pillars of struggle: mass action, the underground, armed struggle, and international support for the democratic movement and the international isolation of the apartheid state.

The negotiating process begs a number of questions which the conference will need to debate vigorously. An ANC statement on the 16 December conference emphasised the agenda would include issues such as an interim government and constituent assembly. The government finds both these issues particularly contentious, and ANC negotiators have signalled some readiness to compromise on them. Delegates will no doubt want to express themselves on any such readiness to compromise: under what circumstances, if any, could such a compromise be tactically justified? How could leadership be kept democratically accountable to membership in the event of such a compromise, yet retain a necessary degree of flexibility?

But the crucial question before the conference isn't whether or not to negotiate and compromise tactically in the process. Rather, it is how to ensure a balanced and realistic strategy of which negotiations are merely one component part.

Currently, mass action is being heavily underlined by many ANC members as a guarantor of progress at the negotiating table. Recent political developments have made clear the struggle for constitutionalised democratic freedoms is by no means over.

In an article for the ANC mouthpiece, *Sechaba*, political education chief Raymond Suttner argues for the movement to 'focus very strongly' on 'our most powerful area—the political terrain.' He says while the ANC 'initiated the present process, we do not automatically retain the initiative.'

The ANC 'has to keep the momentum going and in fact ensure that we put the democratic forces in command, dictate the pace of struggle from the streets, townships, workplaces, etc,' adds Suttner.

This emphasis demands that mass action is also discussed in the context of the ANC's relationship with the MDM and its alliance partners. And consultation between the ANC, SACP [South African Communist Party] and the MDM, it is widely acknowledged, must be radically improved.

International isolation is another pillar of struggle that will undoubtedly continue to command strategic attention. The most likely outcome is an endorsement of the

current thinking on retaining international pressure in principle, while employing tactical flexibility.

The underground remains an element of the ANC's current political approach. It is, after all, guarantor of continued existence if the talks fail and South Africa returns to all-out repression of democratic opinion. Yet, in practice the underground appears to have been left out of current strategising. Both the Political Military Council (PMC) responsible overall for underground operations and its regional subsidiaries are no longer functioning. This makes the underground more abstract than real—a situation which is obviously difficult to sustain.

The ANC also has to consider whether it has the resources to retain at least a core of its underground, or whether both resources and personnel might be better deployed elsewhere.

The underground also creates a dilemma for the ANC at the level of principle: can the ANC retain clandestinity at a time when it is trying to democratise its ranks?

Therefore, it is difficult to see the conference resolving to breathe new life into the underground. But clear decisions are necessary on it.

Umkhonto we Sizwe [MK-Spear of the Nation] is a more complex problem. The ceasefire has transformed it into an army-on-hold, which remains nonetheless under pressure from Pretoria. So far there has been no clarity on how the ANC views MK's role—if it has any at all—in the negotiations.

The conference will have to give serious attention to the uncertainty and sense of insecurity which affects MK cadres inside the country and, more particularly, the 4,000-odd in camps abroad. Having been recruited, mobilised and trained for war, and having been prepared to make the supreme sacrifice, they deserve and need (perhaps more so than many others) to be kept fully abreast of, and *involved* in developments towards a negotiated settlement.

Clear decisions on strategy and tactics will mean little if the December consultative conference does not adequately address another key item on the agenda, the state of the ANC's internal organisation.

In short, ANC organisation looks pretty shoddy.

Undoubtedly, problems of relocation from exile, the violence, and limited resources are inhibiting the ANC's ability to build a mass legal base.

But the ANC's organisational shortcomings are not adequately explained by these difficulties.

Structurally, the ANC has an Internal Leadership Core (ILC) tasked with building a new, legal and mass-based movement. Under it are two committees: the political and organising committees.

According to sources in ANC headquarters, the workload of political committee members has made it impossible for the committee to strategise on a daily basis.

The organising committee, say these sources, is also not functioning. The state has effectively blocked a number of members joining the committee: some do not have the necessary immunity to enter the country; Mac Maharaj is detained; and Ronnie Kasrils is in hiding to avoid arrest. Others like Jacob Zuma and Popo Molefe have numerous other commitments. And Chris Hani only returned to circulation in September, after weeks in the Transkei waiting for renewal of his indemnity.

The end result is dismal recruitment figures. While surveys put ANC support at more than 50 percent of the country's potential voters, actual membership is a mere 150,000.

Given that the political space for mobilisation has never been better, the conference must find this result intolerable. And it would be seriously amiss if it closes without suggesting workable solutions and appointing people who *can and will actually do the job*.

In essence, the conference needs to be less a celebration of achievements in struggle, and more a planning forum seeking solutions to a complex political process. The ANC cannot afford to let this chance at pulling together a coherent strategy and tactics slip away—as happened five years ago at Kabwe.

* ANC Secretariat Views Land Reform Issues

91AF0345C Lusaka SECHABA in English
Nov 90 pp 21-23

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Two fundamental issues frame the problem of land reform in our country: our historical grievance resulting from the process of dispossession, and the problem of reconstructing our whole agricultural system—commercial and subsistence. Resolution of this crisis facing our agrarian sector requires an integrated approach which recognises how closely these two aspects of the problem are intertwined.

South Africa has been appropriated by the white minority. Politically this is maintained by a monopoly over political power. But socially, in the lived experience of our people, this appropriation is reflected in control of the land.

By law, whites, who owns 87 percent of the surface area of South Africa, can expel black people from the land, demolish their homes, prevent black people from entering, crossing or remaining on 'their' land. The result is that control over land is not only control over a productive resource, but is control over the lives of people. This means that only if we truly de-racialise the terms of ownership, occupation and use of the land, will the question of land focus on issues of land use and

agricultural development, and no longer be a question of domination and subjugation.

Thus we argue that, if the issue of sovereignty is to be addressed, and the question of how the land should be owned and workers reached, then what we need to do is to ensure that South Africa has one national body of law governing the question of land rights.

This requires that we abolish racist statutes, equalise state supports to agricultural producers, introduce principles of constitutional rights and apply the rule of law evenly to all those living in the countryside. This will de-racialise land law and open the way to a fair and acceptable method of tackling the difficult problem of competing claims to land.

Legally, this vision requires the introduction of constitutional, legislative and practical means of implementation which would:

- protect the fundamental rights and liberties of all who live on the land;
- extend the rule of law to prevent abuse of people's rights—with profound implications for local policing and judicial practices;
- guarantee a minimum platform of social, economic and cultural rights;
- provide guarantees of workers' rights, and
- produce laws aimed at promoting gender rights and combating the oppression of women, as well as provisions designed to give support to the family.

Achievement of a commitment to extend these universal human rights to all of our people living in the countryside would serve as a basis for addressing the need for land redistribution. In applying these principles, we may identify three important aspects of a possible land reform programme:

- First, there must be an immediate and publicised restitution or return of expropriated land to those communities who have suffered forced removals.

Facilitating the return of victims of forced removals to their land and creating conditions which will allow these communities to live and farm successfully, will both acknowledge past injustices and indicate a commitment to the adoption of just solutions.

- Second, the adoption of legislation to protect occupants on the land from eviction, except on very limited grounds. This measure would create conditions in which it would be possible to begin exercising freedom of speech and organisation in the countryside, to guarantee basic trade union rights for agricultural workers and to create conditions for eliminating existing patterns of physical abuse and the persistent violation of the basic human rights of those living on the land.

- Finally, competing land claims may be tackled through the establishment of a process to evaluate competing claims, possibly through the establishment of a Land Court which would apply an agreed-upon list of factors in each case. Factors may include

birthrights, the history of occupation, a history of productive use, inheritance and the question of title, both ancient and current. The Land Court would then be in a position to make determinations based on the evidence submitted by the parties, and, in case of irreconcilable claims to a particular area of land, it may be possible for the Court to apply standards of just compensation, involving a reallocation of land, compensation for capital improvements to the land, or other suitable basis of compensation.

The success of such a programme of land reform will however also be dependent upon the rapid allocation of large areas of land to alleviate the pressure of immediate land hunger, particularly in relation to the provision of urban land for housing, and land that can be used to alleviate the burden of overcrowding in the Bantustans.

Although we may not ignore the centrality of our claim to the land, which springs from our claim of citizenship and forms the foundation of our national struggle, we must also recognise that land reform and redistribution cannot be achieved outside of a comprehensive reconstruction of South Africa's rural areas. This approach involves much more than the division and parcelling out of land. Although our focus here is on rural land, we must not forget that any land reform programme must address the demands of our people for land and housing in urban areas.

Reconstruction requires the formulation of both a general goal, to create a system of sustainable agriculture and rural production, and a range of more specific aims. For us to create a sustainable agricultural system, we need to address the failures of the present dualistic system of commercial and Bantustan agriculture. Six specific aims may be identified as prerequisites for the achievement of our general goal. These are, in brief, the need to:

- provide a place for rural people to live and produce their food and fuel;
- provide employment for rural people;
- provide food for the urban population;
- provide industrial raw materials;
- earn foreign exchange with the exports produced;
- protect the environment in order to pass land on from generation to generation in a better condition than it was received.

The enormity of our task and the complexity of the issues we face is revealed when we juxtapose some of these aims with some existing realities. When we commit ourselves to a rural reconstruction strategy which aims to provide a place for rural people to live and produce their food and fuel, we must recognise that today:

- over 15 million people, nearly one half of South Africa's population, live in the countryside;
- South African agricultural production is dominated by some 60,000 white farmers with grossly disproportionate control over resources and political power.

This domination is compounded by decades of heavy subsidies which did not necessarily support production;

- and that this exists in a context in which the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts set aside a mere 13.6 percent of the total land area for black occupation and use, and gave white farm owners almost absolute control over the lives of the black people living in the remaining 86.4 percent of the South African countryside—whether as tenant farmers or labourers.

When we speak of reconstruction providing employment for rural people, we must also recognise that:

- a total of some 5.5 million black people live in the so-called white rural areas, and of these 934,000 are farm employees;
- and, furthermore, between 1960 and 1983, the impact of mechanisation, mono-crop production and a state policy of forced removals saw an estimated 1.1 million farm workers and their families removed from white farms.

When we speak of providing food for the urban population on the other hand, we are quickly warned that any attempt to redistribute the land or to restructure commercial agriculture will have a devastating impact on food security.

- However, it should also be noted that by 1983 some 30 percent of white-owned farms supplied about 75 percent of South Africa's agricultural produce.
- Conversely, the same group controlled 80 percent of South Africa's overall agricultural resources, an imbalance reinforced by a history of producer-controlled pricing policies and marketing and financial practices.
- By contrast, Bantustan inhabitants, who make up about one-third of South Africa's population, supply less than 7 percent of the country's agricultural production. This portion of our population lives with severe land hunger on plots which fail to meet even the subsistence needs of their occupiers.

If we aim, in this context, to protect the environment and to make it possible to pass land on from generation to generation in a better condition than it was received, we must recognise that:

- Present South African agricultural practice, including the commercial farmers' exploitative farming methods and the overcrowding in the Bantustans, are rapidly and severely degrading our environment.
- New forms of land abuse have emerged with the over-use of chemicals in insecticides, herbicides and chemical fertilisers.
- Despite their banning in other countries, DDT, 24-D, 245-T and some banned organo-chlorides are freely available and widely used in South Africa.

In conclusion, it must be realised that to even begin to tackle these problems and to strive for these goals, we must all acknowledge that the major issue in any discussion of the land in South Africa remains the issue of sovereignty.

* ANC-Jewish Relations Analyzed

91AF0342A Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English 23 Nov 90 pp 24-25

[Text] SA's [Republic of South Africa's] Jewish community is not the largest in the Diaspora (dispersal)—it has about 120,000 people—but it is certainly one of the most affluent—and most supportive of Israel. As the prospect of non-racial government edges closer, the attitudes of the major black component of the new SA, the ANC [African National Congress], to this talented and versatile community has caused it increasing disquiet.

Though there have been no recorded acts of anti-Semitism by the ANC—which boasts a large (in relative terms) and supportive Jewish following—the ANC strongly identifies with the Palestinian cause, is deeply critical of SA-Israel military ties and has a large, influential and radical Muslim constituency. Judaism has no more bitter foe than radical Islam.

Jews try to downplay these issues, but a recent leading SA Jewish envoy who approached the Israeli government about an official visit to that country by Nelson Mandela was turned down flat. Controversy about a recent address by the ANC deputy-president in Temple Shalom in Johannesburg has still not died down. The man behind the invitation, Reform Rabbi Ady Assabi, says he has received 23 death threats, mostly from Jews. He also admits that most of his colleagues objected to the invitation.

He says that in SA, anti-Semitism (hatred of Jews) has become synonymous, inaccurately, with anti-Zionism (those who may reject either the policies of Israel at a given time, in particular toward the people of Palestine, or those who do not acknowledge the right of the State of Israel to exist).

Survival is the watchword which underpins Jewish life. And to many South African Jews, the survival of Israel is a pivot of faith and a symbol of Jewish security. In recent weeks, many have been disturbed by the Anglican synod motion condemning the Temple Mount shootings. In this country, the Anglican Church leadership has become closely associated with the ANC. Then—as part of what is becoming a long history of such statements—ANC executive council member Steve Tshwete, speaking at a Palestinian solidarity rally in Lenasia recently, accused the Israeli government of trying to "wipe out Palestinians" with "successive outrageous campaigns."

Walter Sisulu, internal leader of the ANC (who spent six weeks in Israel in 1953) says that an ANC government would resist any negative action against Palestinians. And the attitude of such a government to Israel is taken as a touchstone of possible attitudes towards SA Jewry.

One ANC misgiving is that at least some SA Jews place Israel first in their loyalties and SA somewhere after that. Ahmed Kathrada, ANC National Executive Committee member and one of the Rivonia trialists, finds such a view "very unfortunate" but not unusual. He notes the

Indian community in previous years retained strong ties with India. But, "SA citizens should have their first loyalty to SA in times of war and peace."

Michael Katz, president of the Jewish Board of Deputies, quotes another famous South African to explain the bond between SA Jewry and Israel. "Jan Hofmeyr said: 'Jews would be poorer, not better, South Africans, if they lightly turn their backs on their own traditions. One can love one's mother as well as one's father and the two loyalties are by no means incompatible.'"

Most of the community was deeply offended when Mandela hugged Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] leader Yasser Arafat in Zambia in March and then went on to visit Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi. Mandela initially brushed off Jewish anger at his embrace of Arafat with an ill-considered "it's too bad." This remark he later denied, but it was one recorded by the more than 100 journalists present.

The ANC cites what it claims has been massive military dealings between Israel and SA. Israel, it says, not only helped smuggle embargoed weaponry to SA—but also assisted with military intelligence and training. SA sold large amounts of arms to Israel, too.

Mandela, in his deference to Arafat and al-Qadhafi, is paying off old debts. The Arab nations provided military training and equipment to the ANC and particularly close relations were established with the PLO and al-Qadhafi—who also assists in military training and the supply of arms to the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC]. Egypt, for example, was one of the first nations to give refuge to SA exiles in the early sixties. Israel is not one of the 44 nations around the world in which the ANC has offices and this relates not only to that nation's close ties with Pretoria, but to ANC links with Arab nations.

Assabi also notes that, "for almost 40 years, the Jewish Board of Deputies, the representatives of the Jewish people in SA, made no public statements against apartheid; the first was three years ago."

The ANC and SA Zionists have a relationship a little like that which the ANC has slid into with the Nat [National Party] government. While personally some of the leaders like each other and publicly brush aside differences, privately there are unhappy eddies of suspicion that occasionally break to the surface.

Will, for example, Zionists be able to send the millions of rands they now do to Israel? Gerald Leissner, chairman of the Jewish Board of Deputies, says this figure is R30m a year; however, the real figure is believed far higher and certainly the Reserve Bank has bent the rules in this respect.

Kathrada says this would depend on the financial situation the country finds itself in. "But it does, again, raise the question of where one's first loyalty lies. SA needs and will continue to need vast sums of money and material assistance in the new SA."

But there are those who argue that a statement like that conflicts with the moral philosophy of Judaism. There are no logical economic arguments for exchange controls—only political ones. And once apartheid goes, in a liberal dispensation they should have no reason to exist. But control over capital flows is stated ANC policy—supposedly to despoil the whites. On the possibility of large outflows of money to Israel, the ANC says it is a matter it has still to discuss.

As the ANC has become a master of ambiguity, an answer like that is bound to cause Jewish disquiet.

Similarly, while the ANC is unlikely to interfere with Jews working on kibbutzim, or receiving military training in Israel, it might not be happy if it cannot see similar enthusiasm and energy being used in rebuilding SA, by SA-born Jews.

Of the Jewish SA population, about 65,000 live in Johannesburg and 25,000 in Cape Town. It is a primarily urban, white, middle-class community. The first great wave of Jewish immigrants arrived here from Russia at the turn of the century; the next large influx came during the Twenties and Thirties from Germany, Poland and Lithuania. Leissner says there has also been considerable immigration from Israel over the past 10 years. It is a community whose values are deeply rooted in Western civilisation and culture. It is unashamedly capitalist.

While the ANC seems to have an imperfect understanding of the emotional significance of Zionism, some argue that the Jewish community has not always displayed great sympathy with the immense difficulties a possible ANC government—or, indeed, any government that addresses itself to a nonracial future—will face. While certain ANC and Jewish leaders have met, it seems both constituencies need closer grassroots contact to reduce suspicion.

While local Jewish spokesmen insist that it is in the nature of Jews to be capitalist and ANC economic policies are matters for grave concern among the Jewish community, Israel was established as a socialist society centred around the significance of communalism, to bind communities torn asunder during the Diaspora. But experience has moved it increasingly away from collectivism and a command economy.

Jews, like Afrikaners, don't easily recognise in their own struggle similarities to that of black South Africans. So points of mutual strength can too easily become the focus of division. The visit of Mandela to Temple Shalom is a case in point.

Nonetheless, Mandela spoke to a capacity congregation and was loudly applauded. In his speech, he rejected anti-Semitism and recalled that it was some time before Arab nations would have dealings with the ANC, because it worked with Jewish organisations and, he failed to say, has many Jews within its ranks. (Well-known Jews include Selma Browde, Albie Sachs, Audrey and Max Coleman and their son Neal Coleman of

COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions], Joe Slovo and many others.)

Mandela said that if "Zionism means the right of the Jewish people to live in secure boundaries, to have their own State, to contribute toward peace, to live in a manner that affords them the right to fully express their culture, traditions and religion, then we consider Zionism a healthy movement. This is what we understand Zionism to be."

The catch is secure boundaries. The FM [Foreign Minister] asked Kathrada which boundaries were meant by "secure" and he said the pre-1967 borders.

Solly Sacks, head of the Zionist Federation, says: "We do not believe pre-1967 borders are secure. We don't need the permission of the ANC for Israel to exist." Katz says any authority "that was anti-Israel would result in tension between the SA Jewish community and any such authority."

Herein lies another aspect of Zionism which the ANC, and perhaps others, find troubling. Sacks says: "It has always been the policy of this community and of the SA Zionist Federation to back the government of the day in Israel, right or wrong, because of our spiritual attachment to Israel. While in the Diaspora we feel it is not becoming of us to criticise or attack the government in power, while we don't have to suffer the consequences."

However, other local Zionists argue that: "Israel has to find a way of working in peace with Arabs and changing the PLO, as the ANC is being transformed, now that the door has been opened." This is precisely why Rabbi Assabi is so controversial in the local Jewish community. He does not hesitate to attack Israeli government policies which he believes are wrong, particularly with regard to its policy on Palestinians. Indeed, he criticises this community for supporting the hawkish policies of successive Israeli governments when few local Jews take part in that combat or live under the fear of eternal war. (Assabi himself was injured in battle during the 1973 Yom Kippur war.)

Kathrada says the ANC's relationship with the PLO will remain close. "Israel is doing what not even the South Africans did. One never heard of SA bulldozing houses because a child from one of the houses threw stones. Israel does it and continues to justify it. It occasionally deports Palestinians forcefully, which again SA never did."

The 1975 General Assembly motion equating Zionism with racism has exacerbated matters. It was backed by Arab nations and the Third World, which, as the early Seventies oil crisis peaked, increasingly aligned itself with oil-rich Arab states.

Some Zionists are concerned that SA could follow Zimbabwe, which Sacks says has 14 Arab embassies, including a PLO one—but not an Israeli embassy. There is no direct flight to Israel and there are restrictions on

Zionist youth activities. The Jewish population in Zimbabwe has dwindled to 2,000.

Leissner says Jews may leave SA too, if SA Jewry feels lifelines to Israel are being cut. The ANC, while clear that the PLO would be accorded full diplomatic status, also sees no potential of a break in diplomatic ties with Israel. The ANC and Israeli government officials have met and have cordial relations.

Chief Rabbi Cyril Harris says: "We want to be friendly with Mr Mandela; we admire his struggle, but we don't want to be told what we have to do about matters as close to our heart as the well-being of the State of Israel. Feelings run high on this issue." But in a piece he recently wrote for JEWISH TRADITION, the national newspaper of the Union of Orthodox Synagogues of SA, Harris noted that the Jewish community "has done precious little to build bridges of communication with other groups" or engage in "formulating a nonracial SA."

A Zionist businessman comments: "Nowhere are the similarities as great as between SA and Israel—and, if SA can succeed, it could enhance the hope that Israel and the Arabs might find their way to a better future."

The Jewish community here has contributed greatly to the general development and the creation of wealth, from which blacks have benefited substantially compared to those elsewhere in the sub-continent, though inadequately when compared to whites. As a community, Jews could do little to reverse Grand Apartheid. Instead, they contributed mightily to general prosperity.

Judaic cohesion and ethical intransigence has withstood extraordinary onslaughts in many countries over many years. Those more powerful than the ANC who have chosen to confront Jewish tradition and ethical values have invariably been the worse off for it.

* ANC Analyzes Pretoria Minute; Aftermath

91AF0345B Lusaka SECHABA in English
Nov 90 pp 17-20

[Article by Raymond Suttner; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The decision for the ANC [African National Congress] to suspend the armed struggle has been difficult for many of our supporters to accept. It has also been seized upon by 'radical' critics as a sign of betrayal. All the more so when it appears that the leading liberation movement has given this up unilaterally, and apparently without corresponding concessions on the side of the apartheid regime. How do we understand this? Is this a setback?

Subsequent to signing of the Pretoria Minute, a massive onslaught has been unleashed against communities on the Reef, leaving some 800 dead. There is clear evidence of police and SADF [South African Defense Force]

involvement, connivance and condoning of acts of terror against the people. It does not appear to be co-incidental that these attacks coincided with the launch of a large number of ANC branches in the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging Industrial Area] region. What this means for the future of the talks will be considered in a final section. It is necessary first to understand the reasons behind the adoption of the Pretoria Minute.

When the ANC and its allies initiated the process leading to the adoption of the Harare Declaration, it was a strategic initiative with a particular purpose. It was known that governments like that of Thatcher were preparing their own initiatives, whose purpose would have been to sideline the ANC and other democratic forces and create a favourable climate for continuing white minority rule.

The ANC did not want to have to respond to such an initiative. Instead it set its own process in motion, which, through its unanimous adoption in the OAU and the cogency of its arguments, became accepted as the authoritative road to a negotiated settlement in South Africa.

The ANC wanted to ensure that the possibility of achieving its ultimate goal, a non-racial, democratic South Africa, through peaceful means, should be fully explored. The Declaration was constructed in a manner that sought to map out a fair process which would not, as in other plans, put the democratic forces at a disadvantage.

It was envisaged, at the present stage, that the government should take steps, unilaterally, to create a climate for negotiation, identifying amongst others, some six obstacles in the way of the onset of negotiations.

While we have initiated the present process, we do not automatically retain the initiative. We need at any particular moment to evaluate whether or not our action or inaction may lead us to lose the initiative and in fact endanger the achievement of our fundamental purpose. This can only be adequately addressed if we consider the state of the process at this point of time, not only in relation to the Harare Declaration, but within the context of our overall strategic perspective, of the national democratic struggle.

It is clear that the adoption of the Pretoria Minute does not strictly follow the wording of the Harare Declaration. The ANC unilaterally suspended the armed struggle, without there being a climate for negotiations, without the removal of the obstacles listed in the Declaration nor that of other obstacles that have gained greater prominence in recent times, for example, the right wing violence, and the violence in Natal.

Does the failure to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Harare Declaration mean that we have made an unacceptable compromise?

It is crucial that we negotiate with a proper climate and that we eliminate all the obstacles that have been identified. But we need to ask whether the precise sequence of events laid down in the Harare Declaration must necessarily be followed, irrespective of conditions. In particular, we need to answer this within the context of the logjam that has developed in the process.

Do we want there to be a permanent blockage? Do we want a permanent stalemate? Or do we have a way of unblocking the process? If we do, and this entails deviating from the precise formulation of the Harare Declaration, we need to weigh this against the purpose of the Declaration.

The object of the Declaration was not to have precise words adhered to (though deviation from these provisions cannot be done lightly). The object was to make speedy progress towards peace in a democratic, non-racial, unitary South Africa. The means chosen to achieve this were laid down in the Declaration.

Just as the Harare Declaration has a specific and larger purpose, at every phase of this process we need to assess how we are moving towards this main goal, that is, whether what we are doing or not doing helps or retards progress towards a new, democratic constitution.

We have to ask how we are to achieve our strategic objectives while moving with tactical flexibility. We need all the time to ask whether the positions we adopt are advancing our goals or not.

The ANC's main strength is political. The opening up of the mass terrain creates possibilities that we need to utilise fully. The armed struggle had been conceived as a political weapon in a situation where open, legal, political action was virtually impossible. The reopening of the legal terrain has meant that the possibilities and need for action in this area have become much greater than ever before.

The government sought to have the ANC go further than a suspension of armed struggle, and wanted a demobilisation of the people: an end to consumer boycotts, strikes, and a wide variety of mass actions.

We rejected this because the ANC is a product of, and accountable to, the people. Its strength lies in this link. This is not a time for demobilising the people, but for heightening the struggle on the ground, as an adjunct to that at the talks or the negotiating table. (It may well be asked whether suspension of the armed struggle could not have been avoided if the level of mass struggle had been higher, of that could not have been used to break through the blockage delaying the peace process.) [as published]

The ANC has faced hard choices, and has chosen to make tactical adjustments. We need to understand what the choices were, and what considerations came into play when the choices were made.

Until now, we have driven hard bargains and have achieved many victories, some going further than the obstacles listed in the Harare Declaration (for example, the return of exiles, which is not mentioned). But at any moment we have to be flexible with regard to our response, and broad in our vision of what we are prepared to concede, if in so doing we can advance our goals.

At a particular stage we may facilitate our future gains by conceding more than the opposing forces. Up till now, as mentioned, we have mainly had unilateral concessions from the side of the government. To take this further has required a concession on our side. That concession was judged necessary in order to facilitate the achievement of our long-term strategic goals.

But we need to keep the momentum going, and in fact ensure that we put the democratic forces in command, dictate the pace of struggle from the streets, townships, work places, and so on.

The political terrain is where we are strong. While we have engaged the regime militarily, that is not our most powerful area. In this time we need to focus very strongly on the mass struggle and remove obstacles in the way of its becoming an irresistible force, felt very much at the negotiating table itself.

We have tried to speed up the process, but we need to ensure that we are equipped by our organisational activities to use this speed to our advantage.

An important question that needs to be addressed is whether we have not made a unilateral suspension, while the state remains free to perpetrate aggression against the people. Realistically, we are not in a position to secure the disarming of the SADF and SAP [South African Police] at this stage. But serious steps must be taken to monitor and curb their repressive acts. The state has identified some 96 officers at various places, as contact people who should be informed of corresponding ANC people, to liaise with one another over situations which threaten to erupt into dangerous conflagrations leading to the shedding of further blood of our people.

We have been accused of delay in naming corresponding contact people on our side. Recent evidence indicates, however, that many of our people on the ground are very dissatisfied with the system because the contact people are very often, in their view, those members of the police who are responsible for the violence.

Clearly, as the NEC [National Executive Committee] has demanded, much more thoroughgoing steps need to be taken to identify and charge the perpetrators of the current terror, and to see to a visible disbanding of the various killer squads.

Our main job now is to interpret this Minute to the people, and explain that it is essential that all our members, and the masses in general, are involved in the process of negotiations. The release of Mac Maharaj and

other political prisoners, the return of indemnity to Ronnie Kasrils and Maharaj, are not matters for the leadership alone. It is for the people to open the jails and take decisive action, under the leadership of the ANC, to end the violence.

We need also to make the people focus on our political and organisational tasks, to ensure that our branches and regions can raise demands which will provide our representatives at future negotiations with clear structures from which a mandate can be obtained and to whom the leaders are accountable.

The suspension of the armed struggle is a compromise. But whether or not one compromises is not an abstract, purely logical, decision. If a compromise is necessary in order to advance our struggle, we must compromise. If a compromise is necessary to raise the level of struggle and create new conditions which may take us further in the realisation of our ultimate goals, we must compromise.

We do not enter this process with a view to compromising. But we cannot cater for a changing situation if we allow ourselves to be frozen into one response: no compromise. To refuse to compromise is not a principle in itself. It is not an issue subject to no variation. It is, in the main, a tactical question, and how one relates to compromise is a combination of the conditions existing at a particular time and their relation to our ultimate goals.

Anything we do now must relate to the present and the future, to our present conditions and our ultimate objectives. The question of compromise is justified or unjustified by the effect of any action on the obstacles in the way of the realisation of our aims. Does such a compromise assist in the removal of such obstacles, or not? is the question we need to answer.

The Pretoria Minute is a justified compromise, ensuring the release of political prisoners, all of them, whether on death row or serving sentences; it secures the return of exiles, and, in the spirit of the Minute, serious steps ought to be taken towards the repeal of security legislation and the resolution of the Natal conflict.

If we want a negotiated settlement, if we want our brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, in jail to be released, if we want an end to the aggression against our people, we have at this time to adopt the type of approach found in the Pretoria Minute. Ideally, only the apartheid regime should make concessions, but in real life, politics does not operate that way. Even though we initiated the process leading to the Harare Declaration, we do not control all aspects of the way it unfolds in South Africa. The suspension of armed struggle is a bold step, seeking to ensure that we retain or regain the initiative, that we have the moral high ground and that there is no legitimate reason for the government to delay the process towards a just settlement.

It is important, nevertheless, to clarify what has not been agreed on. The armed struggle has not been ended. It has

been suspended, with the proviso that it would be revived if the government fails to meet its obligations. The forces of Umkhonto We Sizwe [Spear of the Nation] have not handed in their weapons, or identified arms caches. Umkhonto remains in existence until such time as a cessation of hostilities, consequence on a total settlement, is reached.

We certainly hope that it will not be necessary to resume armed activity. We want a peaceful solution, and we need every democrat to demand, with us, that there be speedy movement towards the creation of a democratic South African state.

After the signing of the Minute:

The recent violence on the Reef raises new questions about the future of the talks. The controversial nature of both the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes amongst many of our supporters has been compounded by the revocation of the indemnities, and the massive war against ordinary people and the ANC on the Reef.

Many people fear that we are in a reversal of the Dingane-Retief encounter, where the enemy now takes advantage of our suspension of armed struggle, and interprets agreements as it wishes.

It is important to remember that the interpretation and implementation of agreements arising from both Minutes is not merely the examination of wording. While the Pretoria Minute, in particular, commits the government to specific time scales for releases and the return of exiles, it is not clear what is required from the security forces. We interpret the spirit, as opposed to specific wording, as supporting our view that the state has an obligation to step in and stop the carnage.

But how successful we are in achieving this is a matter of struggle. We need in particular to take more determined steps to win the propaganda battle as to the meaning and cause of the violence. We need to step up this campaign until it reaches a point where massive pressure can be exerted by all peace-loving people, to force the government to end the war.

Another thing to remember is that we need also to talk a different type of language. Mass action—such as stay-aways costing R [rands] 750 thousand in the case of that over the Natal violence—often have strong persuasive powers. The ANC needs, now, to take a bold lead in showing its muscle, ensuring that the government is forced to listen and act decisively to bring the killers to book.

Do we continue talking?

If we pull out of the peace process we risk the continued incarceration of comrades who have a right and a duty to play their part in the transition to a free South Africa.

The same goes for comrades who have spent up to three decades building the movement abroad, struggling on the international terrain, or in training cadres for work

inside the country. We want all these people back. They are entitled, and must be allowed, to play their full part in the rebuilding of the ANC as a legal mass organisation, building the new South Africa.

This does not mean, as Comrade Deputy President Mandela has emphasised, that we will continue with this process no matter what is done to our people. Crimes are being committed against ordinary, innocent people. If this is not stopped, the government will be responsible for derailing a process that could transform this country into a place of peace and democracy.

We initiated this entire process because the ANC, since its inception, has worked for peace. Its members have hungered for peace, peace that can only be brought about with the end of apartheid and the creation of a democratic South Africa.

But we are not prepared to delude ourselves, if the government continues to meet this commitment with acts of war, or the toleration or connivance in such acts performed by others.

We are taking steps to defend our people. The scale of recent violence has, however, been so great that we cannot pretend to be able to provide a defence umbrella that can repel this. If we are forced to return to the armed struggle, the responsibility lies squarely on the government.

We are confronting a counter-revolutionary attack, an attempt to return us to the pre-February 2 situation, to renew all the obstacles in the way of negotiations. This should alert us to the need to deploy all our forces to defend our gains and ensure that our strength is felt.

We hope that we can bring the government to its senses. We will, as suggested, not only use the power of reasoning to achieve this. We will rely on our main strength, the power of the people, the power of mass action, which can often achieve more than countless debates and arguments.

* Women's League Fails To Get ANC Support

91AF0340D Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 15-16

[Article by Sheila Meintjes; first paragraph is WORK IN PROGRESS introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] *The problems facing the ANC [African National Congress] Women's League are similar to those which have dogged women's organisations in the past—in particular, reports Sheila Meintjes, a lack of interest from the ANC leadership.*

Attempts to organise the ANC Women's League are being hampered by a lack of coherent leadership, a scarcity of resources and minimal support and interest from ANC head office.

The league, which still has to hold a fully representative conference, needs urgently to address how it is going to harness women in the tasks it has set itself.

At the level of rhetoric, the ANC national executive committee has made a remarkably progressive statement on women, saying: 'The emancipation of women is not a by-product of struggle for democracy, national liberation, or socialism. It has to be addressed in its own right.'

The statement recognises that women in South Africa have experienced gender oppression, and that their subjugation has occurred culturally, legally and economically as a result of patriarchal domination.

This has prevented women from participating fully in the political process, and this is true even for the ANC.

The ANC pledges itself to giving priority to programmes of education and advancement for women, and claims gender equality as one of its central objectives.

To achieve this, 'women must take the lead in creating a non-sexist South Africa.'

And so, a historic role has been created for the ANC Women's League.

The aims of the new Women's League are spelled out in the draft constitution: to mobilise and organise South African women to participate in the liberation struggle, through their membership of the ANC.

Within the ANC, the league's role is to 'spearhead the emancipation of women,' as well as to 'promote the all-round development of women and help in building their own confidence.'

Since the national launch at Currie's Fountain on 9 August, there has been a regionally varied response to the call to join the league. Areas which have a tradition of strong women's organisation, like the Western and Eastern Cape, have successfully drawn women into their branches.

In Natal and the Transvaal, where women's organisation has always been weaker, women have been slow to join, although a Soweto branch exists. On 18 November, a Central Johannesburg branch is to be launched.

To what extent has the league managed to initiate programmes to achieve its objectives?

It has not been able to establish effective women's lobbies within ANC branches. Although women are being elected to branch executives, albeit in small numbers, and many women are joining the ANC, this does not mean that women's particular problems and needs are being addressed.

Women hold office in their own right, and are not there to implement the league's policies.

Moreover, local league initiatives are severely hampered by the lack of support from the Women's League national task force.

Symbolic rallying points have yet to be mobilised in the organisation.

This is reflected in the absence of a suitable logo.

The interim leadership of the Women's League is largely comprised of exiles, who are still adjusting to the radically changed modus operandi since 2 February.

There are only eight members of the national task force, whose resources are overstretched. To organise effectively, they should be mobile, yet they lack transport. There is no phone connected to the offices of the interim leadership of the ANC Women's League in downtown Johannesburg—ANC head office, in another building, has to take messages.

These are only some of the many difficulties the national task force faces since the league's relaunch.

As yet, the organisation lacks coherent co-ordination. Campaigns emanating from the task force, such as the nationwide Women's Charter campaign, have not got off the ground.

In part, this relates to the difficulties in communication. But there is also a need to face the problem of the lack of a guiding programme of action.

The league needs urgently to address how it is going to harness women to the very important tasks it has set itself.

More seriously, little support has been forthcoming from the ANC itself.

The Department of Political Education has not prioritised a programme to promote either an understanding of the centrality of women's oppression and its overall social effects, or to encourage ANC women to join the league.

This has implications both for the league and for the future of women's issues in the ANC.

But it is not surprising in view of the massive task the ANC faces in establishing accountable local and national structures as it moves from an illegal underground organisation into party politics in the new political terrain in South Africa.

The Women's League will have to go it alone. One possible strategy to win support from the women of South Africa, is to try and mobilise around the proposed Women's Charter.

Just as the Freedom Charter campaign in the 1950s presented the ANC with the opportunity to organise nationwide, the Women's Charter creates the conditions for a concerted membership drive and politicisation campaign.

The women of South Africa have to be able to express their needs from the grassroots, and the ANC Women's League must take those forward as demands for a future, free and equal society.

* SACP Concerned With ANC Organization

91AF0340C Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 10-14

[First paragraph is introduction; words in italics as published; quotation marks as published]

[Text] *'If the ANC is not sufficiently democratised, if it fails to lead active mass struggles, if the working class is not massively present within the structures of the ANC [African National Congress], then the ANC and our alliance are in serious difficulty.'*

An otherwise generally well-informed foreign correspondent in Johannesburg is betting a case of whiskies that the ANC and SACP [South African Communist Party] will be splitting from each other by the end of this year. The correspondent is going to lose his whiskies.

But there is, of course, more than whisky at stake in this matter. It is not clear whether the chief government negotiator, Constitutional Affairs Minister Gerrit Viljoen, is quite as optimistic (and therefore quite as mistaken) as the correspondent in question. But Viljoen, too, is publicly speculating on an ANC-SACP divorce—at least over the next few years.

To ruminate openly about an impending rift in the way Viljoen has been doing is, obviously, primarily intended as incitement to the act.

In the context of this growing speculation, what exactly is the perspective on the future of the alliance now emerging from the side of the SACP?

This question is intimately related to a second question: What kind of ANC does the party hope to see evolve over the next months, in the course of the crucial building of ANC branches and regions, through December's Consultative Conference and into next year's ANC Congress?

Ever sensitive to accusations of meddling and manipulation in the affairs of the ANC, SACP official statements and public pronouncements about the ANC have always tended to be somewhat circumspect. Interestingly, in the period after 2 February these statements have become slightly less circumspect. This suggests that, while the party is clearly not in any state of alarm or panic, it is also not simply taking the alliance or the character of the ANC in the new situation for granted.

Appearing a month after the unbanning of the ANC and SACP, the March 1990 edition of the party organ, *Umsebenzi*, carried an editorial which noted among other things: 'The ANC will undoubtedly remain the over-all head of the broad liberation front. The need to consolidate and advance the liberation process in the

immediate aftermath of the people's victory may also justify a widening of the democratic camp in a variety of alliances.

'We can look forward to an ANC of massive strength and every militant must help to make this a reality. In the process, some strata with their own agenda will undoubtedly find it self-serving to flock into its ranks and try to steer it away from its working-class bias. All in all we should be ready for an inevitable sharpening of inter-class ideological contest in the run-up to victory and in its immediate aftermath. It follows that the consolidation and growth of our party and the trade union movement—as independent contingents and as part of the liberation alliance—is more imperative than ever.'

This perspective is certainly more forthright about the ANC than anything appearing publicly from the side of the party in previous years.

In the most recent issue of *UMSEBENZI* (October 1990), under the headline 'No Retreat Now,' the leader article takes the forthrightness several steps further. It expresses a clear concern that the strategic initiative is being lost to De Klerk. Although the article is careful to be self-critical of the tripartite alliance (ANC-SACP-Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions]) as a whole, its criticisms obviously relate most especially to the over-all head of the alliance, the ANC.

The article goes beyond the earlier concern that the necessary broadening of the ANC may dilute its working-class bias. It addresses itself, by strong implication, to the current ANC leadership. It is critical of the fact that in the period after 2 February no 'effective formula' has been found for relating mass struggle to the negotiations process.

It singles out three styles or modes which it says are coming to dominate alliance politics—working group technical discussions with the regime; an endless round of 'post-apartheid' future-gazing conferences; and the technical building of ANC structures (regional launches, branch launches, elections and AGMs [annual general meetings]). While all of these activities might be important in themselves, what has more or less totally disappeared, according to *UMSEBENZI*, is ANC-led mass struggle.

This disappearance is all the more serious as it corresponds to the regime's primary objective in the present situation. Having been forced finally to recognise the ANC as its principal and inescapable antagonist, the regime is trying to change the character of the ANC by divorcing it from its militant mass base.

The implicit message in the October *UMSEBENZI* in regard to the kind of ANC the SACP would like to see developing is fairly evident. There is an obvious concern that too much time and effort is being expended on grooming the ANC as a future government, while too little effort is accorded to making it a democratically based organ of active mass participation and struggle.

'We need to balance all the talk about "when we are in power," "when we have an ANC government," with solid strategic planning about how we are going to get there in the first place.'

SACP leadership sources are quick to qualify some of this implied criticism. According to one member of the party's national Interim Leadership Group: 'Many of the difficulties and challenges the ANC is encountering relate to objective realities not of the ANC's own making. Organisational building and the consolidation of ANC cadres involves the welding together of exiles, released prisoners, comrades who have emerged out of the last 15 years of mass democratic struggle, and total newcomers. The party, in a smaller way, is encountering the same difficult challenge.'

'For the ANC, in particular, this complex organisational task is made all the more difficult by the extraordinary pressures of time and profile to which it is exposed. The regime has learnt from Zimbabwe and Namibia that liberation movements have inevitable difficulties coming out of the bush or coming out of the underground into a new open political role. And so De Klerk is putting on the pressure. If the ANC fails to respond quickly to initiatives from the other side it is presented, at home and internationally, as dragging its feet, as not being sufficiently committed to the peace process.'

'But if it moves too quickly it runs the constant danger of outstripping its organised mass base, which is still only emerging. Democracy, consultation, mass involvement in negotiations, all tend to fall by the wayside. While we need to be vigilant and self-critical, we also need to be realistic about the objective pressures we are all confronted with, but which touch the ANC in particular.'

SACP representatives also insist that their concern about the unfolding character of the ANC is not narrowly a concern with the future of socialism and of the party in South Africa. As the same spokesperson puts it: 'When Viljoen incites an ANC-SACP break he is not only trying to frustrate a longer-term transition to socialism. He is trying to change the character of the ANC itself.'

'Never mind a future socialist project, Viljoen is trying to undercut the quality and depth of the impending national democratic transition. An ANC deprived of a mobilised mass base, and stripped of its SACP alliance, is not an ANC that will spearhead a meaningful democratic transformation of our country. Viljoen knows this.'

These comments, like the implied criticism in the October *UMSEBENZI* are, of course, not saying anything that is not being whispered in corridors, minibuses, and informally in the offices of a thousand and one popular organisations. But the fact that these views are now being voiced publicly and officially by party representatives and in official party organs is significant.

Part of their significance lies not just in the question of what the party hopes to see the ANC become, but to the

related question of what the party's own future role and identity might be. And there are not easy nor obvious answers to this latter question. The SACP is having to come to terms with new realities after 40 years in the underground, and in a world where many of the received Marxist-Leninist orthodoxies are now openly questioned. Yet, despite disadvantages, the Communist Party is also launching itself publicly into the paradoxical situation where it has never been more popular, and where the mass support for socialism is riding relatively high.

At its launch rally on 29 July, the SACP set itself the dual task of being both a relatively mass party (general secretary, Joe Slovo mentions a figure of 'several tens of thousands by July 1991'), as well as being a vanguard party. Traditionally, at least in much Marxist writing, the concepts 'mass' and 'vanguard' party have been counterposed as alternative organisational options.

This is a point conceded by various party representatives. But they point to the particular situation in South Africa, and most especially to the existence of the ANC-SACP alliance. There is strong relatively large worker-based support for socialism, and, at the same time, there is a broader, revolutionary national liberation movement, the ANC, with overwhelming mass popularity. The strategic role of the SACP has to be carved out within the parameters of this relatively unique situation.

Apart from its obviously distinct, longer-term socialist perspective the SACP has set itself a number of present tasks which relate to its endeavours to continue to play something of a vanguard role. In the first place, it is clear that the new forthrightness, a relative degree of independence of perspective within the context of the alliance, and a higher public profile than the party has had for four decades are part of a newly defined vanguard party role.

Another aspect of its vanguard role relates to cadre development. Spokesperson Jeremy Cronin said in a recent interview: 'There's a unique relationship between our party and the ANC, which allows a certain division of labour...the party can focus more on cadre development, more on building quality, and in this way, although we hope to be relatively large we also hope to continue to play a vanguard role.'

This cadre development is intended to strengthen not just the party, but the ANC as well. The SACP continues to see the ANC as the major organisational vehicle for change in the present situation. In party publications and in interviews the necessity of ensuring the maximum working-class participation within the ANC recurs constantly as a theme.

John Gomomo, an SACP, ANC and Cosatu leader, recently said: 'Struggling for maximum worker involvement in the ANC, and the struggle to build a democratic, mass-based ANC are the best guarantees for a strong

ANC and for a strong, ongoing alliance between the ANC, the party and Cosatu.'

Increasingly, at least in media speculation, the SACP's attitude towards the ANC is related to the question of future non-racial national elections for a constituent assembly or for a parliament. Would the SACP stand in opposition to the ANC?

'It's a question we've been asked a great deal in the last months,' says Slovo. 'I have tended to say that it's too soon, and too speculative at this point.'

'But there are two basic points of departure that could guide us. In the first place it is obvious that it is fundamentally under the ANC umbrella that democratic elections will have to be fought, and it would be short-sighted for the party to split the vote. On the other hand, I believe it is desirable for the SACP to actually test, democratically, its support on the ground. We need to look at various possible formulas. For instance, multi-member constituencies as in the Irish system.'

SACP Political Bureau and ANC NEC [National Executive Committee] member Chris Hani recently expressed a similar perspective: 'We (i.e., the ANC and the SACP) could have the same candidates at elections. It might be decided that I should contest a particular seat under the banner of the SACP. However, I am sure there will be a common programme between the ANC and SACP because of shared priorities after a democratic transformation.'

But if the SACP needs the ANC at elections, does the converse apply? Viljoen, for one, thinks not: '...almost by way of divine dispensation, the discrediting of communism as an economic, political and social system has happened worldwide. I think the ANC must have noticed that they are becoming discredited internationally by being virtually the only alleged pro-democratic organisation which is still in the anachronistic stance of supporting what was a very strong Stalinist Communist Party.'

Well, the SACP can derive some comfort from the fact that (dare we say it?) 'almost by way of divine dispensation' the party's popularity on the ground in South Africa is uniquely high. Moreover, in the words of one leading market researcher, 'the pattern of cross-allegiances between the ANC on the one hand, and the SACP on the other indicates that considerable voter confusion could arise if the public association between these organisations broke down.' It might run against the grain of world trends, but here in South Africa, the ANC appears to need the SACP.

What about the longer term? SACP representatives and publications consistently note that the ANC is not a socialist organisation, and that it should be an organisational home for all democratic, patriotic elements who accept its broad programme in the present, whether they are socialists or not. So what happens in the event of a longer-term transition to socialism?

The Sowetan recently posed this question to Hani: 'Surely at some point there will be a logical split between the two, even if they remain allies?' Hani's reply was typically direct: 'Correct. Those are the dynamics of the struggle.'

Other SACP spokespersons have offered a different potential outcome, Cronin points to the Cuban example: 'Fidel Castro and the band of guerillas who launched the Cuban revolution did not necessarily start out as socialists. They were essentially patriots and democrats. At first, the Cuban communists were rather peripheral to the guerilla struggle...After the successful seizure of power, led by Castro's 26 July Movement, a new dynamic set in. The defence of the national democratic revolution, the deepening of its patriotic and democratic content led, in a straight line, towards a socialist transition. This in turn created the conditions for a successful merger of the 26 July Movement and the party.'

According to Cronin, a similar dynamic could develop in South Africa after a democratic transformation. 'One might find the evolution of the ANC into a broad mass socialist party, within which the party merges. This is rather speculative, but it is a possibility which I would favour.'

Whether they are speaking of the longer term, or of the more immediate situation of a developing ANC as it moves towards its national congress, one thing is striking: SACP representatives show very little interest in the kind of red head count that seems most to preoccupy much of the commercial press. One senior party member comments: 'Frankly, from an SACP perspective, it's largely irrelevant if we have 5 or 35 party members on the new ANC NEC due to be elected in June next year. The alliance between our party and congress was not built on board-room manoeuvres in Lusaka, but on the ground over decades in mass struggle.'

'If the ANC is not sufficiently democratised, if it fails to lead active mass struggles, if the working class is not massively present within the structures of the ANC, then the ANC and our alliance are in serious difficulty—whether or not there is a high proportion of party members to non-party members on the incoming ANC NEC.'

* Need for ANC Policy on Media Urged

91AF0342B Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 41-43

[First paragraph is WORK IN PROGRESS introduction; italicized words as published; quotation marks as published]

[Text] *The state has a future media policy. So do the monopolies which own most of the media. So, asks David Niddrie, how long do we wait until the ANC [African National Congress] develops one?*

The idea of a 'media summit' to draw together the formations of the democratic movement and elements of the media itself to formulate a position on the media needs of a democratic South Africa was first mooted early in 1989.

In media circles, where isolated initiatives in this direction were already underway, it was greeted enthusiastically. Largely at the prompting of the Association of Democratic Journalists (ADJ), regional media summit committees were established to begin discussions in preparation for a national media summit, which COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] and the United Democratic Front [UDF] undertook to convene.

Since then...nothing. The regional committees have for the most part withered away and from the centre—from the national convening committee under NEW NATION editor Zwelakhe Sisulu—silence.

The democratic movement is thus moving through a transition period and, presumably, towards a democratic society without an agreed and articulated media policy.

Even on the issue of a possible ANC daily newspaper, there is not agreement. Since 2 February several leading ANC figures have said the movement was planning one; others have said, equally firmly, that it isn't.

Virtually the only clear and uncontradicted statement to emerge from the democratic movement on media in the last nine months is that they think press freedom is 'A Good Thing.'

This is hardly a definitive statement. Virtually without exception, all significant political formations are saying the same thing.

Others, meanwhile, are hard at work to ensure that their views on how the media should look are the ones that dominate in the future.

A task force appointed by president F.W. de Klerk's government is doing it at the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation]. The Media Council, a non-government body established under government pressure by the media industry, is proposing changes to legislation affecting the media. It is doing so without consulting any of the formations likely to have to govern the country in terms of these revised laws.

The Argus company—the country's biggest newspaper group, publishing more than half the newspapers sold in South Africa every day—is also seeking to pre-empt major post-apartheid restructuring of the print media. But with a political vision worthy of a company which took its name from the vigilant, 100-eyed being of Greek mythology, Argus is attempting to do so by making the ANC, and anyone else who may swing some weight after apartheid, an offer it is going to be extremely difficult to refuse.

Before going into the details and implications of these initiatives, it is necessary first to establish what might be considered a definition of press freedom appropriate to the plural political democracy likely to be established in South Africa.

Press freedom is no more than one means of exercising a prior and more general right—that of freedom of expression.

At its most basic, freedom of expression grants to individuals the right to speak freely to their immediate circle of acquaintances.

Denying individuals this right—as the government did for the 30 years prior to the legalisation of the ANC, the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], the SACP [South African Communist Party] etc. on 2 February—can be a powerful political weapon. Ask the man sentenced to three years' imprisonment for writing 'Viva ANC' on his tea-cup at work a few years ago.

But freedom of expression goes further than this localised right.

Communication in South Africa, as in all other large and complex societies, takes place not only by word of mouth, between individuals. Information and opinions are distributed and received via the printed word (newspapers etc.) and by the broadcast media (radio and television).

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human rights recognises the resulting dual dictates of freedom of expression. It acknowledges as a basic human right not only 'the right to freedom of opinion and expression,' but also the right 'to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.'

But equality of access is a crucial yard-stick by which the exercise of any right is judged.

It is on the basis of inequality that most of the world rejected apartheid.

The most graphic demonstration of this is the fact that just over 6-million South Africans have since 1984 enjoyed the right to elect representatives to the tricameral parliament. A further 15-million did not—they enjoyed only the 'right' to elect representatives to some form of Bantustan structure. This was unequal, and the world therefore concluded that democracy did not exist in South Africa.

Applied to freedom of expression, this logic demands that all South Africans enjoy equally the opportunity to express their opinions: both at the level of expressing themselves to their immediate circle and, more broadly, to the audiences available to the national print and broadcasting media structures.

While the 'local' right has arguably existed equally for all South Africans since 2 February (although restrictions,

such as that on advocating communism, remain), no such automatic right of access to the national audience exists.

Every one of the 1.5-million-plus newspapers sold in South Africa every day is published by one of six interlocked companies, which between them also own M-Net, the national news agency, Sapa [South African Press Association] (which they own jointly with SABC), the national newspaper distribution networks, and the country's major paper production plants.

And the four biggest of these companies are controlled, in turn, by South Africa's three corporate giants—Anglo American, Rembrandt and Sanlam—which between them control more than 70 percent of the country's public stock companies.

A handful of 'alternative' or independent media publications have carved for themselves a niche in the media, but the fact remains that they are essentially fringe publications. Argus' THE SOWETAN alone sells more copies every day than all the 'alternatives' combined sell in a week.

Control of broadcasting is even more concentrated, resting almost entirely with the National Party, through SABC.

Access is thus not a right, but a privilege granted on the basis of who the media owners choose to give it to—editors, reporters etc. and who they, in turn select as 'newsworthy.'

As a result, there is little correlation between opinions expressed by the media and those which appear to hold general sway in society—on the issues of sanctions, armed resistance to apartheid, and on the much-debated question of a democratic government's intervention in the economy.

This is not the result of any conspiracy between the owners, editors and reporters.

Harvey Tyson asserted two months before retiring as editor of THE STAR: 'In 17 years as editor...I was not once approached by shareholders, board members or management about editorial (content).' But two decades earlier British political scientist Ralph Miliband had countered a similar argument: 'Editors write what they like because managers like what they write.' Boards of directors, unsurprisingly, appoint editors who agree with them.

We thus currently have a media in which there is no guaranteed right of access, but which, because of its control structures, unintentionally skews national debates.

An appropriate definition of press freedom must thus go beyond simply acknowledging the right of those who own the printing presses and radio and television transmitters to exercise their right of freedom of expression. It

must recognise the need to grant this right to all people through diversification of control.

Because current disparities of access are experienced not by individuals, but sectorally—the opinions and concerns of black people, the working class, women, and rural populations are particularly under-represented as sectors of society—solutions offered must redress the sectoral imbalance, itself primarily the result of apartheid.

But if the specifics of those solutions must come from the contesting parties themselves, on the basis of democratic debate, one final issue must be raised. Why not nationalise? The media is, after all, a national resource like water, electricity the railways or the post office.

State monopoly media do not have a successful history, almost invariably gravitating towards a single perspective view of society, inevitably that of the ruling party—much as the commercial media inevitably speaks the language of those who ultimately control it.

In Eastern Europe their failure to record the growing discontent of society further widened the gulf between ruler and ruled.

And closer to home, in multi-party Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front] rules by popular mandate, the state print and broadcast media is criticised even from within the ruling party as 'his master's voice,' reflecting what the government would like to be, rather than what is.

And in South Africa itself, SABC provides a particularly gross example of state-monopoly broadcasting.

The problem with Cliff Saunders is not that he is biased in favour of the white government and its allies, but that his bias distorts the view he presents of the world.

A democratic alternative to this bias is not bias in the opposite direction, but an accountable and representative broadcasting service.

This, however, is precisely what De Klerk's government is seeking to prevent with the current initiative at SABC.

A government-appointed task force, headed by SABC chief Christo Viljoen and with strong representation from the state intelligence community, has for several months been going through the motions of charting the future of broadcasting in southern Africa (see WIP 69).

Its conclusions are, however, virtually pre-defined: SABC has begun accepting applications for national and regional broadcast licenses—30 have so far been received.

They include M-Net's application for a licence to broadcast news; Bop [Bophutatswana?] TV's application to

broadcast beyond the Bantustan and Soweto; capital Radio and Radio 702 applications for national FM signals.

These are virtually assured, in line with what is now clearly a government policy of privatising as much of the air-waves as is possible. The possibility also exists that some or all of the existing SABC regional stations such as Radio Highveld, and some of the Radio Bantu stations, will be sold off.

Although Pretoria seems currently set to hold on to its national stations (but with several areas of operation contracted out to private producers), the aim is to hand over to an incoming government a state-owned broadcast system whose audience is drastically reduced from the 14-million currently enjoyed by SABC.

And while this may be diversification of ownership of a type, it is of a very special type: SABC is attempting to concentrate the new licenses among already established media institutions.

None of the political or other organisations which have applied (Inkatha reportedly among them) is being considered, according to broadcast industry sources.

And, they add, SABC has or intends to approach Argus, Nasionale Media (the major pro-government publishers) and other major newspaper corporations to ask that they submit applications.

If the newspaper companies do so, and are granted licences, an incoming democratic government would have to contend with multi-sector media giants whose domestic and international influence would make any state attempt to tamper with their enterprises virtually impossible.

Some pre-emptive discouragement is possible, however: the ANC has already announced that privatisation of state corporations will be reversed if and when De Klerk's government is replaced by one of which the ANC forms part.

On broadcasting, the warning could be expanded to include any new licences granted.

In sharp contrast to the SABC 'keep it out of their hands' initiative, Tyson, now a director of Argus which owns THE STAR, has put forward a proposal for co-operation with 'any major, currently historically disadvantaged interest group...to launch their own media' which could substantially ease attempts to redress the imbalance in access to media.

Acknowledging an 'imbalance of resources, of opportunities and of media coverage' and the need to put it right as soon as possible, Tyson told a conference organised by Rhodes University's journalism department: 'I believe the so-called monopolistic press would be more than happy to willingly share a century and a half of effort,

talent, sweat, investment and experience to ensure fairness and balance, equal opportunity and diversity of opinion and analysis.'

This sharing, he said would involve offering to historically disadvantaged interest groups all or any of the following:

- full use of the mainstream printing presses at the same rates as the papers now cost out their own printing. This would be a major concession, for the cost of a single newly imported big press is now prohibitive—as much as R100-million for a large colour press with peripherals;
- equal use of all pooled distribution resources, again at the same rates (usually based on circulation) as the existing dailies and weeklies arrange for themselves;
- training facilities for editorial skills, and advice on newspapering techniques. Everything, in fact, except participation in the emerging press' editorial decisions;
- secondment of newspaper managerial skills;
- circulation expertise and distribution management;
- advertising advice, volunteered free by the agencies;
- Newspaper Press Union membership and its shared facilities;
- Media Council membership.

Tyson stressed that he was speaking in his personal capacity and that his offer was not necessarily formal Argus policy. Since then, however, Tyson has moved on to the Argus board. His general sentiment has, in addition, since been echoed by other Argus executives, and comes after a year-long internal Argus commission 'The Future of Newspapers.'

His proposal is thus one which in all probability carries some weight and is worth considering.

Argus motives are not at issue: arguably, they are attempting to ensure as smooth a possible transformation of the media, and one in which their own structures remain untouched by an incoming government. Considering the sharply contrasting SABC initiative, this is not necessarily something to criticise.

While it would leave the commanding heights of the media in Argus hands it goes a long way to leveling the media playing field, and appears to give any new media initiative—or several for that matter—a reasonable shot at contesting on more-or-less equal terms in the media market place.

In media terms, Tyson's offer appears to be an improved version of what De Klerk offered in national political terms when he offered to negotiate.

One of the problems in responding, however, is the lack of an agreed and comprehensive position from the democratic movement on what it is looking for in a national media.

Until consensus is reached in the democratic movement, it must respond to initiatives such as the Argus' and

SABC's on an ad hoc basis. Such responses as there have been so far to SABC have been based either on a more general opposition to state corporation privatisation, or initiated from outside the leading formations of the democratic movement—from the Film and Allied Workers' Organisation and the Campaign for Open Media. The leading formations of the democratic movement have, themselves, initiated nothing.

And until a media summit takes place, they will be without a policy basis from which to do so.

* Dissidents Disillusioned With ANC Leadership

91AF0460E Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
11 Dec 90 p 4

[Text] Cape Town—ANC [African National Congress] expatriates in Canada are pessimistic about what is going on with the organization in South Africa. It seems to them that the ANC is in the process of unraveling.

This is the impression with which Professor Willie Breytenbach, noted political analyst at the University of Stellenbosch, returned from a visit to Canada. He also talks about a reevaluation of South Africa within that country's government circles.

Prof. Breytenbach was invited by the Canadian government. According to him, this alone is proof of a new approach, since previously the Canadian government had invited primarily ANC-oriented people, not representatives of the South African "establishment."

Prof. Breytenbach said that he spoke with several ANC expatriates. They feel that the ANC's own house is not in order, and are pessimistic about the organization's ability to dictate matters.

The expatriates are not sure whether the ANC is in control of things. It seems to them that President F.W. de Klerk is outmaneuvering the ANC.

They are concerned that the ANC is no longer in a position to dictate everything. It is clear that they overestimated the ANC's abilities, and they are now pessimistic because things are not working out like they believed they should.

The expatriates feel that the ANC leadership in South Africa is too compliant. They want a "win-and-seize-everything situation," like elsewhere in Africa where nationalistic movements have thrown off the colonial yoke. He pointed out to them that that is not possible and that an arrangement will have to be reached, Prof. Breytenbach said.

Prof. Breytenbach said that the Canadian government is beginning to think differently about sanctions, even though it will probably continue to be led by the ANC concerning their lifting.

South Africa has fallen on Canada's agenda of issues and is increasingly becoming a "forgotten problem."

*** Right Wing Attacks Increasing**

91AF0380F Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
15 Nov 90 p 6

[Unattributed article: "'Right Wing' Attack Was Second at Swimming Pool"]

[Text] Today, one of the men who was allegedly assaulted on 22 October of this year near the municipal swimming pool dam at Ermelo is temporarily blind in one eye.

That attack came to the attention of the BEELD yesterday after inhabitants of the village expressed their dissatisfaction the day before yesterday about an incident on Saturday when black people in the village were allegedly scared away from the swimming pool with cowhide whips.

A close investigation showed that apparently another incident had also taken place there.

A spokesman for the police in Eastern Transvaal confirmed yesterday that an assault complaint had been made after Mr. Freddy Mofokeng from Ermelo was assaulted at the dam in front of the municipal swimming pool.

Later, Mr. Mofokeng was transferred to the St. Johns Eye Clinic of the Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto and was recently dismissed. A spokesperson for the hospital confirmed yesterday that Mr. Mofokeng is blind in one eye but that this is temporary in nature and should improve with time.

According to one of the inhabitants, that day she had gone to pick up one of her children at the Sports Center. She saw several men who had gathered at the center, diagonally across from the dam and the swimming pool. She thought that they had gathered there to drive to another place.

While she was in the center, one of her children had called her and told her to come and look because one of the uncles was hitting a black man with a whip.

Another inhabitant who was with the woman, said that she had seen how right wingers on the other side of the dam had called a black man with neon colored swimming trunks out of the dam. She had heard one of them shout: "Come on now, you are F.W. (president De Klerk)'s child, aren't you?"

A man who had driven by at the time of the attack, said yesterday that he had seen the men hit the black man. As for the men involved in the attack, they apparently said later that they had hit the man because he had been provocative and naked. According to the inhabitant he had definitely been wearing swimming trunks.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of the village expressed their concern yesterday about the image of Ermelo being carried abroad.

"We are actually too afraid to open our mouths, because there is a kind of reign of terror going on. But all those who live here do not agree with what is going on in the village and we want people to know that," said a man.

*** CP Objects to Indians in Pretoria White Areas**

91AF0393E Johannesburg BEELD
in Afrikaans 28 Nov 90 p 21

[Report: "CP [Conservative Party]-Member of Parliament disturbed by Indians' Requests"]

[Text]It is normal procedure for the city council involved, the M.P. [Member of Parliament], and immediate neighbors in an area to be asked for commentary when a Colored person requests permission to live in a White residential area, says Mr. Nico van Rensburg, territorial ordinance director at the Department of Local Government, Housing and Public Works.

Mr. van Rensburg furnished commentary after Mr. Joseph Chiole, CP-M.P. for West Pretoria, told BEELD that he and the Pretoria city council were not asked for commentary on the requests of about 40 Indians to be able to live in the White residential areas Erasmia and Christoburg.

The department has already approved 17 requests from Indians to live in those two areas. Another 20 requests or so apparently are being considered by the department now.

Erasmia and Christoburg border Laudium—the existing Indian residential area of Pretoria.

According to Mr. Chiole, the CP was shocked that those requests were approved, especially because the development of Lotus Gardens—the extension of Laudium—is proceeding well.

He believes that this is a public defiance of the wishes of the community. It is expected that the first Indian families will start moving in next week.

Mr. Chiole said that earlier this month he and three residents of those two residential areas talked with Mr. Amie Venter, the Minister of Local Government and Budget in the Parliament, about the matter. During those discussions Minister Venter was told that the granting of permits to Coloreds to live in Erasmia and Christoburg is against the wishes of most of the residents.

According to Mr. Chile that will lead to racial mixing and friction, and a "spontaneous reaction" might arise among the White inhabitants to protect their community life and rights.

The CP also submitted a petition against the granting of permits, signed by almost 900 residents, to the department.

Mrs. Ansie van Vuuren, National Party city council member for District 4—which includes Erasmia and Christoburg—said she was happy that the first permits were granted to Indians.

She said that the new South Africa is being worked on now. For a long time already, Indians have shown an interest in buying houses in Erasmia and Christoburg, because currently there is a great shortage of housing in Laudium.

"Any person, regardless of his color, is welcome here if he or she will cooperate in making District 4 a better place for all the inhabitants."

Mrs. van Vuuren, a real estate agent, also challenged CP supporters in the district not to sell their homes to Indians.

The city council of Pretoria, which is controlled by the NP [National Party], decided already earlier this year to consider on their merits all requests by Coloreds to live in White areas in the city.

* UDF Leaders Discuss Future Role

* Popo Molefe's View

91AF0399A Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION* in English 6 Dec 90 p 7

[Interview with UDF National Secretary Popo Molefe; date and place not given]

[Text] Popo Molefe is the United Democratic Front's (UDF) national secretary, deputy chairperson of the African National Congress (ANC) in the Pretoria-Witswatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region and chairperson of the Alexandra ANC.

[NEW NATION] Conditions have changed since 2 February when organisations were unbanned and there is a general feeling that the UDF has no place in the current situation. What's your comment on this.

[Molefe] It is true that conditions have changed and that there are these debates taking place. I think we should say that there is another school of thought which says that the UDF has a role. But it is a different role to the one that it has been playing up until 2 February. You need to have a UDF but a transformed UDF. I will come back to this later. Prior to 2 February, the UDF played a dual role. That of a Front co-ordinating a range of organisations opposed to the government's constitutional reforms as well as the laws that related to local government. But it also played the role of political central stage. Since there was no visible presence of the ANC, the UDF found itself playing that role. Circumstances in which the ANC has been legalised, one expects that we should rightfully take the role of political leadership. It must clearly play that role in the national democratic struggle that is unfolding in our country. However, it would seem like, for many people, the UDF

was a mere stand-in for the ANC. Perhaps it was, because there was a preponderance of ANC supporters or members within the UDF when it was launched. But apart from that you know we, the patrons of UDF, are mainly drawn from the leadership of the ANC and in particular, the Rivonia trialists. Now to that extent, I mean people probably thought that the UDF was just another ANC. The other factor that could have added to this view would have been the adoption of the Freedom Charter by the UDF in 1987 and the majority of its affiliates even prior to 1987.

[NEW NATION] What is the strategic objective of the UDF?

[Molefe] Our strategy is that of national democratic struggle and our strategic objective is that of attaining power. The strategic objective is for the transference of power, from the minority to the majority. Now, for a long time we have accepted that if that strategic goal has to be obtained, there will be a need on the part of the leading forces fighting for freedom to harness in that struggle which we termed the national democratic struggle. To unite our people nationally, be it that they are African people, but also draw in the Indian and coloured people as well as democratic whites in that struggle. Our struggle extends beyond provincialism, or regionalism. It is also a struggle that is not partisan. Whilst at the head of it is the ANC, but harnessed in that struggle are all forces that are opposed to apartheid and seek a non-racial democratic society.

Some of us believe that those organisations and individuals who are drawn into the national democratic struggle but nonetheless remain sceptical about participation as members of the ANC would be lost to the struggle if at this point in time, you consider dissolving the UDF. The UDF provides a home for them and an opportunity to participate in that struggle. But it also suggests that the continuing existence of the UDF especially in the changed conditions where we could perhaps look at the possibility of adopting a new kind of principle, we should broaden the UDF such that it could draw in other forces. A transformed UDF has a potential of virtually drawing all those forces into this broad front. This means that if we agree that when the ANC takes its rightful place as a vanguard of the struggle that would require of the UDF to scale down its political involvement. Those who fear being associated with high and radical politics would have no reason to refuse to be part of the Front—they would feel more at home in participating in the activities of the Front. In that way, we would then have the opportunity to broaden the Front.

[NEW NATION] Could you list some of the challenges facing UDF now and in the future?

[Molefe] We are in a situation where prospects favour an ANC government and this could happen in circumstances in which our country and our society is characterized by extreme inequalities: homelessness and lack of access to education.

There are also inequalities in respect of health care facilities. We are faced with masses and masses of black people who have no skills because they have no access to technical education; the economy of the country is largely in the hands of the whites, no black entrepreneurs, we have no participation at an active level.

We are faced with the local government structures which are collapsing and we do not have amongst our civic structures people qualified in local government planning, management and administration equipped with technical skills in terms of provision of services and so on.

Now, clearly therefore, concurrent with the collapse of apartheid is an urgent challenge of development and reconstruction. And that is a challenge that does not only fall squarely on the shoulders of the ANC but upon the entire democratic movement. If you look at our past before 2 February, all of us—the ANC, UDF and indeed all other anti-apartheid forces—emphasised the whole question of protest. Criticising the apartheid regime, pinpointing its weaknesses, the inadequacies of its policies and programmes. We are not proactive and that stage was necessary because we had to show how illegitimate the regime was. And to show its lack of concern in respect of the interests of its people. But now the situation has changed. These very problems that the apartheid system is facing today—are now going to be bequeathed to the ANC. We can't say the same things that we said at the time of the apartheid rule. Neither can the ANC do so. All of us are now required to be proactive now. The address squarely the question of development and construction. We think therefore that rather than talking simplistically, and in a very emotional and romantic way about the dissolution of the UDF, we should look at the three questions that I have addressed. What is our strategic goal; which strategy will attain that goal and what are the current challenges facing us in the current phase of our struggle?

[NEW NATION] You stated three questions which have to be addressed by the UDF. If the organisation has to continue, what should be its role in the current period?

[Molefe] We suggest that the UDF should increasingly look at the possibility of uniting organisations along sectoral lines—like building strong sectors in health, education, legal, business and civic centre. Each one of those areas being addressed in the most critical and concrete way, particularly the whole question of the needs in that field.

If you look, for instance, at the health and the health fund, you would no longer have doctors merely criticising the inadequacies of the health system in this country. They would actually formulate policy to remedy the problem but at the same time look concretely at addressing how many doctors are needed and what are the priorities in that regard in each area in the long-term and short-term, what is that we can do to make available medical treatment to people who are deprived.

We could also look at the area of people in the squatter and in the rural areas. That is where we could begin to develop a programme where we will actually have committed doctors developing a programme that will enable us to send people periodically into those areas to assist them. On the education front, you have people developing policy proposals but at the same time a programme of producing manpower that we need in the areas; check how many young people must be trained as technicians. We then target a period of ten years and we say within this period, this is the number of technicians that must have been produced to meet the demands of our industrial growth and higher productivity—which is our main goal. As I say we are dropping off the distribution of resources—we are talking of the need to raise the quality of life of our people.

* Paul Mashatile: Options

91AF0399B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 6 Dec 90 p 7

[Text] The UDF [United Democratic Front] has fulfilled the objectives it was founded on and it was now time that it disbanded and freed some of the key political activists who still serve in its structures.

This view, expressed by the UDF's Southern Transvaal secretary, Paul Mashatile, represents the other side to the debate on whether the UDF should continue existing or should disband.

It is a view that is rapidly gaining ground amongst activists, many of whom are frustrated at having to belong to a duplication of structures that often blunts their effectiveness.

The view rests on a number of considerations, chief of which are that;

- With the unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress] the UDF must assume a lower political profile and must give way to the ANC as the leader of the struggle.
- Numerous former affiliates of the UDF, notably the youth and women's formations have now collapsed into ANC auxiliary organisations.
- The UDF has completed its growth circle and cannot hope to attract a groundswell of support outside its traditional support base.
- The prospect of a National Civic body to co-ordinate the work of civic associations countrywide renders the UDF irrelevant.

Concern has also been expressed that with structures performing more or less the same tasks, scanty resources are wasted instead of being channelled towards the building of the ANC.

There is however unanimity in that in the event of a UDF dissolution, there would still be a need for the formation of a national co-ordinating structure outside of the ANC.

Mashatile summarises the debate for dissolution: "The UDF was formed around specific objectives and these objectives have now been met and the time is right for the UDF to disband."

"The disbanding of the Front must however be viewed positively because we achieved a lot through it and created the necessary base from which the ANC could organise."

Mashatile typifies the dilemma that faces many activists because he also doubles up as the ANC's organiser in Alexandra.

"Many of our people have moved into the ANC, helping to build the organisation. We need these kinds of people with the type of experience they have. The problem is, with the continuing existence of the Front, many activists have to play doubles roles when what should happen is that energies must be concentrated in the ANC."

"We are going through a transformation phase whose implications are that we must move from protest politics to politics of reconstruction."

"I accept that there may be areas of political work that the ANC may not be able to reach at this stage—but for that we need an entirely new co-ordinating structure," he added.

He rejects the suggestion that one possible option for the front is to change its character and perhaps begin to play the role of national co-ordination within the civics, noting: The UDF is not in a position to play that role because of its narrow political limitations.

"By adopting the Freedom charter we in the Front aligned ourselves with a particular political position and so created a limitation for ourselves. To do the kind of work such as national co-ordination we would need a structure that is seen to be broader than the Front."

"The Front's key personnel and activists on the ground are too closely identified with a particular position and this would increase the difficulty of shedding its past identity."

"The way towards that necessarily entails publicly dissolving the present structure and initiating a new one."

"If we do not do that then we will be seen as taking the UDF with its character intact to do a different type of work."

In arguing for a politically non-aligned new structure, Mashatile makes it clear that he is not proposing the depoliticisation of local structures such as the civics.

On the contrary, he says, a non-aligned co-ordinating structure for all civics would obtain a solid base that would cut across ideological positions and this would benefit all communities.

The dissolution of the Front and its replacement with a different structure is becoming urgent, he says.

"When we call on councillors to resign we cannot do this in a vacuum, there must be a structure in place—but that structure should not be the UDF," concludes Mashatile.

* Symbol of 'Boer Humiliation' Target of Bombings

91AF0457A Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
6 Dec 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Their Bombs Planted for These Reasons"]

[Text] The bomb at Melrose House in Pretoria was planted because it is a monument to British imperialism in South Africa and not a monument to the Boer struggle.

The Treaty of Vereeniging, which is commemorated by Melrose House, was the Boers' "greatest humiliation" yet, Mr. Piet "Skiet" Rudolph testified yesterday in a request for bail before Johannesburg Regional Court, referring to reasons for the bombing last 23 May and for four others in Transvaal.

Together with Mr. Henk Bredenhann of Heidelberg, his deputy commander, he faces six charges of terrorism.

The reason for the bombings on 22 June at the NP [National Party] office in Roodepoort and Auckland Park, Johannesburg, was the fact that Mr. Roelf Meyer, NP member of parliament for West Johannesburg, and Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe, NP member of parliament for Helderkruijn, were in the process of negotiating with the African National Congress [ANC].

Later, while in custody, he wrote the two men requesting a pardon.

The bombing on 26 May at the offices of the Food and Allied Workers Union in Rustenburg can be attributed to the fact that ANC freely recruited members there—in Rustenburg, the "cradle of Boer resistance."

He also acknowledged that the flag of the late South African Republic was raised at the British Embassy in Pretoria and that shots were fired at the building because the British at that point were making the first moves in favor of the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela.

Mr. Rudolph forgot about the bombing of BEELD's offices in Johannesburg, but he quickly corrected his error. "I am not terribly angry with BEELD," he said jokingly.

The bomb was planted because he believes that BEELD, in conjunction with the Security Police, ran a report on a forged letter in which he requests protection, "is seeking shelter from the Zulus," and said that he wants to negotiate with the "traitor" F.W. de Klerk. This made him a traitor as well.

All these were "symbolic acts," he testified, adding that all possible precautions were taken to keep anyone from being injured.

Mr. Bredenhann later testified that he personally saw to it that no one was around at the time of the bombings.

They also did not use timers to ignite the explosives; rather, they used the shortest possible fuses so that no one might be injured accidentally.

* BVB Maps Out Homeland Boundaries

91AF0457B Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
8 Dec 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Boer Freedom Movement's National State Has a Conservative Party Complexion"]

[Text] The map for a Boer national state recently released by the Boer Freedom Movement (BVB) shows great similarities to thinking within the Conservative Party about what a white national state should be.

Places such as Pretoria, Vanderbijlpark, Vereeniging, Boksburg, Brakpan, Benoni, Kempton Park, and Krugersdorp fall inside the "territorial outline," but Johannesburg and Soweto are cut out of it. Durban and Cape Town are also excluded.

The BVB studied six areas, including Professor Carel Boshoff's "Westland model." In the area that the BVB deems most acceptable, there are 2.72 million whites, compared to 2.9 million nonwhites.

The peculiar boundaries extend from the Strand in Cape Province in a narrow strip along the coast up to Port Elizabeth. From there, a narrow corridor shoots into the interior through Graaff-Reinet, Noupoot, and Bloemfontein, up to Vanderbijlpark.

The eastern Transvaal constitutes the largest single block, with a thin finger extending to Richards Bay, and further north a crooked finger passing through Kruger National Park and Phalaborwa to Tzaneen. Furthermore, a southwestern Transvaal block and a north-western Transvaal block are connected to Pretoria through narrow strips.

The BVB regards this state as remarkable, and believes that it will be able to have a lasting government and economy.

The BVB rejected Prof. Boshoff's model as the one least suitable for a national state.

Prof. Boshoff reacted by saying that it is a healthy phenomenon to have different proposals on the table. However, he believes that the "terribly long borders" on the BVB's map bring with them numerous problems, including the difficulty of keeping the infrastructure in place.

Mr. Jaap Marais, leader of the Reconstituted National Party, said that the idea of a national state is theoretically attractive, but that it is "actually a departure from reality."

The only realistic way to get a state like this is through violence. He does not believe that the people who are making these proposals are serious about the methods for attaining them.

The political and constitutional-law aspects have not been thought through in the least. Such proposals by people who do not go before the electorate as political parties simply become points of contention and divisive factors that obstruct the tasks of political parties.

Mr. Robert van Tonder, leader of the Boer State Party, also rejected the proposals because it gives certain areas away on the basis of demographic factors.

He demands the Boer republics, which historically are the legal property of the Boers. The exclusion of Johannesburg in particular is unacceptable because according to him the Witwatersrand and Johannesburg have a greater concentration of Boers than Pretoria.

The BVB's map was drawn up by a "territorial outline task force" under the leadership of Dr. Wally Grant. Professor Alkmaar Swart, leader of the BVB, also served on the task force. The BVB broke away from the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] last year after the Jani Allan incident.

The four months of research conducted by the task force to establish the borders was, according to the BVB, "unequaled in terms of depth and scope and scientific content."

* Islamic Party Issues Draft Manifesto

91AF0595B Cape Town MUSLIM VIEWS in English
Dec 90 p 12

[Text]

A. FAITH:

1. That there is one God who is the Lord of the Universe, of mankind and of everything that exists. He has no partner, neither does He give birth, nor is He born. He has no beginning nor ending and is eternal. He is nearer to man than his jugular vein. He is All-Powerful, All-Hearing and All-Knowing. He is the Most Beneficent, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful.

2. That there exist Angels who interface with God and man. Angels such as Jibreel and Mika-eel.

3. That Prophets and Messengers have been sent to various peoples at various times. Prophets such as Adam, Ebrahim, Musa, Isa and Muhammad (SAW).

4. That revelations to the Prophets are recorded in the Holy Books. Original books such as the Torah of Musa, Zabur of Dawood, the Injeel of Isa and the Qur'an of Muhammad (SAW).

5. That after death, our souls will be placed in a state of suspension. That there will be a day sometime in the future when the whole universe will be destroyed. Afterwards all people will be resurrected and will be judged on the Day of Judgement. That their good deeds and bad deeds will be weighed and those with a preponderance of good deeds will be sent to paradise wherein they will dwell forever. Those with a preponderance of evil will dwell in hell temporarily and with Allah's mercy be allowed to enter paradise afterwards. That those in paradise will be able to see the ultimate vision, that Allah will remove the veil and man will be able to see the Lord face to face for the first time.

6. The entire creation is under the direction and control of Allah. No event, whether small or large, can take place without His will or knowledge.

7. That the definition of what is good and evil has been revealed and that there should be no dispute in this.

B. MORALITY AND PRINCIPLES:

1. That the following moral values should be encouraged; peace, brotherhood, justice, mercy, forgiveness, compassion, honesty, trust, humility, simplicity, moderation, freedom, responsibility, equality, equity, patience, perseverance, prayer, truth, steadfastness, tolerance, courtesy, charity, kindness, etc.

2. That the following evils should be discouraged and eliminated from society. Evils such as greed, exploitation, theft, crime, injustice, opportunism, dishonesty, jealousy, envy, inequality, intolerance, hatred, racism, not fulfilling obligations, shirking responsibility, lewdness, promiscuity, disease, starvation, intoxication, etc.

3. That spiritual, moral and material values should be the basis of society and not material values alone. That man will never find peace until he accepts this fact.

4. That there should be a constant striving to do good and to refrain from evil.

5. The party membership shall be open to people of all religions and races who subscribe to the party's constitution.

6. The party is opposed to political, state and criminal violence. That tolerance of each other's political views must be encouraged and intimidation discouraged.

C. POLITICAL POLICY:

1. The party is totally opposed to apartheid and all other forms of discrimination.

2. The party supports the negotiation process with the existing government. However, a reasonable time period should be agreed to until negotiations are finalised.

3. All South Africans should have a vote of equal value.

4. The party accepts that the rights of minorities should be protected in terms of religion, language and culture.

5. The party supports a system of multi-party democracy with regular elections and proportional representation.

6. That the party does not accept the system of "the winner takes all." That the new constitution should ensure that laws should be passed in parliament in proportion to a party's support to ensure that each vote carries equal value.

7. The party believes in the de-concentration of political power to prevent any abuse of power. One method of achieving this is through a geographical federation.

8. A Bill of Rights determining all the human rights, entrenched in the constitution and enforced by the courts and not violating the Shariah.

9. The party recognises the independence of institutions such as the judiciary, the press, and broadcasting if they are subject to the moral policy Islam.

D. ECONOMIC POLICY:

1. The party deems it imperative that the economy should be a free enterprise, free market system with private property rights. A multi-party democracy can never work without the freedoms mentioned above. The values to be promoted are efficiency, equity, growth, stability, freedom and equality of opportunity. These rights should be restricted only to the extent that they harm public interest.

2. The market should however be optimally regulated to discourage exploitation, opportunism, monopolies, gambling, leveraging, etc.

3. The state should provide the goods or services which the private sector is incapable of providing or provide subsidisation.

4. Broad planning and management of the economy should be undertaken to encourage growth and equity and to minimise inflation and unemployment.

5. Property rights should be protected and entrenched. Human rights without property rights are meaningless.

6. Reparations should be paid by those who enriched themselves by means of apartheid in the form of a general wealth tax to correct past injustices perpetrated under apartheid. The rate and period of this tax could be negotiable.

7. The above tax as well as loans should then finance development of the underprivileged in the following spheres: education, training, job creation, food, health, housing, informal and small business sector, etc.

8. Nationalisation of or the dismembering of large corporations will lead to inefficiency, wastefulness, bankruptcy, corruption, bureaucracy, red-tape, stagnation, technological backwardness, loafing, shirking, etc. We believe that market forces should determine the optimal size, ownership and control of corporations and not political forces. Redistribution of wealth should rather be done through taxation, investment in education and training, redistributing opportunities, growth, discouraging extravagant consumption, etc.

9. There is enough land for everyone. People who were dispossessed because of group areas, homelands, etc., should have their land returned where possible, otherwise fair compensation should be paid.

10. If individuals require unused land for development which land is privately owned by other individuals, companies or authorities, then the state should expropriate this land in return for the original price paid. The land should then be sold or donated to the individual depending on financial circumstances.

11. That the state should be a welfare state which is necessary to eliminate poverty and to minimise inequality.

12. Some examples of extravagant consumption should be prohibited and others discouraged by means of a progressive sales tax.

13. All types of regulations inhibiting the informal economy and small businesses should be eliminated or minimised subject to public interest.

14. The party regards both labour and capital as necessary for the functioning of the economy. That labour and capital are symbiotic and that their returns should be determined in an open and fair market. That labour and capital should be co-operative and not adversative.

15. That anyone should be free to join a trade union of his/her choice. That workers should have the right to withhold labour and to strike. That workers should refrain from intimidating other workers or destroying the property of businesses.

16. A department of consumer affairs should be instituted to protect consumers from shoddy workmanship, exploitation, opportunism, etc.

E. SOCIAL POLICY:

1. The family is the basic unit of society. The increasing problem of promiscuity, venereal diseases, AIDS, unmarried mothers, abortions, illegitimate children and prostitution should be tackled with greater conviction. The large-scale breakdown in family life can only lead to social disintegration, crime, poverty, etc.

2. Crime must be brought under control and minimised. Criminals should be punished severely as an effective deterrent. At the same time, socio-economic conditions which breed criminals should be changed. Unemployed

young people roaming the streets in gang infested areas should therefore be sent to government work camps.

3. Intoxicants and dangerous substances such as alcohol, drugs and cigarettes should not be supplied at all. Alcohol causes the largest proportion of crimes and road accidents. Drug addiction leads to crime and possible death. Smoking contributes to cancer and heart failure.

4. That the rights of women shall be equal to that of men. That women should be encouraged to play a greater role in society and government.

5. Hunger, starvation and malnutrition should be eradicated. People who are able-bodied and are unemployed should be employed in government work programmes. If this is not possible, then a government financed unemployment scheme should be instituted.

6. That the protection of the environment should be balanced with development needs.

7. That affordable education of a minimum standard should be provided to all people. That any discrepancies in spending should be eliminated over a reasonable period, say five years. That the foundation of the wealth of this country should rest on education and work skills. That education should be restructured to gear it more productively to the needs of the economy.

8. That the minimum shelter in the form of "site and service" schemes should be made available to those who cannot afford formal housing. That they can use these sites to erect informal structures as a starting point. In this way people would be able to urbanise in an orderly manner. That the government should provide housing to people who can afford formal housing in the lower income groups.

9. That a minimum level (affordable) of health facilities and services should be provided by public hospitals.

* Right Wing Plea: Black, Boer Demands Similar

91AF0457E Johannesburg VRYE WEEKBLAD in Afrikaans 7 Dec 90 p 5

[Report by Pearlle Joubert: "Rudolph Still Ready to Die"]

[Text] "A Boer's word is his honor."

This is what Piet "Skiet" Rudolph's attorney, Jack Nel, said yesterday before Johannesburg Magistrate Court, asking that Rudolph be released on bail and saying that he will not disappear again.

This week, Rudolph described himself in court as a "Boer" and "freedom fighter," "an honest, selfless, and fearless person" who is ready to die for the freedom of the Boer nation.

The court proceedings were attended by as many security policemen as family members of Rudolph, as well as his co-defendant, Cornelius Bredenhann.

Both requested bail after they were arrested last week under Article 29 of the Domestic Security Act. They are currently in custody facing six charges of terrorism.

A bearded Rudolph, wearing khaki clothes, said that he "wore out the constitutional path" for making the government aware of the demands of the Boer nation.

"For that reason, there was no option other than violence later on."

He said that the Boer nation and blacks are "in exactly the same situation" because of the government's refusal to recognize their demands.

Rudolph and Bredenhann are charged with robbery and the bombings of the National Party offices and of the Melrose House in Pretoria. According to Rudolph, the bombs were planted in such a way that no one would be injured, and the targets were chosen for their "symbolic value."

* MK Leader Discusses Present, Future Role

91AF0595A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 11-17 Jan 91 p 10

[Interview with MK [Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe)] commander Joe Modise; date and place not specified]

[Text] The complete return of exiles is something expected to happen possibly in the next few months.

And a considerable number of these, in particular within the ANC [African National Congress], are cadres of its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).

The ANC leadership has pointed out that MK will continue to recruit and upgrade itself until a new army for the country has been formed. The question here is what is going to happen to the MK cadres when other exiles return.

FACE THE NATION discussed this and other MK related issues with its commander, Joe Modise.

Modise charged the government with breaching the Pretoria Minute by plotting to seize MK's hardware inside the country during its Operation Sentry.

"All weaponry belonging to MK and what is to happen to it is, at present, being discussed by the appropriate working group established in terms of the Pretoria Minute," he said.

He warned that MK cadres would "defend themselves in instances where they are being hunted down like criminals."

NEW NATION: Can you talk about the difficulties and the facilities that the ANC leadership had when it built MK?

Joe Modise: The difficulties are quite obvious. At the time MK was formed, 1961, Africans were not allowed to handle firearms. This means that among the men who started MK none had any knowledge in the use of ammunition.

The first training that took place was that of teaching people to use explosives, since at that time, our targets were railway lines, power stations and government installations rather than the taking of lives.

NEW NATION: When did you start to realise that you could go as far as to take life?

Joe Modise: Well, one of the reasons why we did not want to take life was the lack of that skill among our cadres.

Those skills came later from members of the organisation who were white. That was when we started working more closely with the Congress of Democrats and the SACP [South African Communist Party], whose large memberships were white.

We also sent some of our comrades abroad to acquire these skills, but even then we had a problem of coming back into South Africa to launch any attacks.

And that was because all countries surrounding South Africa were still under colonial rule and had good relationships with the South African regime."

The nearest independent country was Tanzania.

Quite a number of our people were arrested in Botswana, coming or leaving through that route.

Later, around 1966, after we had realised that it would be difficult to leave from Tanzania to South Africa through Mozambique, we entered into talks with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu) which was, at that time, engaged in war against the Rhodesian regime from Lusaka in Zambia.

They agreed to assist us on our way through Zimbabwe. We also anticipated that whilst moving through with Zapu guerrillas our cadres could have to defend themselves whenever confronted by the Rhodesian army.

NEW NATION: What prompted a deal with Zapu: was it because of dissatisfaction among some cadres who were not happy with fighting outside South Africa?

Joe Modise: You know it is not easy to cover such a long distance without knowing the place, without knowing the languages spoken there and without knowing the people. You have to rely on support from people on the ground.

And, in fact, the agreement was that we would go with them and some would break in the Wankie area and some would go further south to the Limpopo River where our units would cross into South Africa and the Zapu forces would remain inside the Zimbabwean territory.

Unfortunately our cadres had to fight in Wankie when they came across the Rhodesian army. Our cadres together with the Zapu forces fought from Wankie, right across Zimbabwe to Botswana.

Some were arrested in Botswana without firing a shot, because we had given them strict instructions that should they escape to that country they should not confront the Botswana troops.

But some comrades managed to reach South Africa while some were arrested on arrival after they have made mistakes such as going home and so on.

NEW NATION: We understand that MK also fought in Angola against Unita [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. What were the circumstances there?

Joe Modise: The operations in Angola were merely defensive ones. It had not been our intention to go and fight against Unita, because we always regarded the conflict in Angola as one between Angolans and therefore a local affair.

But, unfortunately, during our movements between our several camps, we ran into ambushes with Unita.

NEW NATION: Did they know that you were not part of the Angolan army?

Joe Modise: Yes they knew because they had been observing us. We stayed in an area which was known by everybody that it was being used by ANC people.

I think the other reason why they attacked us was because they had South African soldiers among them. The inhabitants of the areas they occupied and the people we captured during the operations would tell us this. So, we are sure beyond doubt that Unita attacked us on the instructions of the South Africans.

NEW NATION: How were such self-defence operations carried out, because we understand they also sparked off dissatisfaction among cadres who did not wish to fight outside South Africa?

Joe Modise: We had to choose between two things: closing our camps in Angola and coming back home, because Unita would destroy them and kill all of us, or defending the camps and ourselves.

NEW NATION: Shifting a little to the future of MK: our neighbouring states are currently fighting to improve their economies and almost all of them need South Africa. What would happen to MK if those countries asked MK to leave in order to gain economic assistance from South Africa?

Joe Modise: Let me, first of all, tell you that MK started inside the country and even now is still recruiting and training people inside the country. So there is no question of us having nowhere to go. We will come back home.

You will also recall that our people have been shot dead and arrested in Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho whilst on their way to South Africa.

But we carried on and staged spectacular operations against the regime during that period.

And I want to believe that these countries, in spite of the economic difficulties that they encounter, also have a commitment. They want to see South Africa free.

It is their duty as members of the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) and of the Frontline States to support the liberation struggle in South Africa.

Therefore, just as much as it is our business, it is also the business of the whole of Africa.

NEW NATION: What will happen when the exiles return? Will the cadres return as well?

Joe Modise: The bulk of our army will not come to South Africa before the question of apartheid has been resolved. Some cadres who have skills in organisational work will come home to perform political functions.

NEW NATION: Will the remaining of some not spark off dissatisfaction?

Joe Modise: We believe not. Our soldiers know it very well that their ultimate goal is the total liberation of this country.

NEW NATION: There has been a statement made by most ANC leaders make [as printed] that "MK exists among the people." Is that statement not amounting to rhetoric if we take into account that people are being maimed everyday and there is no visible MK to defend them?

Joe Modise: No, it is not rhetoric. MK lives among the people. If that was not the case, we would have long been defeated by the regime. And that is the reason why the regime has spent millions of rands to try and pay spies to neutralise our cadres.

NEW NATION: What role has MK played in defending the people in instances of violence such as the recent cases of Natal and the Reef?

Joe Modise: We have said so on several occasions that MK will have to defend our people if the state fails to do so.

Our notice from our consultative conference is clear. We shall be compelled to reconsider the Pretoria agreement and resume armed action if the state does not stop this violence.

We will resume bringing into the country our men and material to defend our people.

Inkatha elements, which we believe are behind all these things, are financed by the system. Their policemen are trained by the state and cannot exist without the government's assistance.

NEW NATION: Do you then see any prospects of peace between the ANC and Inkatha?

Joe Modise: If we could suspend hostilities against the regime, there is nothing that stops us from negotiating peace with Inkatha.

But we are told that the problem will only be resolved if there is a meeting between our deputy-president, Nelson Mandela and Gatsha [Buthelezi].

We seem to believe that there is a sinister motive behind that meeting. We in fact have concluded that that sort of meeting is not for Buthelezi's gain, but for the regime's.

NEW NATION: The experience in our neighbouring states is that after freedom some excombatants find difficulties securing jobs because they have no skills and others may not even be integrated into the regular army for reasons such as education. What precautions is the ANC taking to reintegrate the excombatants into the society?

Joe Modise: We are trying to do everything in our power to help these people. We are aware of the problems of our neighbours and we will learn with their experiences.

We are also aware that apart from qualities to belong to a regular army some of our cadres may not necessarily be willing to live as soldiers. They will want to return to private life.

We will set up organisations and appeal to the international community to assist us with means to get them employed.

NEW NATION: In what kind of military skills is the MK personnel trained?

Joe Modise: MK men have been trained in air, sea and ground warfare. And we are training them in the use of the most modern material.

NEW NATION: Did not the changes in the Eastern Europe—where we believe MK trained its cadres and acquired its material—jeopardise these processes of training and acquiring material?

Joe Modise: It has not. We still have effective access to training and material in some of those countries.

NEW NATION: How will the defence units operate? Will the people hand over the assailants to the police, thus assisting the state to fight crime and other issues, or will there be people's courts to try the assailants? And if there will be people's courts will there be a uniform code of conduct to ensure that there are no different sentences for similar crimes?

Joe Modise: I think that question will be better answered by the structures on the ground. Not only the ANC, but the community formations as a whole.

MK will merely assist in the formation of the units.

NEW NATION: The police recently claimed to have arrested some ANC members for alleged involvement in a bank robbery in Durban. Is that true?

Joe Modise: I have also heard about that, but I do not have the full facts. And I am not saying any individual member could not have been involved in the crime. We have a lot of policemen and members of the SA [Republic of South Africa] army who have been involved in crime, we cannot hold the whole government responsible for one thief in the SA Defence Force or a few murderers in the SA Police.

The ANC has not given instructions to anybody to be involved in acts of crime.

But the state's argument that the use of AK-47's in robberies means that the involvement of our cadres is completely unacceptable.

The government itself has thousands of AK-47's they confiscated from us over the years. Thousands more were captured in Angola and Namibia.

Where are those arms? Were they destroyed? And anybody who has money can now buy from the Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] bandits. If De Klerk is going to use this excuse of criminals to haunt our people there may be a derailment of the talks.

*** Extreme Right Wing Group Accepts Negotiations**

91AF0595C Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English
6 Jan 91 p 2

[Text] The white extremist organisation Orde Boerevolk (OB) has renounced violence and opted for negotiation after a meeting between the OB central committee and its arrested leaders, Piet "Skiet" Rudolph and Henk Bredenhann.

In a statement to Sapa yesterday the OB said the meeting, organised by Sandton security police last Thursday, was held to appoint an interim OB leadership and discuss a letter written by Rudolph to President F.W. de Klerk.

Other issues discussed were the OB's stand concerning negotiations with the government and the formulation of its demands.

According to the statement the central committee decided to abandon violence as a means to secure an independent Boer state.

The organisation said its members met the security police to discuss ways of recovering weapons stolen at

Air Force headquarters in Pretoria during a raid by Rudolph over the Easter weekend last year.

The OB pledged to call on all its members to return weapons taken during Rudolph's arms heist.

The statement added this call should make it clear the OB would no longer commit acts of violence in the present political climate and expected the government to accept it had chosen the negotiations path.

Police spokesman Major Ray Harrauld told Sapa the police welcomed the statement by the leadership of the OB concerning violence.

Maj Harrauld added the police were "very pleased" by the appeal of the OB leaders for the return of the firearms stolen from the Air Force headquarters and still in possession of some of its members.

Maj Harrold said: "We trust that the followers of the Orde Boerevolk will heed the request made by their leaders and that the weapons concerned and any other illegal weaponry will be handed over to the SAP [South African Police] without any further delay."

According to the statement, the central committee decided negotiations with the government would be the OB's future strategy, so as to safeguard "our nation's freedom."

It added it expected the government to accept this decision and start negotiating with the OB.

The organisation also demanded the immediate release of its leaders, Piet "Skiet" Rudolph, Henk Bredenhann, and Dirk Ackerman, and that all "Boere freedom fighters" be granted indemnity from prosecution.

It said a letter had been written to President de Klerk explaining Rudolph's views on violence and negotiations with the government.

It had been written at the meeting to appoint Kallie Bredenhann of Heidelberg as acting OB leader, Coenraad Vermaak, also of Heidelberg, as his deputy, and Chris Beetge of Pretoria as publicity secretary.—Sapa

* Secrecy of Broederbond Challenged

91AF0395D Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 6 Dec 90 p 10

[Interview with Hans Strydom, member of Johannesburg Council: "Mandela, FW Challenged To 'Come Clean'"]

[Text] Former journalist Hans Strydom has over the past decade spearheaded the campaign against the Broederbond and its secret operations.

He is a member of the Johannesburg Council and recently resigned from the Democratic Party [DP], questioning the party's commitment to democratic values while some of its senior members still belong to the

Broederbond. He has publicly challenged former DP co-leader Wynand Malan to resign from the secret society.

Strydom warns that the peace process will not succeed if leading members of government maintain links with the Broederbond. He also likens the relationship between the Broederbond and the government to the ANC-SACP [African National Congress-South African Communist Party] alliance.

While facing the nation this week, he called on Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk to "come clean" about their secret agendas.

[NEW NATION] How do you view the negotiations for a future non-racial and democratic South Africa?

[Strydom] In the long term I am optimistic about the negotiations and the new dispensation, because I think in the end we will reach a situation where we will have equal rights.

But I am worried that both sides—De Klerk and Mandela—have not really come clean with each other. I think they both have secret agendas which should be put on the table.

De Klerk must explain his relationship with the Broederbond, of which he has been a member since he was 28.

The Broederbond has a membership of about 16,000, consisting exclusively of Afrikaaner men who occupy very powerful positions in our society. It not only discriminates on grounds of race, but also of sex and religion—members must belong to the Dutch Reformed Church.

It is also not an elected organisation. Members are selected by association, forming an elitist clique with its own secret strategy.

The aim of the negotiations is to set up a new constitution that prohibits discrimination.

De Klerk will sign it on behalf of the whites. But does he have a mandate from the Broederbond to sign it?

If this organisation continues as it is in the new SA [Republic of South Africa] I see little hope, because then you may find a non-racial government in power but behind the scenes the Broederbond will be ruling.

It is interesting to note that all the negotiators on the government's side are Broederbond members. But De Klerk has yet to spell out the organisation's future role in relation to the Afrikaners, the whites and the rest of the nation.

On Mandela's side, there is a similar problem with the SACP. The role of the SACP has not been explained to the satisfaction of many people in this country.

These are two of the major obstacles. People need to know whether they are voting for the ANC or for the Communist Party, the NP [National Party] or the Broederbond.

[NEW NATION] But it is claimed that the Broederbond is merely a cultural organisation.

[Strydom] I dismiss that claim entirely, for a number of reasons. I have studied numerous Broederbond documents that clearly show they spend little time on cultural affairs.

Secondly, there are numerous organisations which cater to the cultural needs of the Afrikaners and which are not secret. Thirdly, why should anyone need a secret organisation to protect their culture? I am Afrikaans and I say we have nothing to hide about our culture.

[NEW NATION] If the Broederbond continues to exist, would you condemn the establishment of a similar type of organisation in the black community?

[Strydom] Unfortunately, that may come about. A non-racial government which inherits the Broederbond in the civil service, the police and the army will find it difficult to operate.

[NEW NATION] Would you say there is a link between the Broederbond and the state security apparatus?

[Strydom] Yes, they are involved at all levels. Take the latest appointments in the Defence Force, for example. General Kat Liebenberg, the new head of the army, is a member of the Broederbond. So is General Johan Coetsee, the new commissioner of police.

[NEW NATION] Was there a link with the Civil Co-Operation Bureau?

[Strydom] I don't believe a link can be drawn there. The Broederbond is not a violent organisation. Its main objective is to outmanoeuvre others, but on an intellectual level, not in a physical way.

But it cannot be denied that the Broederbond has created a terrible thing in SA: a conspiracy of silence. It conspires in secret to use the masses for its own benefit. Silence is a powerful weapon—it allows you to get away with just about anything.

[NEW NATION] What is your comment on calls for an interim government?

[Strydom] You can't compare SA's situation to the Namibian one. Namibia was a colony, not a sovereign state. I don't understand why black organisations are not already a de facto part of government.

Negotiations must move as fast as possible. Within two years we should see non-racial elections. This doesn't mean we should wait two years before blacks participate at government level; there is no reason why black leaders should not take part in cabinet decisions in the meanwhile.

[NEW NATION] But how will you decide who the "recognised black leaders" are without an election?

[Strydom] That could present a problem. But I am talking about decision-making on issues like education and housing, which I believe should be removed from the political platform.

Decisions about things like a new school curriculum, a new building, new appointments, etc. should no longer be unilateral. And I believe if you consult with the right objective, you will get the consent you need to take decisions.

[NEW NATION] In other words, you agree with the view that negotiations at the highest level only will have little impact on the lives of people at the grassroots and, therefore, people should negotiate at all levels?

[Strydom] Exactly! Bodies like the Johannesburg City Council should be doing much more to get involved.

But one of the difficulties at the moment is, who do you talk to? If you want to deal with Soweto, for example, the problem is that so many people claim to be the representative leader.

In this respect again the present laws create difficulties, but unfortunately they can only be removed by parliament.

*** Northern Transvaal Proposed for Afrikaner State**

91AF0393B Johannesburg BEELD
in Afrikaans 29 Nov 90 p 1

[Report by Sarel van der Walt: "Northern Transvaal Proposed for Afrikaner State"]

[Text] Pietersburg—The entire Far Northern Transvaal with Pietersburg as its principal seat is suitable for an Afrikaner Nation State, according to a statement by Dr. Willie Snyman, CP [Conservative Party] Member of Parliament for Pietersburg and senior member of the parliamentary caucus of the CP.

Dr. Snyman said that the whites of Northern Transvaal are in a "demographically favorable position."

But, according to official numbers, Whites only represent 3 percent of the inhabitants of Development Area G, the area involved.

Area G is one of nine development areas in South Africa and is composed of areas such as Thabazimbi, Ellisras, Waterberg, Potgietersrus, Soutpansberg, Messina, Phalaborwa, Gazankulu, Lebowa, and Venda.

Dr. Snyman's proposal to make a White homeland out of the Far Northern Transvaal comes shortly after the dissension which was unleashed in the CP after Mr. Koos van der Merwe, the information chief of the party, made his proposals for a White state in a magazine interview.

Mr. Van der Merwe's theory that large parts of South Africa would be cut out from the White homeland was later repudiated by the CP head office. Mr. Van der Merwe said that the CP will never give up Pretoria.

Dr. Snyman's plan does not mention any other area, either in the Free State, Natal or the Cape.

Dr. Snyman says that in August this year there were 95,320 White voters in the electoral divisions of Pietersburg, Lydenburg, Potgietersrus, Soutpansberg, and Waterberg.

"Add to that the number of children under 18 years of age and the total number of Whites rises to about 200,000," he said.

Dr. Snyman said that in Area G there are seven formal Black towns and nine informal towns and hamlets which jointly have a total population of 55,400 blacks.

He said that the rest of the Black population in White areas live on White farms where they are subject to a work agreement between employer and employee.

Mr. Schalk Schalkwyk, the chairman of the board of the election division of the National Party in the election division Pietersburg, stated yesterday that it is a ridiculous proposition that demographically there are more Whites than Blacks in the so-called White Northern Transvaal.

Dr. Snyman made his homeland proposal in reaction to a challenge addressed to him by Mr. Schalkwyk as to where the borders of the CP's White state are.

"Everyone has eyes to see and knows that Dr. Snyman's propositions are far removed from the truth," said Mr. Schalkwyk.

*** Extraction of Cobalt from Waste Studied**

91AF0393A Johannesburg *BEELD*
in Afrikaans 2 Nov 90 p 4

[Report: "Other Sources of Cobalt Investigated"]

[Text] South Africa's production of cobalt, which is found in the Merensky reef of the Bosveld basin area, will always be a by-product of the platinum industry, according to Mintek in its Bulletin.

However, other sources of that rare metal are being investigated, says Mintek.

The South African production of a few hundred tons a year is about 2 percent of the world production. In the rest of the world, that metal is also mainly obtained as a by-product of base metal exploitation, with Zaire and Zambia as the main sources and Australia, the Soviet Union, and Canada as other important producers.

Use of the metal in applications which involve advanced technologies accounts for about two thirds of the industrial demand for cobalt. The largest application is in

super alloys which contain more than 10 percent cobalt and are subjected to high stress where ordinary steel is not appropriate.

Cobalt is ferro-magnetic at up to 1121 degrees Celsius and therefore is used in permanent magnets which must work under very high temperatures. It is also used in some of the new magnets which are made of a mixture of cobalt and rare metals which give a great strength for a low weight. The metal is also the most satisfactory blend for segmented carbides and is used in special types of steel and equipment.

The next largest use of the metal is in organic compositions which are used in paint and drying agents. Another use is as a catalyst in the ceramic and glass industry. The artificial isotope Cobalt-60 is used as a radioactive tracer, in cancer therapy and industrial radiology.

Due to its unique applications and to the sensitivity of the stability of the sources of the metal, cobalt is considered a classified metal and is included in most stock-piling programs.

The primary South African producers of cobalt are Rustenburg Refiners and Impala Platinum. Impala produces metal powder with a purity of 98.4 percent and Rustenburg Refiners produces cobalt sulfide from ores which are found in the Merensky platinum ore reefs.

Mintek has conducted various investigations on the hydrometallurgical separation of cobalt and other base metal by-products in the platinum process. A series of replacement phosphoric acids for the extraction of cobalt, nickel, and other metals have been synthesised. The organization also has already looked into the economic viability of recovering cobalt from waste material.

New Mineral Economics Degree Offered at Wits

91AF0419B Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 30 Nov 90 p 31

[Text] The Department of Mining Engineering at Wits University has introduced a new masters degree in the application of business and economic principles to the mining and mineral industries.

The new Master of Science degree in Mineral Economics, which is offered from 1991, will be the only degree in the country to provide a mineral economics qualification.

It is aimed at professionals such as engineers, geologists and economists operating in the fields of mining, investment or the public service.

The programme offers a choice of 16 courses, of which 12 must be successfully completed for the actual degree and 6 in order to obtain a graduate diploma.

*** Steady Decline of Gold Industry Noted**

91AF0447B Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS in English 15 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Tom Hood]

[Text] Only 15 of 28 South African gold mining companies are making money—the others are piling up losses of millions of rands [Rs] and will have to make serious decisions about cutbacks and retrenchments in the new year.

Gold has rescued the country from economic disasters in the past but its role as a lifeline is fading dramatically.

Once a huge contributor of taxes of government coffers, the gold mining industry is estimated to provide only about 4 percent of all revenue.

Gold mines have been squeezed hard this year by rising costs and a falling gold price.

The world's eight highest-cost producers are now all in South Africa, reports the authoritative British MINING JOURNAL.

These are Afrikaner, ERPM, Venterspost, Grootvlei, Loraine, Western Areas, Stilfontaion and Rand Mines.

Only Driefontein is among the world's top eight low-cost producers.

A survey by Mining Journal shows that around 6 percent of 217 of the Western world's gold mines are operating at a loss.

However, cash costs in rands rose by more than 16 percent last year and the trend seems to be accelerating so that fewer and fewer mines are able to keep up dividends to shareholders.

Since 1970, South Africa's gold production has fallen by 40 percent or some 400 tons and its share of gold output within the Western world has reduced by more than 50 percent.

The industry's demise is due to several factors.

They relate to geology, technical complexities and high cost of mining ore kilometres below ground. There has also been a steady rise in wages in a highly labour-intensive industry without improvements in productivity.

Average ore grade in South African mines has dropped from 13 grams to less than 5 grams a ton in the past 20 years, while the tonnage of ore has rocketed by 53 percent.

The average profit margin for gold mining companies reached a record low of 18 percent in the June quarter, estimates MINING JOURNAL.

As a result, share prices have continued their slide. For example, Vaal Reefs, one of the largest gold mining

companies in the world, and in value terms was the most actively traded share in 1990, with almost R1 billion worth changing hands, started out at R450 last January. Yesterday it was trading at R187. The price reached a high of R505 a year ago and it is now below its 1987 low of R202.

Despite cost-cutting measures and the retrenchment of thousands of miners, the cost of production is rising against a falling gold price and unless there is a turnaround, mine closures look inevitable, says MINING JOURNAL.

Speculation is that possibly six mines employing more than 44,000 workers face closure.

The low rand exchange has rescued the industry in the past but the governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr Chris Stals, has made it clear he will not let the rand devalue to help the gold mines.

Gold sales fetched as much as R35,000 to R36,000 a kg a short while ago but today the mines are receiving only about R31,000, estimates Mr David Giese, gold analyst at David Borkum Hare.

With the mines' tax contribution falling significantly, it is obviously wise for the authorities to keep the rand steady to help inflation rather than try to aid the mines, he said.

- In spite of the gloom, Southern Life investment manager Paul Beachy Head contends that some of the background fundamentals are working strongly in gold's favour, with U.S. real interest rates at their lowest since the 1970s and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board credit creation rising rapidly.

*** Moss gas Project Nears Completion**

91AF0456A Johannesburg ENGINEERING NEWS in English 14 Dec 90 p 3A

[Interview with John Crompton, Moss gas project director, by Jill Stanford: "Moss gas Project Rushes Towards the Finishing Line"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Can you give a progress report on the Moss gas project?

[Answer] Overall progress on the onshore project at 81 percent complete at the end of October is some 2 months behind the original schedule.

Most equipment has now been delivered to site and top priority in the period ahead is to expedite construction.

On the offshore project overall completion reached 87.4 percent at the end of October.

Offshore platform installation activities commenced in October and the project is on schedule to deliver the first gas to shore by the middle of next year.

[Question] What are the final completion dates for the construction of the onshore project and the hook-up and commissioning of the offshore segment of the project?

[Answer] Completion of the onshore project is scheduled for the end of 1991, while the offshore project will be commissioned by mid 1991.

[Question] What is your comment on the quality of workmanship of companies building components and providing services to Moss gas?

[Answer] Quality has been checked progressively against project standards and specifications, and the occasional rectification work found necessary has contributed to late delivery.

[Question] What is the biggest hurdle remaining in the way of successful implementation of the Moss gas project?

[Answer] The Moss gas project has entered the final straight, and barring circumstances beyond our control, we do not see any major hurdles remaining.

[Question] What will the final local content of the project be and is this in line with original projections?

[Answer] Overall more than 70 percent, which is slightly less than the original projections.

[Question] An addition of a COD unit (to convert olefins to distillate) has been made to the onshore plant. Can you explain the function of this plant and have any other changes been made to the onshore project and, if so what are they?

[Answer] The letters COD stand for conversion of olefins to distillate.

Apart from scope changes announced in August last year no other significant changes or additions have been made.

[Question] The onshore site has now entered the mechanical, electrical and instrumentation installation stage and the offshore project has reached the installation and hook-up stage. What are the demands on the provision of labour, the equipment on site, safety and quality standards?

[Answer] Labour availability, equipment and quality control on a project of this size are planned carefully.

We have in position what we need to have to complete the job.

[Question] The latest figure released for the cost of the Moss gas project is R8.8-billion, a further increase of R1-billion. What are the reasons for this increase and is there any likelihood of further cost escalation before fuel is produced in 1992?

[Answer] Disclosure of this information is the prerogative of the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs who

has indicated that he will comment on project costs once the project has been completed.

[Question] The ENGINEERING NEWS understands that the product pipeline to Voorbaai is the largest contract still to be awarded for the onshore project. When is the contract to be awarded?

[Answer] This contract award is imminent and consists of an 8" steel pipeline to API specs.

[Question] Have you awarded contracts for various support services such as helicopters and life boats?

[Answer] The FA [Armed Forces] Platform will have five survival craft.

Two of the craft will hold 70 people and the remaining 3, 38 people each.

They have been manufactured by Marine and Industrial Glassfibre of Port Elizabeth.

Court helicopters will provide the helicopter support services.

The sizes used will obviously depend on the needs at the time.

[Question] Are there any other contracts still to be awarded for the entire project?

[Answer] All the significant project contracts, apart from the product pipeline, have been awarded.

[Question] Do you foresee a slump in South Africa's steel fabrication, piping and other industries that have been heavily involved in Moss gas after the completion of the project?

[Answer] Any mega project amounts to a major bonanza for the industries concerned, and even more so in South Africa where megaprojects are few and far between.

In the absence of any other mega projects these industries can obviously not continue at the same levels as during the Moss gas project.

* Onshore Project Director Comments

91AF0456B Johannesburg ENGINEERING NEWS in English 14 Dec 90 pp 4A, 6A

[Interview with Peter Dixon, onshore project director, by Jill Stanford: "Onshore Plant Construction Is in Full Swing"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] What is the progress on the onshore project with regard to the engineering, procurement, and transportation of equipment and physical construction?

[Answer] The project is about 0.9 percent behind schedule.

It's 78.3 percent complete as against the 79.2 percent scheduled.

On the construction side we're well over the halfway mark; at about 55 percent.

At the moment, we're doing a reassessment of the construction phase because only now do we know the final quantities.

[Question] Have there been any hiccups on site such as weather, strikes or late deliveries which have delayed or created problems in the construction?

[Answer] We've had a bit of everything, but on every project you lose time and it's nothing unusual.

Delays in the delivery of equipment both locally and from overseas have been the biggest headache we've had to cope with as well as certain delays in engineering.

We've had a year, which I think I'm right in saying, was the wettest year in this area's history and last year, at a stage when we were trying to get construction out of the ground, it hurt us a lot.

[Question] Can you give me a word picture of what activities are presently being carried out on site?

[Answer] We are working in every area.

We are getting out of the civil field and are now well into the piping and mechanical installation area.

We have made a good start on the electrical and have just started on the instrumentation, so literally where we should be working, we are working to some degree.

The site now is in full swing and even inclement weather doesn't worry us like it used to because we're out of the ground.

[Question] What are the next major contracts to be let for the onshore project?

[Answer] We don't have any more major contracts, by the standards of this project, left to let.

We have got some minor contracts in the R2-million to R3-million mark, but nothing in the R100-million mark.

These contracts are all awarded and we are working our way through all those and getting them finished.

Probably the biggest contract we have got left to let is that for the Voorbaai pipeline, which is in the process of evaluation.

This pipeline will deliver the main portion of the product from the refinery to the tank farm at Voorbaai where it is to be held for distribution by tankers.

[Question] What work still has to be completed for the refinery construction to be complete?

[Answer] Our prime objective now is to complete the piping, electrical and instrumentation which is the latter part of the project.

The piping is well over the halfway mark and on a petrochem project, piping usually accounts for 30 percent to 35 percent of the total project.

Electrical, mechanical and instrumentation also comprises about 35 percent of the total project.

So we are well into the latter 70 percent of the project.

The rest of the project is mainly made up of underground civils and drainage, which are practically behind us.

[Question] Can you provide some statistics of refinery construction requirements? For example, how much earth has been moved, how much concrete has been poured and how much hardware such as piping and cable is required?

[Answer] Earthworks for the project have run to about 5 million cubic metres and concrete amounts to roughly 230,000 m³.

Five hundred thousand metres of piping and 1,400 km of cabling will be used for the construction of the total onshore project.

There is also probably 15,000 tons to 20,000 tons of structural steel and about 60 tanks on the site.

[Question] What is the present cost of the onshore project and do you foresee further escalation?

[Answer] The current cost has not been released.

[Question] At our last meeting you said that Moss gas was spending in the order of R7-million a day. Now that you are nearer completion has this spending tailed off? How much are you now spending each day and how much have you spent to date on the onshore project?

[Answer] This spending has naturally decreased and is in a different category as procurement is 93 percent complete.

The R7-million I mentioned was a ballpark figure which Moss gas had to spend each day if it took the cost of the refinery and the time in which it had to be built.

[Question] How many million manhours have been worked to date on the onshore site and how many will be worked on completion of the refinery?

[Answer] We have worked just short of 23-million manhours to date.

We don't work in manhours, however, our costing is based on a unit costing system, not a manhours one.

One of the things I think South Africans are going to have to do is look at unit costs rather than the cost of manhours.

How can you compare an electrician's manhour with the manhour of a man digging a hole for example.

Manhours worked on the civils portion will probably amount to 50 percent of the total manhours of the project and if we were to measure progress by manhours, the project would probably be 70 percent complete; but not in my book.

So, manhours is a useful thing for calculating accommodation and camps, for example, but a very dangerous one to try and measure progress against and, internationally, we don't use it.

[Question] Do you think the South African construction industry will change its thinking on manhours versus unit costing?

[Answer] I would like to see it happen and I believe Moss gas will implant the idea of unit costs.

What a metre of 6 inch pipe costs, or what a cubic metre of concrete costs, is far more applicable than saying that a tonne of steel takes you 30 manhours to erect.

Your cost is what you are more interested in, at least I am.

[Question] How many labourers are presently on site?

[Answer] The workforce at the moment is 11,648.

This includes all supervision and labour with the exception of BDL.

[Question] You have extensive experience of the construction of refineries all over the world. In what ways does the Moss gas refinery differ from these others and in what areas is it superior or lacking compared to these other refineries?

[Answer] There are, to the best of my knowledge, only two other refineries outside South Africa that produce petrol and diesel from gas; one in Borneo and another in New Zealand.

On a gas field you normally produce and export gas for heating and power generation, not to make fuel.

South Africa certainly leads the world in this technology.

So there's a fundamental difference between this plant and any other refinery I have ever worked on and it is necessarily different.

If you look at the refinery section of this plant it is comparatively small to what you normally find on a plant of this size.

There's nothing in the refinery part which is unusual, it's a modern refinery by anybody's standards but the day we finish it, it will be out of date because any plant built after this will be re-engineered.

One of my jobs is to make the engineers on the project come to a point where they have to accept that no more changes can be made.

We are building the plant to the drawing we have now and hopefully these won't get changed anymore.

[Question] Do you think Moss gas will ever consider selling natural liquid gas?

[Answer] Yes, it is only the international political situation that is stopping this.

In Australia on the northwest shore, the gas plants convert gas into liquefied natural gas and sell it to Japan and the Far East.

If the international political climate changes maybe that is what somebody will do here eventually.

Moss gas is converting gas to fuel, firstly because it's marginally economical with the present cost of oil and secondly, because South Africa has limited access to oil and is unable to sell gas internationally for heating and power generation, but the day will come I'm sure when this country will probably export gas.

There's a lot of experimental work being done in South Africa on converting gas to petroleum fuels and if this technology is developed it could also be sold elsewhere.

[Question] What in your opinion has South Africa gained through the construction of Moss gas?

[Answer] The first thing I have to say is that it is the first fuel-from-gas plant that South Africa has ever built, so something must be learnt from that.

There's been a tremendous benefit to the steel manufacturing industry because it has been forced into making grades of steel that have never been made before.

The other thing South Africa has had to develop for the project is welding techniques.

In addition, more South Africans have been exposed to the difficulty of running a major project.

[Question] Can you describe the logistics of catering for the housing, feeding etc. of the workers of many different cultures that are working on site?

[Answer] We have had very little trouble for a job of this magnitude.

Accommodating all the workers is obviously more difficult in South Africa than in other countries because of South Africa's race laws.

It was very hard to judge what race group we were going to get working on the project.

Working in the Cape, I was told that we would not have many blacks, that it would be mainly a coloured labour complement, and in fact it hasn't worked out that way.

So, after increasing our black accommodation we suddenly found we were wrong and had to guess again.

Not being able to put segregated camps in one larger camp has also added to this difficulty, while bussing 11,500 people on to the site in the morning is another major problem.

Because of the late delivery of equipment and the nature of engineering we have squeezed the construction phase into a tighter time frame which means our labour peak is much higher.

In the short term, we are going to make use of the accommodation we have got by increasing the number of people to a room and increasing ablution and feeding facilities.

It is a continual slog to keep the catering contractors up to scratch as any camp food becomes monotonous.

Added to this, the food eaten by the coloureds is different to the food eaten by the blacks, although the expats, coloureds and whites basically eat the same food.

[Question] Are there any other issues you would like to discuss?

[Answer] The one real problem I experience every time I come to South Africa is the lack of craft supervision.

This country has engineers, but has never brought up its tradesmen, craftsmen or artisans and given them the status and increased pay incentive to encourage them to want to become craft superintendents.

This is the biggest headache I'm having on this project.

On all international projects, there are very few engineers; normally the top people are never engineers and in my whole life in international construction I have never once had a boss who was a graduate engineer.

All the great construction people came through the ranks and that is how the American and Australian construction industries were formed.

If you look at more recent companies around the world, they are mainly being started by entrepreneurs who are a get-up-and-go type of people.

South Africa, on the other hand has built a little bit of a technocrat society.

[Question] Has the closure of the East Cape Training Centre [ECTC] affected the availability of labour or the standard of work on site?

[Answer] We are looking at gas in 7 months time.

To take 4 months of that time just to train a person with no experience we would run out of time.

So, although the training centre produced a lot of people we couldn't benefit by it now.

I am old-fashioned; I like the apprenticeship system and the ECTC scheme provided almost an abbreviated apprenticeship course.

Nobody can be given more merit than the ECTC in providing training en masse but you don't get the long-term gradual build-up of artisans being fed into an industry through such a scheme and experience really is the most precious thing there is.

South Africa certainly needs to train artisans.

We could not construct the Mossas project with the artisans that are in South Africa.

Extended by 2 or 3 years you may, but there's no way to build a large project in South Africa at the moment without the importation of artisans; you just don't have them.

* Technical Director on Installation

91AF0456C Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS in English* 14 Dec 90 pp 5A, 30A, 34A

[Interview with Mattie Oosthuizen, offshore project director (technical), by Kim Trollip: "Mossas Jigsaw Puzzle Gets Its Act together"]

[Text] [Question] Please could you provide a detailed progress report for offshore activity on the project including the jacket, piles, MSF, modules, flare boom, pipelines and any other auxiliary components?

[Answer] The jacket has already been installed and 10 piles have been stabbed.

We are in the process of driving these piles into the seabed.

The module support frame (MSF), modules and flare-boom are all virtually completed.

The MSF and accommodation module have been loaded out on to the cargo barge in Durban harbour.

MO1 to MO4, the wellhead, process, utilities and power generation modules, are currently being pre-commissioned in Port Elizabeth where they were built.

The flareboom is complete and awaiting load-out in Cape Town.

The pipelines are all laid and in the process of being trenched.

The drilling modules too are being pre-commissioned.

[Question] Is the docking and installation process of the jacket and modules on schedule and if not, why?

[Answer] We are 2 weeks behind schedule, mainly due to a number of mechanical faults with installation tools, the semi-submersible crane vessel and weather downtime.

[Question] What is the next major step in the hook-up process?

[Answer] Installation of the eight-legged steel MSF module out in the FA [Armed Forces] or field is scheduled to take place in early December.

The 3,490 ton structure will be lifted, by the SSCV [expansion not given], from the cargo barge and placed on the seafastened jacket.

It will be welded to the receiving "arms" of the jacket 80 km offshore in preparation for the placing of the modules on top of the frame.

The Flotel, a converted oil rig from Soekor, will be anchored next to the jacket at about the same time.

It will provide accommodation for people working on the platform during hook-up and commissioning.

Has the conversion of the Actinia into a "Flotel" been completed and when will the Moss gas workers start making use of the vessel?

The conversion of the Flotel is substantially complete and workers will be using the vessel as soon as the MSF is installed.

This was scheduled for 6 December.

The conversion was carried out under the management/supervision of Moss gas and the main contractors were Dorbyl Marine and Simon Cape.

[Question] Please can you describe the upcoming installation process step by step?

[Answer] After the MSF is fastened to the jacket, the installation of the first 4 modules can commence.

All modules are lifted on to the MSF by the SSCV and welded into position.

The utilities module, the wellhead (the largest of the units), the process module and the power generation module will be transported and installed on the MSF by the crane vessel.

These steps are scheduled to take place between 20 and 23 December; on the basis of one module a day.

The forecast date for the next installation is 5 January 1991, when the drilling/mud module is brought to the site of the gas field.

The following day should see the installation of the Cape Town-built MO6A and MO6B, also known as the mud treatment module and the drill floor.

Around 7 January, the drilling derrick will be carefully placed on the platform.

On the same day, the flare boom, which has been stored in Cape Town along with the mud treatment module, is expected to be lifted and perched on the structure.

[Question] Could you describe what happens between installation of the modules and the time when the first gas and condensate arrives at the onshore plant?

[Answer] After all the modules have been welded into place on the jacket, the hook-up and commissioning phase begins.

It involves the connection of all pipework, instrumentation and electrical wiring between the modules.

This will be a 5 month, around-the-clock operation utilising 500 to 600 workers split into two 12-hours daily shifts.

The first priority will be to prepare the accommodation module for safe habitation.

This must be followed closely by the commissioning of the drilling modules and associated equipment.

Once drilling has commenced, commissioning of the power generation module begins.

It is carried out in parallel with the preparation of the process modules (by simulating process conditions) in readiness for the receipt of hydrocarbons onto the platform.

After all testing has been completed, commissioning of the two pipelines, connecting the FA platform to the onshore plant is carried out.

The first gas is expected to arrive onshore in about April 1991.

[Question] Have the undersea pipes from the platform to shore been trenched yet and if so, which contractor carried out this work?

[Answer] The pipes are being trenched at the moment by Allseas, the same contractor which laid them.

Trenching is now about 60 percent complete.

[Question] Are there any outstanding hook-up contracts to be awarded?

[Answer] All major contracts and sub-contracts associated with the hook-up and commissioning phase of the FA platform have been placed.

However, the contract for the commissioning of the two pipelines connecting the platform to the onshore plant is presently out on tender with nominated contractors.

[Question] The installation contractor is Opic. Which companies comprise this group and what is the role of each?

[Answer] The companies comprising a joint venture are MIOC, Land and Marine and Kew Project Management.

The main contractor is MIOC [expansion not given] and the two South African contractors are providing local support for labour and marine facilities.

[Question] Who supplied the tugs which are assisting in the installation of the jacket and the hook-up and what role do these tugs play?

[Answer] The tugs for the installation were supplied by Germanine and Pentow.

They assisted in the launching, installation and piling of the jacket and are also providing supply and standby facilities.

Tugs for the hook-up and operation periods will be supplied and managed by Soekor.

[Question] Please could you describe in detail how the gas and condensate will be extracted from the FA wells and what happens to it between extraction and arrival at the refinery?

[Answer] In total, 14 wells will be drilled to a depth of approximately 2,600 m to terminate in positions which allow optimal exploitation of the reservoir.

After drilling, the wells will be completed with stainless steel production tubing and connected to the valve manifolds on the platform which is hooked up to the process facility.

These facilities will process the raw gas, condensate and water reservoir fluids to produce a dry gas and condensate stream which will be pumped to the onshore refinery in two separate pipelines.

Process water will be cleaned and returned to the sea.

[Question] Gas is to be extracted from a reservoir 2,500 m under the seabed. Who is the drilling contractor and how will drilling be done on the platform?

[Answer] The drilling of the wells is done by modules MO6 and MO7 which comprise the drilling facilities, permanently installed on the platform.

Gisor has been appointed drilling contractor to operate these facilities and drill the wells.

[Question] Who is supplying the safety system or the blowout preventor for the wellhead module?

[Answer] The blowout preventors were procured by Emso/Mossgas and supplied by Hydrill.

[Question] Who is responsible for the fabrication of the single point mooring terminal and how is work progressing on the SPM and its undersea pipelines to Voorbaai?

[Answer] The SPM terminal is the point where tankers will moor, without anchors, and take up export products via pipelines from the onshore tank farm.

It is being designed fabricated, supplied and installed by Imodco.

The pipeline section is being installed by Land and Marine which has sub-contracted the installation to Pentow Marine.

Both these contractors are progressing on schedule and are about 60 percent complete.

[Question] Who is supplying the radar warning system on the platform?

[Answer] The radar warning system, designed to warn ships and submarines against steering too close to the platform, was procured by Mossgas and is installed in the accommodation module which has been loaded out in preparation for sailaway.

[Question] Have there been any recent gas or oil finds in the vicinity of the FA field which will be exploitable from this platform?

[Answer] No, none from this platform, but there are several promising finds in the region.

These may be exploitable after subsea completion.

The gas or gas and condensate from these reserves could then be piped to the FA platform for processing.

[Question] How often will maintenance work be carried out on the jacket and the rest of the platform once it is operational and who will be responsible for this work?

[Answer] Maintenance work will be carried out continuously in accordance with Planned Maintenance System which is managed and controlled by Soekor.

Soekor will also be responsible for the operation of the platform.

[Question] Who will do the catering on the platform once it is operational and who supplied the catering equipment for the platform kitchen?

[Answer] Catering equipment for the platform and kitchen was procured by Emso and Mossgas.

Cape Catering is the catering contractor.

* Managing Director on Viability

91AF0456D Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS in English* 14 Dec 90 pp 6A, 27A

[Interview with Managing Director Bernard Smith by Kim Trollip: "Making Mossgas Viable..."; date and place not given]

[Text] Mossgas is exploring ways of increasing its economic viability by producing high value chemicals at Mossref and the likelihood of building the naphtha cracker on the same site has not been ruled out.

MD [Managing Director] Bernard Smith confirms that, "We are studying the possibility of producing ethylene from various streams, but obviously we are focussing our efforts on completing the plant and producing fuels first.

"We will not change the production slate too much but under consideration are solvents, alcohols and liquid petroleum gas.

"It is too costly to make changes to the plant now but I'm sure that in due course there will be some ethylene production."

Another factor in favour of making Moss gas more viable, despite cost escalations, is the high crude oil price.

At current levels around U.S.\$30 a barrel, Smith says the project will be very close to breaking even, even in real terms.

THE ENGINEERING NEWS asked the MD what the main reasons for the R1-billion [rand] escalation, announced at the beginning of last month, was.

"The escalation comes as a result of delays in the delivery of steel and fabricated pressure vessels as well as the cost of trying to recover from these delays," says Smith.

"For example, we anticipated 10,600 people will be on site at the peak of the project; previous estimates were around 8,000.

"Other reasons for the increase include engineering overruns, estimating variances and higher inflation than forecasted.

"The project is based on the assumption that we don't have any major industrial relations disputes on site; or that there are no other unknown factors that cause us major completion delays or delays beyond our control."

Smith firmly believes South Africa still needs an additional strategic fuel producer despite the changing attitudes towards the country.

"The chairman of Shell once said that in his opinion every country needs some source of domestic fuel for strategic purposes.

"I believe this statement is underlined by the strategic needs of South Africa."

Others argue that the R8.79-billion could have been spent on other ventures.

An academic was quoted in THE ENGINEERING NEWS (5 MAY 1989) saying that depending on the configuration, a new crude oil refinery—of a moderate size and capable of producing around four times the estimated capacity of Moss gas—would cost South Africa around R1-billion.

At that time the official figure for the Moss gas project was R5.5-billion.

THE ENGINEERING NEWS asked the MD whether Sasol [South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation] was not capable of seeing to South Africa's strategic need.

"It is a matter of judgement whether Sasol production is adequate in such circumstances."

Smith points out that there have been gas, condensate and oil discoveries in the Bredasdorp basin that may well be more commercially viable than the EM field.

"The possibility exists that we won't develop EM next, but if we do, it would only come on stream a decade from now.

"Unfortunately, we only know the ultimate potential of a reserve once it is in production but if any of the gas and condensate finds are viable I am sure they will be processed by Moss gas.

"Oil production would be sold to existing conventional refineries.

According to Soekor, it will be known within 1991 whether sufficient reserves exist in the basin 90 km offshore of Mossel Bay.

Small reserves have been discovered but it has not been made known if a field exists.

If the reserves are to be exploited, it is likely that a floating platform will be used.

Gencor subsidiary Engen is reported to be considering oil exploration outside South Africa, particularly along the west coast of Africa, but Smith—who is also Engen chairman—will not specify where.

He says the energy group is considering possible exploration elsewhere but no decision has been taken on where this should be done.

One of the countries which Engen is reported to have had discussions with is Angola.

Smith states that the group has not had discussions about specific Angolan oil reserves, but will give it a lot of thought in coming months.

According to the mass media, Gencor is to take part in a \$1-billion project to exploit the Alba oil reserve in the North Sea.

The group has an 8 percent stake in the venture which is scheduled to produce oil by 1994.

Gencor also has an 8 percent stake in the Kilda gas/condensate field in the North Sea which is currently being explored.

In conclusion, Smith praised the team working on Moss gas for its commitment and determination.

"The achievements of the offshore team under John Crompton and contractors which have worked on Moss gas deserve the highest praise for their efforts to date.

"This is exemplified by the fact that the jacket is in place, notwithstanding some difficult situations which have arisen during the project and have been resolved by hard work and dedication.

"I am particularly pleased about the way the onshore project under Peter Dixon and Gene Beirne is coming together.

"Preliminary figures suggest that construction progress in October exceeded 5 percent, which is remarkable for 1 month.

*** Future Projects in Angola, Mozambique**

91AF0456E Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS in English* 14 Dec 90 pp 7A-8A

[Interview with Emso Managing Director Steve Hrabar by Kim Trollip: "Offshore Project Manager Looks Towards Angola and Mozambique"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] EMS, later Emso, played an important role during Moss gas inception and during the design phase. Please could you briefly describe the company's role in the early phases?

[Answer] In late 1980 and the beginning of 1981, EMS noted the success of the Soekor drilling programme off Mossel Bay.

It was apparent that major gas or oil finds could become a reality.

In pursuing offshore projects EMS investigated the technologies and the players in the development of offshore projects.

This entailed visits to the North Sea and meeting clients and potential engineering and project managers who specialised in this field.

At the end of 1981 EMS approached the international company Crawford and Russel with a view to forming a company in South Africa which could handle these complex and intricate projects.

A joint company Emso was formed to specifically tackle these projects.

We continued our research to find out more about the Soekor's gas finds in the Mossel Bay area.

In 1983, Emso submitted a pre-feasibility study to Soekor and in 1985 was awarded the feasibility study on the Moss gas Project.

In 1986 we were awarded the conceptual engineering and the project management for the whole offshore project.

[Question] What has been Emso's role since the completion of the design phase and the present?

[Answer] EMSO has been managing the fabrication contractors and procuring equipment and materials for the project.

This entailed establishing fabrication sites throughout South Africa and overseas.

In the management of fabricators we had a management presence on all the sites to control costs, quality and programme to ensure that the project is completed on time.

[Question] What has been Emso's biggest challenge to date, on the project?

[Answer] The completion of the jacket and the modules on time.

The jacket was completed ahead of schedule and launched on 18 October this year.

What remains now is to complete the modules in order to sail away to the FA site on schedule.

[Question] Pleased could you provide an update of activity on the offshore segment of the project from the Emso point of view?

[Answer] The activities on the offshore part of the Moss gas project basically comprise the pipeline, the module, the jacket and the piles.

The jacket is in position and piling has commenced.

The pipeline was laid last year and the final trenching on the 18 inch line is progressing satisfactorily.

The MSF and accommodation module are loaded up on the barge and are on their way to the FA side.

The four Port Elizabeth modules are nearing completion and we are going through butt lists to ensure that all the work is thoroughly complete.

In Cape Town, the majority of the work is complete and we are making butt lists for the final completion of this work.

Commissioning onshore has progressed beyond expectations, which should reduce the offshore activities during the latter stages of the project.

In Emso's scope of work we were awarded the contract for the SPM that will transport the product to coastal tankers in Mossel Bay.

This project is going according to plan and we should have the pipeline and terminal installed by April/May 1991.

[Question] What remains to be done between now and offshore commissioning in April 1991?

[Answer] Once the modules have been placed on the jacket, the remaining activity is to hook-up the modules and commission them to produce dry gas. We expect that the first gas will be delivered through the pipeline in July 1991.

[Question] Will Emso continue to exist after the completion of Moss gas and do you foresee it becoming an international player in the offshore industry in future?

[Answer] Emso will certainly continue to exist after the completion of the project.

We are aiming to be an international player in the southern hemisphere and service countries south of the equator.

[Question] Crawford and Russell International is the overseas partner in the Emso joint venture. How many C&RI people are still in South Africa and how many do you expect will remain in this country permanently?

[Answer] At present we have 24 Crawford and Russell people in the country.

As you may be aware, project management moves through many phases.

With the project so close to completion, many of the C&RI are engaged in the construction activities such as hook-up and commissioning.

As to the retention of these people, this will depend on the contracts that we secure.

Many of them would like to stay in South Africa should the opportunity arise.

[Question] Did you witness good teamwork emerging from the South African/expatriate combination and how has South African industry benefitted from it?

[Answer] The teamwork that emerged was excellent.

If this had not been the case, we would definitely have had problems completing the job on time and within budget.

[Question] Are there any more tenders to go out at all?

[Answer] There are no further tenders to go out on the offshore project.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the quality of work carried out by Emso clients on the project?

[Answer] Yes.

This was initially a headache to us because we had to educate South African industry to perform to the quality standards of the offshore industry.

It was no easy task, but through team work we have succeeded in getting the quality of work to international standards.

I believe this augurs well for future projects; offshore or onshore.

[Question] The cost of the Moss gas project has risen several times since its inception and now stands at R8.79-billion. To what extent was the offshore segment responsible for the increases and do you believe the cost will rise again?

[Answer] The cost of the project has risen several times but the budget for the offshore portion which was established in 1986 is still intact and we do not envisage any overruns.

[Question] What do you believe local industry should do with the skills and experience gained on this fuel-from-gas project?

[Answer] With the skills built up over the last 4 years, South African industry should capitalise on the experience and export more complex products to the international market.

Apart from that, the skills level that has been built up should be of benefit to South Africa as a whole, because we need to be more productive in the international arena.

[Question] It has been rumoured that local companies are bidding to build jackets for two international projects. Is this true and which projects are being bid on?

[Answer] As far as I am aware, prequalification documents were received by South African companies.

The purpose of pre-qualification is to assess the capabilities of a contractor to undertake the envisaged work and not to make him spend money and resources in a futile tender.

When you submit a pre-qualification document, the client will decide whether you are competent to bid on a particular tender.

I know of two pre-qualification documents that have been issued to South African industry, namely for the Cabinda oil fields and the gas oil fields in Turkey.

No bids have been submitted as the results of the pre-qualification process have not been disclosed.

[Question] Is it true that Emso has been involved in discussion, with Angolan and Mozambican authorities, about the development of oil and gas fields in these countries?

[Answer] Emso, through Genrec, has been involved with Chevron in Angola.

We did not however approach the Angolan authorities about oil or gas fields.

Genrec Offshore, with the support of Emso, submitted a pre-qualification document to Chevron for a project in Angola.

In Mozambique Emso has been awarded a 5-year consultancy project to support Companhia Do Pipeline Mozambique Zimbabwe in an effort to rehabilitate the pipeline from Beira to Mutare.

This project is ongoing and hopefully we will secure more work in Mozambique.

[Question] If this is true, what did the discussions entail and what was the outcome of the meetings?

[Answer] In Angola, Genrec Offshore supported by Emso, submitted a pre-qualification document to Chevron to design and erect jackets and topsides for the Angolan operating oil company.

This pre-qualification was submitted in early October 1990 and we have to date not heard whether we have pre-qualified to submit a tender.

[Question] Are there any other issues you would like to raise?

[Answer] I believe that the Moss gas project has put South Africa on the map in relation to fabricating and installing offshore structures.

We must obtain more projects to retain the skills that we have nurtured over these 4 years.

It is a challenging task for South African industry if we want to be real player in this dynamic and exciting segment of the international market.

* Floating Hotel

91AF0456F Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS* in English 14 Dec 90 11A

[Article by Kim Trollip: "Floating Hotel Prepares for Anchorage..."]

[Text] The conversion of drilling Actinia into a flotel for the hook-up personnel working on the offshore platform is complete and proof-load testing, as well as the testing of lifeboats, is all that remains to be done before it is put into operation.

"Once the tests are complete, the flotel will be moved from Cape Town to the FA field and anchored next to the jacket," explains flotel manager Ben Nel.

THE *ENGINEERING NEWS* asked Nel what would become of the rig after Moss gas.

"The flotel will be stationed at the platform site until after the commissioning of the offshore project.

"Its task should be complete by May 1991 and we may consider letting it as a flotel, to the international offshore industry.

"If the demand for a flotel is not big enough, we will convert it back to a prospecting rig."

The main contractors on the project were Dorbyl Marine, Simon Cape and Coldcor.

The conversion was carried out in Cape Town harbour.

The Actinia, sister ship to the Nymphia, is one of Soekor's semi-submersible with cat rigs which is designed to accommodate 100 people.

The rig, built in Japan in the 1970s, will be required to house an additional 368 people for the duration of the complex hook-up operation.

To meet accommodation requirements, four levels, each supporting four prefabricated modules, were fitted to the pipe rack.

Each module contains 10, 2-man cabins and 2 fully equipped ablution blocks.

The bottom level on the pipe rack will house the 200 seat mess and the galley.

The second wing situated on the riser pipe rack houses freezer and cold storage rooms, a canteen a gymnasium and the laundry.

The catering contractor on the Actinia is Cape Catering.

The second and third levels will house offices and the fourth will comprise recreation facilities.

The fifth and top level houses the cinema.

A gangway flotel will allow commuters to walk "across the ocean" to work on the Moss gas platform each day.

It is designed to compensate for movement of the Actinia relative to the platform in calm to moderate weather.

Strict safety measures are imposed on the flotel.

The existing 2, 50-man lifeboats have been complemented by a further 4, 100 man open motorised crafts.

Additional life rafts are mounted on three sides of the Actinia, while a semi-rigid inflatable motorised boat is available for rescue purposes.

The rig is fitted with comprehensive smoke detection and heat-activated sprinkler systems for fire protection.

The galley extractor hood is provided with a gas fire fighting system and additional hose reels and fire extinguishers have been placed in the corridors.

* Pipelines Beach Crossing

91AF0456G Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS* in English 14 Dec 90 p 15A

[Text] The pipelines beach crossing at Mossel Bay has been awarded the 1989 South African Institute of Civil Engineers' southern Cape regional award for excellence.

The 91 km long gas and condensate pipelines were installed between the platform and shore during 1989.

They will carry these products from the platform to the beach and then on to the offshore refinery located 13 km west of Mossel Bay.

The 219 mm condensate and 457 mm gas pipelines cross the beach at Vlees Bay at a point 15 km west south west of Mossel Bay.

A third pipeline which will be used as an outfall line joins them at this location.

The beach crossing installations were carried out in a severe marine and geological environment, using techniques novel to South Africa and at the forefront of world technology.

These installations were considered to represent one of the major challenges facing the offshore development.

Vlees Bay is typified by a long sandy beach which is afforded some protection from south westerly weather by the point, but no protection from the south or south east.

The waves approaching the beach are seldom less than 1 metre in height, and in severe storm conditions may be expected to reach a maximum of 22 m.

The sand on the beach and in the surf is highly mobile with a predicted envelope of seabed movement which is limited by beachrock at the shoreline, is a maximum of 5 metres at 500 m from shore and reduces to 3 metres and 1,000 m and to 1.3 m at 1,500 m.

In such circumstances, the pipe must be buried below the lowest predicted scour level to ensure stability and acceptable stresses throughout the 30 years design life of the project.

Behind the beach is a large primary sand dune, some 230 m in length and rising to 56 m elevation.

A valley behind the highly mobile dune and a comparatively stable escarpment rising to reach 90 m elevation only 500 m from the beach also made the task difficult.

A design and installation study was carried out by Offshore Design Services, the detailed design contractor for the platform and pipelines, to determine the most cost effective and technically acceptable solution for the beach crossing.

The study specifically addressed the section from 1.5 km offshore to 0.5 km onshore, as well as pipelay interfaces.

Horizontal drilling was selected for the surf zone and Shore Crossings was regarded as the only contractor in the world with sufficient experience to undertake this work.

From the beach, the holes passed underneath and emerged beyond the surf zone.

An inclined tunnel was selected for crossing the primary dune.

This was selected in preference to open cut or horizontal drilling which would have destroyed a large section of the dune and its vegetation.

Esor was contracted to construct the 200 m long tunnel using the shield driven segmentally lined method of construction in preference to the traditional pipe jacking method.

LTA and sub-contractor CBI were responsible for the site access road to the beach, the fabrication yard and the roller track from the fabrication yard to the beach.

Pipe joints were welded together until a pipestring 1.6 km long was ready to be pulled offshore.

Pentow supplied the marine equipment and personnel to support the horizontal drilling activities.

A 150 ton barge-mounted winch was used to pull the pipestrings off the beach.

South African Diving Services made the subsea tie-ins.

Once each tie-in was complete, Shore Crossings used their drilling rig to pull the pipestring back to the beach by way of the horizontally drilled hole.

The 500 m long pipestring extensions for the tunnel and escarpment areas were welded in the yard and lowered down the roller track to tie-in with the horizontally drilled pipestrings on the beach.

The pipestrings have been grouted in place and buried a minimum of one metre below the ground.

All construction equipment has been removed and hydroseeding has been carried out on the escarpment.

The beach and tunnel exit have been bulldozed back to their natural profiles and the sea and wind have reclaimed this area.

Project manager Emso was responsible for engineering and construction management.

Despite problems during installation, the contractors consultants and personnel have managed to complete the project successfully and in good time for the gas and condensate which will flow to the onshore plant shortly.

* Jacket Construction Discussed

91AF0456H Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS in English* 14 Dec 90 pp 17A-18A

[Interview with Genrec Offshore Project Director Jim Grice by Kim Trollip; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] It has been reported that Genrec Offshore is bidding for the contracts to build two jackets for the international offshore industry. Is this information correct and where are these jackets destined for?

[Answer] Genrec Offshore is currently attempting to pre-qualify for work for the African offshore industry.

We are actively pursuing three independent enquiries, but until we have officially pre-qualified (and this has more to do with the present South African political situation or acceptability, than the company's competence) it would not be prudent to prejudice our chances by early announcements.

[Question] When do you foresee the next jacket being built in South Africa?

[Answer] The next jacket could be commenced within 12 months.

In today's rapidly changing oil market, most European and Far Eastern construction yards have good order books for the next 2 years in their home waters.

There should therefore, be opportunities in the "fringe" offshore oil producing countries, i.e., those that develop for foreign exchange purposes, not necessarily for total home consumption.

This is providing world prices stay above U.S.\$25 a barrel.

[Question] What would it take to reopen the Saldanha Bay site for further jacket construction?

[Answer] The layout and natural facilities at Saldanha Bay are not affected by temporary closure.

The rebuilding of infrastructure, in order to become fully operational again, would easily be accommodated in the "off-site" fabrication period of the next contract.

[Question] How many of the expatriate managers brought to South Africa by GO are still in the country, and will they remain here to build another jacket?

[Answer] At this time, four expat engineer/managers who were engaged in the project throughout the original contract, are still with GO in South Africa.

Robert Stevenson, the UK technology joint venture partner in Genrec Offshore, is the largest offshore contractor in Europe and could re-muster all the necessary technical staff again, if and when required to fully support the joint venture effort.

All the local staff members with offshore experience are currently engaged in other Genrec projects around the country.

[Question] It has been said that South Korea builds the cheapest jackets in the world, why would the international offshore industry therefore choose to use Saldanha or any other South African port instead?

[Answer] Over the last 20 years, in the offshore industry, I have known the description of "cheapest" to alternate between Japan and Singapore as well as other Far and even Middle Eastern ports.

Brazil and Spain too, have at times "merited" this title.

But, in major offshore projects in the international market, finance and politics—between countries and the major oil companies—has as much effect on contract awards as the straight rands or dollars a tonne of construction costs.

[Question] What are the chances of a local company building a jacket for West Africa and where are the possible oil or gas fields where it will be docked?

[Answer] With the political scenario in southern Africa improving continually, the chances of competing for work around the African Coast are good.

Nigeria, Angola and Namibia are the current areas of development in offshore Africa.

[Question] How many jacket construction sites are there in the world and how big is the demand for these structures?

[Answer] Most major offshore oil producing countries, i.e., USA, Britain, Norway, the Gulf, Brazil and Australia, have sufficient yards to produce for their own requirements.

However, because of the fluctuation and cyclical nature of the industry, all the above-mentioned countries import as well as export complete offshore structures or parts of offshore structures to meet their demands.

The Far Eastern yards of Japan and Korea, as well as France, Italy and Spain can all supplement the international requirements.

The many smaller yards in other countries contribute sections of the structures when the fiscal/political scene demands additional capacity.

But, for the reasons stated above, South Africa could and should compete with the success of offshore Moss gas under its belt.

[Question] If South Africa builds another jacket, will it be GO and why do you say so?

[Answer] The international offshore market usually requires a complete involvement, which could include finance, engineering, fabrication, construction and installation.

In fact, it usually requires the complete offshore facility.

By way of its performance on the jacket and its connections in industry internationally, I believe GO should lead the South African "experienced" offshore industry into a major overseas contract.

But equally, we would be prepared to work with anybody in South Africa who can show better credentials.

[Question] What has local industry gained by building the Moss gas jacket?

[Answer] All the local companies and suppliers have benefitted from the quality assurance, quality control demands of offshore work.

The planning controls brought in all fabricators, to meet the schedules, the discipline of the paperwork to meet the certification standards and the highest quality of workmanship ensure that all companies associated with the jacket contraction have raised their previous standards to recognisable international standards.

All industry benefitted from the training and upgrading of hundreds of artisans and other staff members in both the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] and Cape areas during the project.

The involvement of administration and technical staff in a job involving the latest welding technology, planning and dimensional control with multi-crane lifting and the moving of 14,500 tonnes from land to sea has benefitted all industry, and even without further offshore opportunities, everybody involved is more experienced and better equipped to tackle other projects in future.

* Solid Waste Disposal

91AF04561 Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS in English* 14 Dec 90 pp 31A-33A

[Interview with BDL Project Manager Vince Diesel by Jill Stanford: "Disposal Site To Be controlled by State-of-the-Art Technology"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Can you spell out what BDL's role is on the Moss gas onshore project?

[Answer] That of the managing contractor-responsible for project management, project services, procurement, quality assurance and construction.

[Question] How many BDL personnel are involved in the project and how many are on site at the moment?

[Answer] BDL's Sandton office peaked a year ago at 253.

In September this year, we had a total of 398 (local and expats); 200 in Sandton and 198 in the field.

In January next year, 100 project office staff will be demobilised and from February, site will start demobilising people in the field.

Being contractors, Bateman and Davy will need to attract some of these resources again so careful management of the demobilisation phase is a major responsibility for us.

We have given staff as much notice as is practical to enable them to find alternative employment.

Additionally, BDL has tried to place them either within our own group companies, externally with other clients or employment agencies.

Fortunately, since ours is a contracting world, a lot of our resources are contractors and very few permanent staff, therefore, have to be demobilised.

Although we have not achieved the desired number of placements, the demobilisation project committee established to manage this important phase has achieved certain success—specifically placing cost engineers and technical clerks with Batepro, Davy and Moss gas.

[Question] How many main contractors are presently working on the onshore site? Can you provide a list of which contractor is doing what portion of work?

[Answer] While there are more than 70 contractors on site, the main contractors include the two turnkey contractors: Linde for air separation and Lurgi for reformer; Murray and Roberts/LTA for synthol civils; Three G (Goldstein, Grinaker and Group 5) for fire water tanks, most culverts, concrete pipe supports, roads, retaining walls and general civils; and Concor/Ovcon for refinery and reaction water treatment civils.

Other contractors include Basil Starke for all underground piping; Group 5 for demin plant, main crange, equipment supply for warehouses and stores; CBI for steel tanks; Babcock is main contractor for mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and insulation work; Groenewald for electrical instrumentation for synthol and refinery; Southey for insulation and painting; and Moss gas Construction department for major piping and mechanical installation work for offsites and utilities.

Hamon Sobelco is constructing the cooling towers; LTA for site preparation, temporary facilities, unit 73 civils; BPH for lime handling facility; GEC for turbine generators; Transand for waste disposal holding ponds; Ical for boilers; Aquafund for raw water treatment, sewerage plant; McCarthy for site offices; Dorbyl for steel structures; ACE for corrosion protection; and Goldstein for precast for buildings and perimeter wall.

Further contracts have been awarded to KPL/ETSA for temporary electrics; Philips for PABX, temporary electrics; MF Kent for overhead and underground electrics; Siemens for substation fitout; Cape Gate for perimeter fence; African Cables for power cable installation; Stocks and Stocks for buildings for units 77, 78 and 61; and Racec for rail siding.

[Question] The temporary demin plant is to be commissioned soon and the cooling towers are nearing completion. Can you provide a timetable for the commissioning of the various components of the plant?

[Answer] Commissioning is progressive as the whole plant consists of a number of units; as one entire unit finishes, it can be commissioned.

The demin plant can only be commissioned once the plant has water, which should be round about now.

Since the demin plant demineralises and cleans the raw water coming from the dam, the boilers can only be started up once the demin plant is running.

Eskom has built the Proteus substation and main feeder lines—two, 132 kV supplies lines—to the main site substation.

Power is available now but the plant will only be ready to use it this month or in early January 1991.

Temporary power is drawn from the original network which is connected to the construction substation next door to the Bartelsfontein siding.

The contractor for the four cooling towers has started handing over.

[Question] As project manager can you discuss some of the logistics of coordinating the procurement, transport and erection on site of the major pieces of equipment?

[Answer] In 1986 a vendor survey determined that while South African manufacturers could produce a high percentage of the equipment for the project at competitive prices, local resources and the loading—to enable manufacturers to cope—were major concerns.

Instead of engineering providing the information for orders to be placed over an extended period, most of the orders peaked late which impacted adversely on the vendors and suppliers.

This also affected the rate at which Iscor had to provide the right quality of steel to the manufacturers.

Working to the client's 80 percent local content requirements resulted in ourselves and Mossgas having to walk a tightrope being using South African suppliers and keeping them competitive.

Placing the original orders was a lengthy process.

As large sums of money were being spent over a short period on a government project, approval by the Mossgas board, CEF and the Department of Trade and Industries was essential.

For expenditure up to R5-million [rands], the Mossgas project's director had authority and anything above that required a board ruling.

Any overseas order had to have an irrefutable reason.

Having placed the orders, an important part of the procurement function became expediting these to schedule and to the correct QA requirements.

Transport logistics dictated moving equipment the quickest and most economical way to the Mossel Bay site.

Quay 4 in the Mossel Bay harbour was strengthened and a road-on-rail access route, for about R2-million, was built.

This decision meant sourcing overseas low draft vessels with their own cranes.

The last heavylifts were offloaded in Mossel on 10 November.

A similar vessel plied between Richards Bay for Reef-based equipment, CBI in Port Elizabeth, Consani's and John Thompson in Cape Town with the vessels and equipment whose size or mass precluded road transport.

Major equipment manufactured on the Reef was routed through Richards Bay complying with South Africa's Heavy Transport Committee's requirement to use well established routes such as the Reef to Richards Bay route which was developed and used when Sasol 2 and 3 were built in Secunda.

Our contractor for road transport in South Africa was Transnet, which transported the equipment on its own loaders either to Richards Bay or direct to site.

At the harbour, its transporters picked up the loads and moved them to site along the road-on-rail access route.

Sanctions forced Mossgas to investigate consolidating all the equipment overseas, loading it there, and transporting the equipment on dedicated vessels directly to Mossel Bay.

The German-built hot quench towers for the synthol units were shipped direct from Antwerp to Mossel Bay.

To avoid double-handling heavy equipment on site, it was transported directly from the harbour to its final position on site for the heavylift crane to set it directly on to its foundation.

[Question] Can you explain the concept of the road-on-rail transport system?

[Answer] A "road-on-rail" is not unusual but, for Mossel Bay, it was brilliant solution.

The route provided easy access to the harbour, with all road slopes from the harbour to the plateau acceptable for the abnormal traffic.

[Question] Mossgas' own locomotive was used to transport certain goods. What kind of locomotive is it and which company built the locomotive for Mossgas?

[Answer] While Transnet's locos were used to transport goods to the switchyard, materials handling within the refinery boundary is Mossgas' responsibility.

The Mossgas loco—a 45 ton three-axle diesel-driven shunting loco, made by Robert Hudson Boksburg—transfers goods from the switchyard to the plant in the required sequence.

[Question] Have all the major vessels reached the Mossgas site?

[Answer] The handful of outstanding vessels include a knockout drum from Elgin, two for the synthol units,

three separator drums from Consani (on schedule for delivery early next year), two big nitrogen compressors for the synthol area due in from Germany at the end of March and some pumps.

Last deliveries will be made in April.

The big de-ethaniser column and the catalyst reactor for unit 11 from Dorbyl Heavy Engineering in Vereeniging are scheduled for delivery early in January.

[Question] Can you give THE ENGINEERING NEWS some examples of the heaviest, widest, tallest etc. vessels which are now on site?

[Answer] The heaviest vessels are the hot quench towers—each weighing 450 tons; the widest are the six Secunda-manufactured synthol reactor sections each 9,000 mm in diameter, 6,300 mm high and with a mass of 90,000 kg; the tallest is a 64 m long de-isobutaniser column from Cyclop Engineering.

[Question] Can you give an update on construction of the tank farm? Have all the 44 tanks and spheres been installed and what work is still to be done here?

[Answer] Most tanks have been erected.

One sphere is complete and the tanks are 80 percent complete.

We are hydrotesting, painting and finishing the tanks.

Portions of the walkways and accessways are still outstanding but the tank farm should be complete early next year.

[Question] What is the role of the concrete bund walls around the tanks? Which company is doing this construction and can you give an update on this construction?

[Answer] The bund wall, retaining 110 percent of tank volume, is designed to retain the fluid within a tank should there be fire or damage to that tank.

A tank deluge system has also been installed to keep other tanks cool during the dangerous fire-fighting period.

Ease of access dictates that 3G Construction will only start work on completion of all tank bund construction in January.

[Question] Moss gas has its own pipe fabrication shop on site. Which piping is being fabricated here and why was this shop set up?

[Answer] Babcock, Lurgi, Linde and CBI have their own pipe fabshops on site to control their well defined contracting responsibilities.

The Moss gas construction division was set up specifically to run the fabshop in Port Elizabeth which produced all the prefabricated parts for the pipes.

[Question] Is this shop to be maintained on site once the plant is up and running?

[Answer] Babcock's enormous shop will not be needed when the plant is up and running, but that will be a Moss gas operations decision.

Moss gas has its own machines, workshops and equipment for maintenance.

[Question] What measures are being taken to ensure quality standards on the onshore site?

[Answer] The petroleum industry works to specific codes for specifications.

We have a department of quality engineers and inspectors.

Only suppliers and manufacturers who guarantee certain legally accepted quality standards, like the SABS [Bureau of Standards] quality code 0157, have been used.

For the manufacture of pressure vessels, specifications come from ASME—the American code of practice for design and manufacture of pressure vessels.

Quality plans are agreed on with manufacturer's test samples and approved methods of manufacture being carried out before work begins.

Each manufacturer's sequence of manufacture and welding method requires approval and inspection is ongoing.

On site contractors' work is audited and scrutinised and any non-conformance is reported and the contractor is instructed to rectify.

Subsequent tests ensure that the completed work conforms to the specified design requirements.

[Question] Are contractors working double shifts in any areas of the plant for the completion of the refinery?

[Answer] Babcock and Steinmuller are working night shifts in their workshops on fabrication of piping sections to remain ahead of the installation teams.

[Question] Can you explain the function of the east/west piperack. How many kilometres of piping will be installed on this rack?

[Answer] Every other refinery unit ties into the east/west piperack which is the main element conveying all services into the plant and carrying utilities such as water and steam between the various units.

The units refine the feedstock to a certain stage, pass it on to another process unit then, once processed, carries all the material to the tank farm.

There are 50 km of piping with sizes varying between 1.27 cm and 137.2 cm.

[Question] The effluent treatment plant being constructed on site is apparently the biggest in the world? Is this correct?

[Answer] The reaction water treatment plant handles the waste coming off the synthol reactor and must be the biggest in the world because this technology was developed specifically at Secunda to cope with the quantity of waste.

The process design was provided by an overseas licensor and the detail design was carried out by Bateman Industrial Projects.

[Question] Can you explain the function of the waste disposal site? Has the work started on this site and, if so, which contractors have been awarded contracts for the work?

[Answer] While Sasol's various solid wastes are co-disposed in their ash dumps, Moss gas has no ash dumps.

Hence, a facility complying with stringent requirements had to be designed and constructed.

We have had to be environmentally sensitive.

Moss gas' solid wastes include spent catalyst from the synthol plant, biomass sludge from the waste water treatment plant, sludge from the raw water treatment, office and domestic waste and small volumes of other chemical wastes.

Waste soil from construction activities was used to form the backbone for a series of containment cavities within which suitable lining material will be placed.

Consulting engineers Steffen, Robertson and Kirtsen have been appointed to design the facility.

Enquiry documents for final construction of the facility will be issued before the end of this year.

[Question] As project manager, what aspects of the project have given you the biggest headache?

[Answer] The knock-on effect of late placement of the process packages delayed the detail engineering, purchase requisitions and the placing of orders, which impacted adversely on deliveries of equipment and the construction schedule.

We are still receiving information on the final bills of material and, with bulk materials purchasing driven by engineering, we are continuing to experience construction restraints due to late delivery of these materials.

[Question] Are there any other issues you would like to discuss?

[Answer] The complex logistics of moving vast quantities of equipment and material into the field is typical of a mega project.

Due to the client's structure, decisionmaking was lengthy, strict guidelines were set and the entire project has to be auditable by the Auditor General.

We had to have procurement committee meetings to finalise the placing of orders which impacted on the bidding and the selection process of orders.

Any item over a certain value had to go to the Moss gas board for approval.

We had to meet nightly with the client in order to get the orders placed.

As limited local suppliers of items, such as castings for pumps, existed and also due to early casting failures, BDL QA staff had to help these suppliers overcome their problems.

This again impacted on our delivery schedule.

The overloading of forged fittings and vessel dished ends on local suppliers proved to be another problem; if we had placed a reasonable percentage of the forgings and dished ends overseas for difficult vessels, we would have still placed a fair volume of the work in South Africa and suppliers would have been better able to maintain their schedules.

Additionally, if the local suppliers could have anticipated follow-up business, maybe they would have replaced their old equipment with new and hence, have achieved greater success.

According to the original contract we signed with Moss gas, we will be within a month or so of the original completion date and we are aiming to improve on the present completion schedule.

We also have achieved goals in this country that have never been set or achieved before.

South Africa has never achieved an 80 percent local content on a project of this size.

For the Sasol projects, hardly any Iscor was used.

Moss gas used well over 50,000 tons from Iscor.

Transnet moved just under 300,000 tons of material: 104,000 tons from overseas; and about 176,000 to 180,000 tons locally.

Mossel Bay will inherit an enhanced infrastructure which includes upgraded housing, sporting facilities and the Wolwedans dam.

Sometime between 1995 and the year 2000 Mossel Bay would have needed a new dam.

Construction then would have resulted in the cost of water rising by between 300 or 400 percent.

Building the dam now means water costs will escalate normally.

While Moss gas is using just over 50 percent of the dam's capacity, local farmers will also benefit.

One point I believe needs to be highlighted is that the rapidly changing labour environment in this country requires construction industry management to consider changes in its attitude to the employment of labour.

The emerging trade unions are trying to achieve the objectives of the labour force by militant action and collective bargaining.

In many cases it appears that the trade unions are better organised, using shop stewards within one company to promote the interests of labour across that industry.

Contractors must ensure that their management has sufficient industrial relations experience and training to respond to union initiatives.

One other problem with the Moss gas project was that the activities of labour brokers, and their high charging rates, created difficulties in attracting skilled labour to the project.

But, with the active support of Moss gas and managing contractor BDL, the South African Labour Supply Association, now a significant factor in supplying labour to the project, was formed.

* Reporters Tour Site

91AF0456J Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS in English* 14 Dec 90 p 33A

[Text] Driving into Mossel Bay, "Gas Project" signs pointing towards the beachfront are the only indication that an R8.8-billion synfuels project is being constructed just 11 km west of the historical town.

My first stop in Mossel Bay was at the information centre which is housed in a 68-year-old stone power station.

The station fell into disuse in 1960 and in 1985 was listed as an important building by the National Monuments Council.

A year later, use of the power station was offered to Moss gas which today uses it to disseminate project information and house a permanent exhibition of South Africa's energy industry.

The centre is only a stone's throw from Mossel Bay harbour where major equipment for the project has been offloaded and transported by a road on rail system to the refinery site.

On the edge of the refinery site, a huge parking lot is full of cars and about 80 buses which are used to bring the more than 11,000 workers to site each day.

The prime movers used to pull these buses are uncoupled from the bus bodies during the day and used on site.

Onshore Project Director Peter Dixon took THE *ENGINEERING NEWS* on a tour of the site where construction is now beyond the half way mark.

Our first stop was at the synthol plant where the natural gas piped from offshore is to be converted to liquid intermediate products using Sasol's Fischer-Tropsch synthol process.

The plant has three process units comprising catalyst reduction, synthol synthesis and alcohol recovery.

"The unique part of the plant is the synthesis unit which consists of three identical trains," says Dixon.

The cruciform columns supporting these trains were made outside South Africa in special alloy steel.

Subcontractor CBI is constructing the three loops of the synthol unit.

Receiving a waste aqueous chemical stream from the synthol unit is the reaction water treatment plant.

The Moss gas refinery is believed to have the largest treatment plant of its type in the world, with a capacity of 10.5 megalitres a day.

To keep the plant going in the event of a shutdown offshore, a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant is being fabricated by a consortium of LTA and Genrec.

"The double integrity tank has an outer containment of concrete with an insulated stainless steel inner tank fabricated by Consani Engineering.

"It will hold 10,000 m³ of LNG at temperatures as low as -165°C," says Dixon.

The roof of the tank, supported on struts and resembling a giant flying saucer, was lying next to the tank and workers were installing insulation on to the suspended inner roof.

The roof has since been lifted into position using a Johnson 800 ton crane specially imported by Johnson Crane Hire for the Moss gas project.

The "sterile area" of the plant is the area where the two, 100 m high flare stacks being fabricated by Dorbyl Structural Engineering, are to be erected.

Hamon Sobelco, contracted to build the cooling towers, was the first main contractor to hand over onshore.

The company completed the two main towers, the air separation and the alkylation cooling towers at the end of November.

The company's contract covered foundations, civil works for the cooling towers, which also included interconnected water channels, pumps, suction bays, piping, electrical work, control and instrumentation, supply of all mechanical components and all erection works.

The air separation plant has been designed by Linde TVT of Munich and SA Linde is fabricating 18 vessels for the plant.

"All these vessels are erected inside an outer steel containment and the annular space is filled with insulation material," explains Dixon.

The two trains of the air separation plant have been designed to have a power input of about 26 MW each and will produce 99 percent pure oxygen at the rate of 110,000 Nm³ an hour each.

All piping for these onshore processes, totalling about 620 km, is distributed through the east/west pipe rack which runs the entire length of the site as well as along ground level pipeways.

Moss gas will use 180 MVA of electricity, equivalent to that used by Germiston.

Power for the refinery is being supplied from Eskom's Proteus substation situated 30 km outside Mossel Bay.

The gas-filled switch-gear has been installed by Siemens.

These outgoers are relayed to various substations on the refinery site where the supply voltage is broken down into 11 kV, 6.6 kV and 525 V for distribution to various parts of the refinery.

"Power was due to be on line at the end of last month—at the moment we are using diesel generators as well as a temporary power supply from Eskom," says Dixon.

A new plant has been added to the refinery area, the COD (conversion of olefins to distillate) plant which is part of the refinery products upgrading section used to optimise the overall range of fuel production.

Lurgi, Frankfurt is responsible for project management, process design, detailed engineering and procurement.

"This plant will have a late start up next year, largely due to late delivery of equipment," says Dixon.

The onshore plant has a central control room; an indestructible bunker-type room which can withstand a gas cloud explosion, the worst possible occurrence on a refinery site.

We moved on to the reformer area.

The reformer package is a key processing unit of the onshore project.

It changes natural gas, consisting mainly of methane, into a gas mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide which is the feedstock required for the fuel synthesis process which follows.

Water for the onshore process is to come from Wolwedans dam.

It is estimated that the dam will supply 11.7-million cubic metres of water a year of which 5.6-million cubic metres will be required for the Moss gas processing plant.

On the outskirts of the refinery are the catalyst storage buildings, lime plant, the cable and piping yard as well as a concrete batch plant and two precasting yards.

At the end of the tour Dixon took THE ENGINEERING NEWS to see two pipes, minute in relation to the whole onshore project, but without which there would be no project.

These two pipes, the 200 mm diameter condensate and 450 mm gas pipelines extend 85 km out to sea to the offshore platform and will feed gas and condensate to the entire refinery.

Back at the site office we looked in on the drawing office where there are 600,000 project drawings filed away.

In the photocopying room next door there are 12,000 copies of drawings made each day; "5 to 10 copies of each drawing we receive each day," says librarian Rita Herholdt.

* White Farmers: Land Nonnegotiable Issue

91AF0380E Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
15 Nov 90 p 7

[Article by correspondent: "Keep Farms White, the OVS Farmers Want To Say to FW"]

[Text] Kroonstad—A delegation from the Free State Agricultural Union (VLU) must go talk to the country's president, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, to keep farms white.

At an emergency meeting on land ownership and the financial affairs of farmers held here, emotions at times ran high. At one point, the loyalty of the top management of the VLU and its general manager toward its members was even called into question to applause.

Land ownership was discussed at the meeting as a result of the planned elimination of laws which so far have prevented colored people from buying farms in white agricultural communities.

Mr. Izak Cronje, outgoing president of the VLU, later said that he had the impression that it had been very necessary to hold the meeting and he was thankful that the representatives had acted as responsibly as they did against the background of the emotional matters that were discussed.

Mr. Koos Roos van Zaarstron said that he did not need a law to protect his property. He was booed when he said that the country's president was building good ties abroad for South Africa.

Mr. Danie van Tonder van Dewetsdorp said that the farmers demand loyal actions from the top management and its general manager, especially in cases where the interests of the VLU clash with those of the government.

"Does your heart lie with some ideological group or other, or with the government, or with the farmers?"

Dr. Piet Gous, KP-LP [Communist Party-Labor Party] representative for Parys, stated that those people who do not want to speak the way the farmers want them to should be replaced by people who will do just that.

On a proposal by Mr. Frik Dreyer, regional representative on the VLU's executive committee, the committee was chosen which is to go tell the country's president that the meeting felt that the law which has so far prevented colored people from buying farms, should not be scrapped.

The committee consists of the president and general manager of the VLU and Mr. Johan Taljaard van Reitz, president of the cooperative committee of the VLU, Dr. Gous and Mr. Dreyer.

Mr. Thys van der Hoven van Wesselsbron said that the laws on land ownership are an extremely emotional and political matter. "Our ancestors obtained the right to property through sweat and blood. Land ownership is not negotiable."

* AIDS Care Cost Predicted Too High for State

91AF0380C Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
14 Nov p 18

[Article by correspondent: "AIDS Patients Too Expensive for South Africa"]

[Text] Capetown—South Africa will not be able to afford the cost of treatment and care for all its dying AIDS patients in hospitals and state institutions.

It has been estimated that within a few years, the treatment and care of AIDS patients will cost 80 billion rand per year, and South Africa does not have the monetary resources to spend such amounts on AIDS. Mr. Edward Osborne, an economist from Nedbank, said yesterday at a business symposium in Capetown.

South Africa cannot spend 80 billion rand per year on the care of AIDS patients. The dying patients will simply have to be cared for at home.

Professor Christa van Wyk, a member of the law faculty at UNISA [University of South Africa], said that employers and trade unions can no longer deny the existence and danger of AIDS. Every employer should have an AIDS policy.

This policy should include directives on AIDS education, AIDS testing, and the employment of workers, as well as on how to deal with workers who are AIDS carriers or AIDS patients.

Trade unions should be involved in drawing up directives for that policy.

* Percentage of Blacks in School System Rising

91AF0380B Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
14 Nov 90 p 6

[Unattributed article: "Black School Students on the Increase"]

[Text] By the year 2000 there will be 14 million students in school.

Over the next few decades, the number of black students in South Africa will increase by at least 4 percent a year. By the year 2000 about 14 million students from among all population groups should be attending school. Nearly 85 percent of those students will be black.

These are some of the data published in the latest issue of EDUCATION AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT, a publication of the College of Education at the Free State University.

According to that brochure, last year about 78 percent of all students were enrolled by the Department of Education and Training (DOO) and the Departments of Education of the TBVC [Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei] countries. More than 2 million students were enrolled with the DOO.

Figures indicate that since 1980 the number of students has grown an average of 3.5 percent per year. The largest increase over the last 5 years was in the number of black secondary education students, which increased by 10.7 percent per year.

The growth rate of other population groups will probably level off during the next decade. The number of colored students may increase annually by 1 to 2 percent, and that of Indians and whites by less than 1 percent.

The expected growth in the number of students could have far-reaching consequences for the provision of education in South Africa. For example, an average of 147 secondary schools, each with a capacity of 1,000 students, will have to be built annually. In order to maintain the current ratio between students and teachers, about 3,800 additional black teachers will have to be trained annually.

As far as professional choices for black students are concerned, nearly 90 percent of all those who matriculated last year took biology, while 44 percent took history. This could play a role in terms of a better understanding of the environmental crisis as well as better human relations.

What is unsettling, however, is that students are not taking those courses which offer access to employment. Only 25.5 percent took mathematics, 17.9 percent physics and chemistry, 8.6 percent accounting, and only 0.4 percent took technical courses.

It is worrisome that the emphasis is being placed more on academic than on technical and trade-oriented education. According to the pamphlet, there is still a lack of information and/or prejudice against technical and trade-oriented education.

Students are still being prepared for the labor force through academic matriculation, knowing full well that job opportunities for those people are scarce, they said.

* Nissan Funds Black Community Center

91AF0457C Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
11 Dec 90 p 9

[Unattributed report: "Nissan Gives a Great Deal to This Center"]

[Text] The Nissan Motor Company of Japan has donated 400,000 rands for the establishment of a community center in Alexandra, a residential area known for its colossal lack of educational, library, cultural, and recreational facilities.

Representatives of local organizations who work in the area commissioned an in-depth study of the needs of the Alexandra community. It was found that the community has an urgent need for a multipurpose center that can contribute to uplifting and educating residents.

Nissan of Japan's contribution was made to the Alex San Kopano Association, a joint project of the Alexandra and Sandton communities, established to create such a center.

The center will include a kitchen that will serve the main hall and provide facilities for cooking demonstrations, as well as smaller rooms for activities such as adult education, legal assistance, and assistance in finding employment.

The Alexandra Community Center should be completed by next August.

* Potential Location of Afrikaner State Surveyed

91AF0380D Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
15 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by correspondent: "SABRA Visited 11 Villages in the Cape on Subject of People's State"]

[Text] Eleven villages in the Cape were visited earlier this month by a fact-finding mission to "test the feelings of the area with an eye to the development of a growth area for an Afrikaner people's state," Professor Carel Boshoff announced yesterday.

Professor Boshoff, the leader of the fact-finding mission, said in a statement that a member of the mission, "a respected farmer from Stellenbosch, who also has interests in Darling and in the Karoo," had confirmed that the Northwestern Cape had a high potential for agriculture. The name of the farmer is being withheld.

Two city council members from the Oos-Rand, Messrs. Jackie Nel from Germiston and Ian Slabber from Abertou, especially investigated the industrial potential of the Northwestern Cape region. "Following their mission they stated that this actually involves a totally undeveloped opportunity. In particular water from the Oranje River, solar power, and natural gas from the West Coast open unlimited opportunities," said Professor Boshoff.

The members of the fact-finding mission, all members of SABRA [South African Bureau of Racial Affairs], first visited the Hendrik Verwoerd dam and then met with representatives from Steynsburg and Middelburg.

In addition, Richmond, Prieska, Upington, Keimoes, Brandvlei, Calvinia, Vredendal, Strandfontein, and Lamberts Bay were also visited. Aside from farmers, businessmen, and agricultural leaders, they also talked with the city council of Keimoes and the Upington Regional Service Council.

"The mission concluded with discussions and public meetings in Stellenbosch and in Bellville. Further research and planning will now flow from this fact-finding mission," said professor Boshoff.

* 'Great Trek' to White Homeland Under Way

91AF0457D Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
11 Dec 90 p 13

[Article by Sarel van der Walt: "The Orandese: Olifantshoek Accepts Them With a Shrug"; first three paragraphs are BEELD introduction]

[Text] The Great Trek by right wingers to the northern Cape Province—or Orandee, as they call it—is under way.

Sarel van der Walt, BEELD's man in the far northern Transvaal, who was recently the very first to report on rightists from Messina who had actually moved to the area where the Afrikaner homeland of Professor Carel Boshoff and his supporters will allegedly come in being, tells in the accompanying article about life these days in Olifantshoek.

In two articles published by BEELD last week, he wrote, among other things, about the Orandese's dream of a balanced financial situation in the new fatherland.

What do the people of Olifantshoek and vicinity have to say about the so-called Orandese? They either shrug or contend that nothing has changed yet, or they chose not to express an opinion.

Mr. Hennie van Vuuren, city clerk of Olifantshoek, responds to a question like a diplomat. It is his basic assumption, he says, that all people are welcome in Olifantshoek. It is to the town's advantage.

But the Orandese themselves? No, he prefers to say nothing about them.

According to Mr. van Vuuren, he is being swamped by calls from all over the country from people wanting to know about prices and tariffs in the town. "At this point, we do not have a single vacant house to rent out." However, a large amount of vacant land is still available, he says.

The town's people are apparently divided about the Orandese.

The Orandese have support among the conservatives. But there is a large number of Olifantshoek residents (probably the majority of the town) who simply shrug at the Orandese.

Numerous people with whom BEELD spoke treated the subject like a hot potato, and said that they prefer to say nothing.

Still, Mr. Herman Fouche, a businessman, says flatly that he himself is a right winger and that he welcomes the Orandese. The faster the Orandese put their plans into effect, the better. "It is the only solution. What else can you do with right wingers like us in South Africa?"

Ms. Patricia Horne, 22, who works in her dad's liquor store in Olifantshoek, says that she knows that the Orandese are in town. They don't really mix with the people of Olifantshoek. "They don't bother anyone, but I don't see how their plans can work."

A woman who did not want to give her name and said that she is a National Party Supporter asked BEELD, "Just tell me where these people are working? I know all the stores in town, and I can tell you that they are not working in one in Olifantshoek!"

Mr. Gilbert Tabakeng, a colored community leader, says that there was great unhappiness among his people about rumors that coloreds will not be welcome in Orandee. He is happy about the assurance that Mr. Andre Putter, contact person for the Orandee Development Corps, has given him in the meantime, namely, that they do not have to move.

Olifantshoek has an interesting history. Three armed uprisings in less than 20 years preceded the founding of the town.

The small town is approximately 130 km northeast of Upington and 90 km southwest of Kuruman, in the northern Cape Province.

The first armed uprising was the Langberg Rebellion of 1897, the second in the Second Anglo-Boer War, and the third during the Rebellion of 1914.

In his book "Olifantshoek, Oase van die Langberg" [Olifantshoek, Oasis of the Langberg], Mr. Piet Snyman of the HSRC [Human Sciences Research Council] department of societal development for research into regional and socioeconomic history, writes that the Langberg Rebellion occurred after the dormant unrest in

the former British Bechuanaland, which was inhabited by the Tswanas, exploded in December 1896.

Although the rebellion is known as the Langberg Rebellion, the residents of Olifantshoek and vicinity know it as "Toto's War." A total of 28 soldiers died in the war, which cost the Cape Government a total of 402,259 pounds.

"For Olifantshoek, however, it was of critical importance: It paved the way for white settlement and the eventual laying out of the town," writes Mr. Snyman.

Many residents of the Olifantshoek area rebelled against the Cape authorities during the Second Anglo-Boer War, and in various spots in the northern Cape helped fight the British troops.

Although there were no military actions in Olifantshoek itself during the Rebellion of 1914, the town was cut off from the outside world for some time after General J.C.G. Kemp and his force of rebels cut off the town's telecommunication connection.

After the rebellion, Olifantshoek lost its strategic military position, law and order took root in the area, and it became possible to proceed with the founding of the town.

Olifantshoek today has approximately 1,700 white, 2,400 colored, and 2,100 black residents. The town has, among other things, a school, three churches, a cooperative, three commercial banks, a hotel, two liquor stores, and three cafes. A great deal of through-traffic on the way to Upington, Cape Town, and Namibia passes through the town each day.

Although it is an agricultural town and has profited a great deal from the development of mining in the area, the Sishen-Saldanha railroad line, which passes near the town, has been of no direct advantage to the town, contrary to expectations.

"Olifantshoek, Oase van die Langberg," by Mr. P.H.R. Snyman, was published in 1986 by the Human Sciences Research Council. It is available from the municipal government of Olifantshoek.

* Commentary: True Face of Right Wing Revealed

91AF0457F Johannesburg VRYE WEEKBLAD in Afrikaans 7 Dec 90 p 20

[Commentary by "Brolloks and Bittergal": "This Is What the True Face of the Right Wingers Looks Like"]

[Text] So there we have it. Our intrepid Boer warriors in their khaki clothes, with the Bible under their arm, are actually a bunch of hooligans and high school bullies.

The latest heroic deed of these brave heroes, the bullying of black Sunday school children at a picnic in Louis Trichardt, was elevated to a historic battle when the leader of the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement],

Eugene TerreBlanche, himself sporting a beret, went to pay tribute to his heroes in court. And of course, a couple of CP [Conservative Party] members of parliament were also there.

Praise the Lord with joyous echoes, the people sing to the heroes. Do people then no longer have any respect for anything? Did they fail to notice that it was in fact Sunday school children led by a pastor from the Apostolic Faith Mission? In Brolloks' book this is blasphemy.

Look, Brolloks has a great deal of compassion for people in the CP and AWB. Brolloks even has an uncle or two in their ranks, and they are good people. Misled, poorly informed, and scared people, but basically good, simple people.

Brolloks can also understand some of the AWB and CP policy points, and believes that their questions must be answered seriously by the government, and not dismissed off-handedly.

But this sort of hooliganism and loathsome racism towards innocent children is clearly in a different class.

We are not talking here about understandable white fears; we are not talking about "preserving the Boer nation." This is simply roguishness by people who are obviously unable to bring their influence to bear in society in any other way.

The right wing political leadership figures' apparent support for this roguishness makes the entire incident 10 times more reprehensible.

It is important that everyone in our country should now begin to see these people for what they really are. And this includes the vast majority of well-intentioned CP supporters.

Can you imagine the hell that would break loose if a group of blacks were ever to molest a group of white schoolchildren? It would reverberate all over the world, and the blood would probably flow for weeks.

* Majority of Blacks, Whites Follow Middle Road

91AF0394B Johannesburg VRYE WEEKBLAD in Afrikaans 16 Nov 90 p 17

[Report on interview with Willem de Klerk by Harriet Salm in the Dutch newspaper TROUW: "The Government Must Confess Its Guilt"; first paragraph is VRYE WEEKBLAD introduction]

[Text] A government spokesman must issue a public confession of guilt for apartheid, says Wimpie de Klerk, the older brother of F.W., to Harriet Salm of the Dutch newspaper TROUW. Not because the Afrikaner was evil in the past, but because this would further negotiations...

Frederik and Willem de Klerk, two brothers from a prominent Afrikaner family, were until recently two opposite poles in the white establishment of South

Africa. F.W., the younger of the two, was a member of the government that supported the apartheid policy under the leadership of P.W. Botha, while Wimpie—eight years the senior—had developed into an "enfant terrible" in Afrikanerdom.

"Let me give you a good quote for your newspaper," Wimpie tells me in his office in Johannesburg. "I would welcome it if a government spokesman were to publicly issue an admission of guilt for the consequences of the apartheid system."

He considers it quite improbable that this will happen. "This is not something that politicians do."

The de Klerk family has provided South Africa with politicians for a couple of generations now, and Willem too has been repeatedly approached to take his place in parliament. He has rejected that appeal in every case, and has pursued a career in journalism.

He has been removed from his position more than once because of his criticism of the apartheid policy—the last time in 1987, when he was fired as editor-in-chief of the biggest Afrikaans newspaper, RAPPORT. At present, he is a lecturer in communication sciences at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg.

A book by him is due to be published early next year: "F.W. de Klerk - Die man en sy tyd" [F.W. de Klerk: The Man and His Times].

In the book, he writes about what is described as the "conversion of F.W." But the emphasis is on the political developments of the past two or three years. His brother, the state president of South Africa, an extremely conservative politician until just before his appointment, radically broke with the conservatives in February of this year, joined the "enlightened" direction in Afrikaner politics, and in so doing ushered in the end of apartheid.

Political commentator Wimpie has been "enlightened" ever since his student days. He studied theology at the University of Potchefstroom and was even a preacher in the Reformed Church for a short time. Even then, as chairman of the Afrikaans Students Union, he advocated dialogue with black students.

Wimpie was the first person to use the Afrikaans terms "verlig" [enlightened] and "verkramp" [obscurantist]. In certain regards, the two brothers have moved in a parallel direction with their political thinking in recent times. But now Wimpie, as the advocate of an official confession of guilt by the white rulers, is again going one step further.

In most white Afrikaners, one finds a combination of emotionality and Calvinism. But when Willem talks about his country and the role that his brother plays in it, he is scarcely troubled by exaggerated sentiments about Afrikanerdom and the Boer traditions. He is rational and pragmatic as he details the direction in which conditions could develop.

The few comments that he makes on the question of the confession of guilt are typical of him.

He states that the white fathers of the apartheid policy were not guided by some underhanded "Hitler-like plan." "Apartheid did not come directly from the soul of the devil," he says.

The apartheid system emerged as the result of miscalculations and wrongful ideologies, but it was not a pre-defined evil conspiracy. It was an honest attempt to create order amidst South Africa's problems, de Klerk says.

To that extent, a confession of guilt is thus unnecessary. Still, he calls for a confession of guilt because this would further negotiations.

However, this confession should not be limited to words alone, he emphasizes. "The changes in South Africa must be expressed primarily through deeds. If more just structures are created, then this is also a form of confession for the government that champions them."

He sees two models for the future of South Africa, which he calls the "green light" and the "red light" scenarios.

He gives the former the greatest chance of succeeding, because "I am an optimist." In this model, the negotiations for a new constitution are successful, South Africa gains a democratically elected government, and the new South Africa is a fait accompli within three years.

The red light occurs if negotiations break down—because of either right wing or leftwing radicalism—and a period of serious unrest breaks out.

"Even in that case, the green light will come on after say, seven years."

He does not expect too much resistance from right wing radicals.

"They can be at most a temporary disruptive factor, because of their threats of violence. But in political terms, the conservative movement is already out of the running. There appears to be greater fear abroad of a right wing takeover, but I don't think that the chance of this is very great."

Does he then deny that there is a "third force" in the ultra-right wing faction within the police and security forces that is inciting violence in the black townships?

Certainly he acknowledges that there are military people and policemen who "have right wing sympathies."

Wimpie is convinced that they will be exposed to public contempt and excluded from any role. "There will be incidents, but there will be no major right wing movement within the police."

He refers to a recent study that shows that approximately 30 percent of the white population has a right wing

orientation. According to the state president's brother, the number of actually "converted" right wing individuals is less than 18 percent.

"The others are scared people who feel threatened because established forms of security are now falling away. The more successful the government, the more people who will leave the right wing movement."

He presents a comparable picture of the black radical part of the population. He estimates hard core of that group as 30 percent. At the moment, the ANC [African National Congress] is acting as an umbrella organization covering a large number of black groups. He expects that the majority of the ANC's supporters will form a large non-radical "center group." "Approximately 80 percent of the whites and 70 percent of the blacks will belong to this center group."

Wimpie does not support sanctions. "The more success the government has with lifting sanctions—especially with restoring sporting and cultural ties—the more people who will be brought away from right wing politics."

Was it sanctions that changed your brother?

"This is what people in the United States and the Netherlands would like to think. And within the ANC there are also people who are saying that sanctions forced the government to the negotiating table." But this is only partially true, he says. It is indeed true that isolation by the rest of the world could not be maintained, but he notes other factors that contributed to the so-called conversion of F.W. de Klerk.

First of all, the realistic observation that apartheid does not work, that the system was on the verge of collapse. In addition, the recognition that apartheid is immoral and cannot withstand the test of justice and fairness. Also, the role of the "enlightened" group within the white community ("of which I myself am one of the leaders") cannot be underestimated.

His brother F.W. simply "inflicted the official mortal wound." Wimpie is anxious to rectify the myth of the so-called conversion of F.W. de Klerk.

"He is an intelligent, reasonable, and honest man, and he came to the decision when he accepted his new office. Even though he had a so-called obscurantist past, he could see that apartheid is a dead-end road. It was nothing like the conversion of Paul on the road to Damascus. It was simply a hard, clearheaded political observation."

He expects that it will take about another generation before racial integration becomes a reality in schools, neighborhoods, churches, and in marriages. He bases this estimation on rational considerations as well.

The urbanization of society is a worldwide phenomenon and will continue to take place after the abolition of

apartheid. "The well-to-do blacks will move out of Soweto, and it will become a ghetto of poor people."

He also notes a worldwide phenomenon whereby people are grouping themselves according to the "birds of a feather" principle.

"Race and racial preference are present throughout the world." Schools with 98 percent whites and 2 percent blacks, and vice versa, will continue to exist, just as in other countries.

"This is part of the earthly division according to the Bible."

* Cultural Group: Afrikaans Nonnegotiable

91AF0394C Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
28 Nov 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Rapportryers Say Yes to Third Official Language"]

[Text] Afrikaans is not the property of a single population group, and there can even be a third official language on a regional basis. These are two of the positions adopted by the Junior Rapportryers concerning the status of Afrikaans as an official national language in a new South Africa.

The movement presented these positions yesterday in a statement. "The majority of the colored people and a significant number of blacks also use Afrikaans in their homes," the statement said.

The Junior Rapportryers call for the preservation of Afrikaans as an official language. However, the group believes that it is necessary that official documentation and communication be accessible to the broadest possible part of the population.

"Even the recognition of a third official language on a regional basis is recommended in order to realize this goal.

"In its current stage, the language debate is a political debate. However, the wingspan of Afrikaans is wider than politics, and it is central to numerous areas of development in South Africa," according to the statement.

"(We)... recognize the role and rights of a multitude of languages as an inalienable fact in South Africa, and strongly encourage links with and understanding for other language groups.

"Indeed, the movement believes that a future South Africa can be built only on sound communication among all its inhabitants. But communication presupposes a certain proficiency with language," the statement says.

According to the movement, the status of Afrikaans as an official language is nonnegotiable. The value of Afrikaans as a bridge-builder between various language groups cannot be underestimated.

* White Homeland's Development Projects Discussed

91AF0460A Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
5 Dec 90 p 11

[Text] The Orandese have numerous plans for their new fatherland: They want to increase rainfall there. They want to expand employment. They want to build roads with cement. And they want to finance hospitals partially with erasers and rulers.

Cement roads are not only cheaper than asphalt roads, they also help to increase rainfall in the area, says Mr. Andre Putter, contact person for the Orandee Development Corps (OOK).

A research ship is under construction at Meyerton in the Vaal Triangle. This ship will be used for research in the Atlantic Ocean—the same ocean where they want to build a wall to force away the cold Benguela current.

Recent stories to the effect that it is an airship are pure bunk, says Mr. Putter.

The Orandese are also thinking about providing in-service training in the schools, which will help the economy. "The first graders will make erasers, for example, and the second graders rulers. These goods will then go to a central point in the country, from whence they will be exported in order to fill the state's coffers.

"Some of that money, for example, will be used to finance hospitals," Mr. Putter says proudly.

Speaking of hospitals, the average citizen will not receive free hospital care. "He will have to pay 20 percent of the costs himself. In this way, we will keep people from going to the hospital for hypochondria."

The Orandese also have a plan to develop their professional work force quickly. Say little Jannie wants to be a doctor. He will begin in-service training at the age of 14, and at 20 he will be a doctor!

"Take the fifth grade accounting apprentices. Why can't they do the community's (hotels', butchers', etc.) books while they are studying the subject?" Mr. Putter wonders.

Upington, and not Olifantshoek, will be the capital of Orandee, he says. "However, we believe that a town like Olifantshoek will be a city some day."

According to Mr. Putter, businessmen who do business in the proposed Orandee and do not agree with the Orandese's plans need not be concerned. "There are thousands of patriotic Afrikaners in South Africa who are ready to buy their businesses at a very good price."

Now that he mentions it, who wouldn't be eager to move to a country where hospitals are financed in part by erasers and rulers, and where your company's books are managed by fifth graders?

*** AHI Supports Business Ties Between Groups**

91AF0460C Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
5 Dec 90 p 3

[Text] The African Trade Institute (AHI) has the greatest opportunity to effect unity in the country by bringing people together, Mr. Engels von Ludwig, the chief regional director of that organization, said yesterday.

"Whether you are CP [Conservative Party], AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement], or ANC [African National Congress], there is a place for you in the African Trade Institute," Mr. von Ludwig said in an interview in Pretoria.

The AHI is not run on a political basis. It is not a cultural organization, and the church does not play a role. It is the umbrella organization for most of the country's Afrikaner chambers of commerce.

"The Afrikaner chambers of commerce must extend a hand across borders," Mr. von Ludwig says. The color line is not really meant by this, he says.

The various Afrikaner chambers of commerce are open to anyone who subscribes to the objectives and mission of the AHI, regardless of his race or color. The AHI has been open to all ever since its founding in 1942. The only condition is that the language medium be Afrikaans.

By extending a hand across borders, he means, among other things, Afrikaner chambers of commerce and the South African Chamber of Business (SABEK), which are undertaking joint projects, Mr. von Ludwig says.

The Afrikaner Chamber of Commerce in Nigel, together with that town's SABEK branch, recently held a dinner that went very well.

Many Afrikaner chambers of commerce have already helped found business organizations in black residential areas.

There are already Afrikaner chambers of commerce with Indian members.

This year, the Afrikaner chambers of commerce have had a better opportunity than in the past to mean something to their members.

With the difficult economic conditions and the uneasy labor situation, the chambers of commerce have held talks with labor unions and organizations that wanted to begin consumer boycotts. The chambers of commerce were actually able to conduct talks with the government.

*** New Afrikaner Group Reveals Right Wing Disunity**

91AF0460D Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
7 Dec 90 p 16

[Text] Further splintering in the ranks of right wing Afrikaners appears to be inevitable now that the Afrikaner People's Guard (AV) of Professor Carel Boshoff

has been forced from the mainstream of the right wing cultural movement by a new organization, the Afrikaner Culture League.

Apparently, that organization will now assume the role of cultural standard-bearer for right wing Afrikaners, a role that has been played by the AV since the cultural schism along political lines in 1984.

Although right wing cultural leaders who were approached deny it, there are strong indications that Prof. Boshoff, the chairman of the AV who fell into disfavor with the Conservative Party [CP] concerning his plans for an Afrikaner state, has now been driven out.

The Culture League was founded last week in Pretoria. Among the members of its interim board of directors are prominent right wing cultural leaders who together with Prof. Boshoff suffered a major defeat at the turbulent 1984 Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Associations (FAK) conference in East London. That defeat effected the split.

Mr. Mossie van den Berg is the chairman of the Culture League. He is joined on the new organization's interim board of directors by two prominent figures in the earlier fight for control of the FAK, Professor Koos Lombard and P.G. Nel.

Prof. Lombard sharply attacked Prof. Boshoff with regard to his national state idea at the end of last year at a secret CP meeting.

At that time, a storm was unleashed in right wing circles surrounding Prof. Boshoff, based on allegations that he had engaged in talks with the ANC [African National Congress].

His wife, Mrs. Anna Boshoff, the deputy leader of the AV, told BEELD that the AV itself decided not to be affiliated with the Culture League.

She does not know how the new organization will provide services. It was unacceptable to the AV that the Culture League is both a member organization and an organization accepting affiliates. It must be either one or the other.

The AV is established and is doing its work. It will continue to do so, Mrs. Boshoff said.

Mr. van den Berg said, when questioned, that he "does not think that the AV is very happy about the emergence of the new organization."

From the very beginning, there was a need for an umbrella cultural organization (for those with a right wing orientation) with which one could be affiliated. The AV is still regarded as a family organization.

Mr. van den Berg denied that the developments have to do with dissatisfaction over Prof. Boshoff's alleged talks

with the ANC and his plans for a national state. However, it is a well-known fact that Prof. Boshoff has been sharply criticized for this within CP ranks.

At the secret CP meeting on 1 December of last year, Prof. Lombard said: "There was already crushing criticism of Prof. Boshoff's Orange River idea from academic circles. The national state idea has been very much to our detriment and has ruined the People's Guard in certain places."

* Afrikaner Cultural Group Supports New Era

91AF0460F Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
11 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Andre le Roux: "'ATKV [Afrikaans Language and Culture Association] Is Squarely Part of New SA [Republic of South Africa]"; first paragraph is BEELD introduction]

[Text] The ATKV is 60 years old this year. Andre le Roux spoke with the executive director, Mr. Frits Kok, about the organization's activities in recent years, about membership, and about the ATKV in the new South Africa.

Although the Afrikaans Language and Culture Association is still an exclusively white organization after 60 years, it is squarely part of the new South Africa.

"As a cultural organization, the ATKV makes no apologies for the fact that it is Afrikaans and for the Afrikaner," adds Mr. Frits Kok, executive director of the ATKV.

The ATKV believes in three things: "That the Afrikaner has the right to practice his own culture, but never at the expense of any other cultural group; we adamantly believe that it is absolutely essential that Afrikaner culture be recognized and understood by other groups (which is why we have bridge-building projects, through which other ethnic groups are exposed to Afrikaner culture and Afrikaners to other cultures); and we adamantly believe that Afrikaans is not only the property of the Afrikaner, but of everyone who wants to speak it."

It is an apolitical organization; in fact, political officials cannot be members: "We do not believe that a cultural organization today should be politically subservient; we believe that we can bring together people of various political convictions through culture."

And whenever the ATKV promotes culture through prizes or monetary grants, it does not assign color to its awards, says Mr. Kok, although the by-laws ever since the ATKV's founding in 1930 have limited membership to "a certain ethnic group."

This means whites only, just like to a large extent the signs at an ATKV beach facility like Hartenbos say: "Private property—right to access reserved." This also

means that members must definitely be Afrikaner railroad workers—for whom the ATKV was originally established.

The ATKV, with its approximately 60,000 registered members (children not included) is thus an exclusive organization on the basis of its by-laws. Its motto, "Maintain and Build," means this: "As a cultural organization, the ATKV sees the preservation and maintenance of Afrikaner culture as part of its job in promoting culture. In the ATKV, there has been a very strong emphasis over the past decade on the dynamic, the constructive component of Afrikaner culture," says Mr. Kok.

Opening up the organization is a sensitive issue, he says: "We do certain things with a low profile. Membership has always been limited to white transportation officials. But as far as our activities are concerned, they extend much further than membership; at the beginning of this decade, membership was expanded to include all groups. The ATKV long ago resolved that it would be a part of the new South Africa. When the time is ripe, its members will decide on membership."

The ATKV is financially self-sufficient. It is financed from membership dues, its own business enterprises, and to a certain extent sponsors help with cultural promotion.

This promotion of culture consists of a wealth of projects that are generally recognized.

During the first 30 years of its existence, the organization for the most part held major national festivals, such as the Orange Free State centenary, and collected money for monuments. Over the past 30 years, projects have in practice been focused at certain areas:

The promotion of amateur and school theaters has been under way for more than a quarter century. This was later expanded to Campus Theater in order to encourage the writing of Afrikaans plays. "The five years before Campus Theater (1983) produced only five plays, only one of which could be staged; as of today, nearly 50 full-length plays have been written, one-third of which have been presented on professional stages and 10 of which have been published," says Mr. Kok. A theater project for teacher colleges where Afrikaans is not used as the first language was also launched. This project is primarily for black students.

There is also the light music competition for young amateurs, Crescendo; two classical music competitions, Forte (for amateurs from ages 18 to 30) and Prelude (for schoolchildren); music and lyric evenings; work sessions and courses such as directing and youth leadership courses; the first full-fledged writing school was set up on a professorial level at Potchefstroom University; writing courses for playwrights and light Afrikaans music, for TV screenplays, and next year for radio dramas as well.

In addition, there is the major ATKV prose award for good popular prose; a TV director award, a radio award, an advertising award, and an award for the best one-act play.

In cooperation with the Foundation for Science, Art, and Technology, a colloquial Afrikaans competition is offered for people who do not speak Afrikaans as their mother language.

Moreover, the ATKV is also involved in various ad hoc projects to promote Afrikaans culture. (The organization established a chair in Afrikaans culture and folklore at the University of Stellenbosch in 1964. The ATKV is also the father of the South African Emergency Aid League and the Dispatch Riders Movement.)

What has the ATKV achieved over the past 60 years?

Mr. Kok says: "I would say that the greatest accomplishment of the ATKV during the first 30 years of its existence was bringing Afrikaners together around their own culture; secondly, bringing them together around festivals and memorials. A feeling of pride and a sense of our own identity were created.

"Over the past 30 years, the ATKV has emphasized practical promotion campaigns. We have moved away from building monuments towards living monuments, where you let people act in theater productions, let them speak and write Afrikaans. In practice, the ATKV over the course of many years has appropriated Afrikaans not only for itself, but has also marketed Afrikaans as a means of communication for all those who want to use it."

And the ATKV is positive about the future of Afrikaans, with no concern about its official status.

"It's really hair-splitting, because Afrikaans is in fact an official language and is used by most people. The ATKV understands that we will have more than one official language, but it is not afraid that Afrikaans will not be one of the official languages."

* Black Physicist Denies ANC Harassment

91AF0395C Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English
21 Nov 90 p 5

[Article: "Physicist Denies Report"]

[Text] SA's [Republic of South Africa's] only black nuclear physicist, Gordon Sibiya, yesterday denied a LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH report that he was about to emigrate to the United States because ANC [African National Congress] comrades had "sabotaged" his science courses for black children at Wits University.

The report was published in BUSINESS DAY on Monday.

In a faxed statement issued by the Science and Engineering Academy of SA, of which he is chairman, Sibiya described the claim as "preposterous."

THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH's Johannesburg correspondent, Fred Bridgland, said yesterday he stood by his report. He said he could not understand Sibiya's denial.

Sibiya's statement referred to a "DAILY TELEGRAPH" report. He said: "I am in the United States on professional as well as business matters for a couple of weeks. To say that I have quit SA is the figment of the writer's own imagination. Overall, I enjoy a good relationship with the ANC and other political organisations."

He felt the "rather bizarre article" warranted a public apology, and he intended taking the matter further on his return to SA.

* Broederbond 'Adaptability' Said Essential

91AF0395E Cape Town THE ARGUS in English
26 Nov 90 p 6

[Commentary by Michael Morris, Political Correspondent: "Broeder Power"]

[Text] Long associated with secret strategies to win Afrikaner superiority, the Broederbond appears to have outstripped its grim, conservative reputation to emerge as a significant factor in the politics of the "new" South Africa.

It is doubtful that it is any less secret or any more accountable to the millions of people who are subjected, however indirectly, to its influence.

But it is clearer now than before that the Broederbond is playing a significant role in formulating the survival strategy of the Afrikaner, and that this 71-year-old secret society is being used to help acclimatise Afrikaners to the goals of the FW era.

It has been evident for some time that National Party [NP] policies reflected the AB's [Afrikaner Broederbond] secret machinations.

There is a remarkable resemblance, for instance, between Broederbond document and the NP's five-year plan, the party's 1989 election strategy.

The latest reflection of this is in an apparently secret document—once discovered, it was widely publicised abroad—which accepts among other things that there will be a black majority in South Africa's future government, that group interests may transcend colour differences and, perhaps most significantly, that the abolition of statutory discrimination should not be seen as "concessions," but as a "prerequisite" for white survival.

In fact, there is nothing necessarily startling in the Broederbond's shift from arch defender of white dominance to the current pragmatism underpinning Mr de

Klerk's promises because, as an organisation, it has always committed itself to the ideals of the incumbent power.

The essence of the Bond's survival is the essence of Afrikaner survival—adaptability.

Keeping pace with power, rather than with what fearful English-speakers may have wrongly identified as the inflexibly conservative constituency of Afrikanerdom, the Broederbond today is a creature of the modern National Party.

And yet this is precisely its weakness.

With upwards of 17,000 members, the Broederbond is uniquely placed to measure the mood of its people, and to influence them.

But it is the very people Mr De Klerk must worry about most—the Afrikaner right—who are for all intents and purposes beyond the Broederbond's reach.

Formed in 1918 to protect and promote the interests of the Afrikaners, the Broederbond was remarkably successful in the decades that followed in securing a place for Afrikaners in an economy dominated by English-speakers, and in establishing Afrikaner predominance in South African politics.

The last leader to have the Broederbond at his right hand was B.J. Vorster: he used the church and the Bond to preserve Afrikaner unity.

Until the 1981 election, 80 percent of Afrikaners voted for the NP. Party and people were very largely at one.

But, under P.W. Botha, the fissure in Afrikaner thinking between *verligtes* and *verkrampes* widened dramatically in 1982 into a political canyon.

One former Broeder sees this as the point at which the organisation "lost its soul" and he counts this "loss" as a liability for an organisation that is too closely wedded to the sectional interest of the Afrikaners as a minority to be of much value in the political homogeneity of the future.

"You cannot develop a new soul for Afrikaners unless you believe their future is in a non-racial country, as part of all 37-million citizens," he noted.

Nevertheless, for better or worse, South Africans can expect to see increasing signs of a Broederbond presence in the decisions of government.

The present chairman of the Bond, Professor Pieter de Lange, succeeded Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, as chairman, and also succeeded him as rector of the Rand Afrikaans University.

This will be a close government/Bond link.

Also drawn further into the inner circle will be the Broeder-led *Nasionale Pers*, all the large Afrikaner-dominated corporations and a wealth of academics whose talents were untapped under P.W. Botha.

Others whose qualifications in business, the bureaucracy and academia will provide the government with fresh counsel.

Even though there have been mutterings in the NP about the undue influence of the Broederbond—this bubbled to the surface at the NP's Cape congress in Port Elizabeth—there is clearly something to be gained, from President De Klerk's point of view and possibly even the country's, from having this powerful organisation buttressing political reform.

But the question remains: How effective can it be in winning over those Afrikaners whose entrenched doubts weigh heavily on progress?

* Post-Apartheid Health Policy Addressed

* ANC Lacks Policy

91AF0341A Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 27-29

[Text] There is an urgent need for wide debate on the formulation of a clause in the ANC's [African National Congress] constitutional guidelines on health and health care for all.

Debate around the constitutional guidelines has tended to focus on the more obvious aspects of a post-apartheid South Africa, such as the future form of government and the economy. The ANC itself has organised local, regional and national workshops to discuss these areas. COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] has organised a worker charter campaign to address the issue of what rights and protection workers should have in a post-apartheid South Africa.

But there is a relative silence on the question of health and health care, a matter of concern to all.

At a South African Health Workers' Congress (SAHWCO) conference in 1989 at which the ANC participated through a telephonic link-up, ANC National Executive Committee member Pallo Jordan was questioned about this omission from the guidelines.

Jordan, a member of the ANC committee which drafted the guidelines, threw the ball back into SAHWCO's court. He replied that the responsibility for developing such a clause was not that of the ANC alone. All democratic forces concerned with health care and social services had to take on this task.

SAHWCO responded to this challenge by presenting for public debate their argument for such a clause. In a booklet called "Health and the Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa," the organisation argues that such a clause should be formulated now.

Since its production, the booklet has begun to initiate debate. It was received with great interest by the ANC, which is due to release a second draft set of constitutional guidelines for discussion. This second draft is likely to include a clause on health and health care. In addition, the ANC has also released a discussion document on health policy.

The demands on health in the Freedom Charter and those that have been brought forward by more recent health campaigns should guide thinking in the formulation of health clause for the new South African constitution, says Sahwco.

It argues that the health clause should include the principles upon which health care in a post-apartheid South Africa would be based. From these principles, would flow a particular health policy and health strategy to give practical effect to the principles and policy.

From the Freedom Charter and recent health campaigns, Sahwco draws out the following principles:

- health care is a basic human right;
- provision of health care is the responsibility of the state;
- health care must be comprehensive;
- the health of workers must be protected;
- there must be commitment to preventive and primary health care;
- there must be mass participation and consultation on health care and health issues;
- privatisation of health care should end;
- health services should be centrally planned and democratically controlled under a national health service;
- health care must be free, and;
- there must be equal and accessible health care for all.

Similar principles are likely to emerge from continuing campaigns around health, such as the Health Charter Campaign, adopted at the Conference for a Democratic Future in 1989.

Given the present gross imbalances in South Africa's health care system, the new constitution must at least contain the principle of equal health care, argues Sahwco. Equal health care can only really be possible if there is a single, non-racial health department.

Although a constitution is unable to address the question of removing present obstacles to equal health care, it must commit the new government to this principle. It might also be useful, says Sahwco, for the new constitution to provide for the role of mass grassroots health structures in a future health system.

Upon examination of how health is dealt with in the constitutions of other countries, Sahwco found that of the 50 countries they researched, there were four basic ways in which health was tackled:

- there were those countries which made no reference to health or health care at all. Examples here included South Africa, Australia and Finland;

- in some constitutions health care was set out as a right among other health principles and there was a guiding principle for social and economic policy. Sweden, Spain and Guinea-Bissau fall into this category;
- some constitutions went beyond a statement of health principles and included aspects of health policy such as financing and the structure of health care. Nicaragua, Cuba and Portugal are examples of this;
- health care was also used as a means of social control in El Salvador, it was found.

Although the impact of constitutional reference to health and health care on the actual health system yet remains to be examined, Sahwco emphasises that it is beyond doubt that a good constitutional clause on health can be a basis of sound health policy.

Although health is not seen as a priority area among most mass organisations in South Africa, the issue of health and health care has been receiving more attention in recent years.

In the wake of the 1986 Kinross mining disaster, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) focussed attention on health and safety at the workplace. Under the slogan 'Organise Or Die', the union began a campaign to raise awareness of health hazards on the mines and how these could be dealt with. They drew up a safety code and demanded the right to safety stewards and independent union investigations when accident occurred.

Outside the workplace, long-standing grievances about the availability of health care were also being voiced more consistently and determinedly.

In 1988, more than 25,000 people in Natal signed a petition calling for free health care. This was in response to a decision by the Natal Provincial Administration to increase hospital fees. For the first time, pensioners, disabled people and the unemployed were expected to pay for health care.

The campaign against the increases also raised demands for a national health service, decentralisation of health services and equal health care for all.

The defiance campaign of 1989 began with the campaign to desegregate hospitals. Thousands of black patients presented themselves at white hospitals with a clear demand: 'Open all hospitals to all people!'

In March 1990, Johannesburg health workers marched to the JG Strydom Hospital, renamed it the Yusuf Dadoo Memorial Hospital (after the South African Communist Party veteran who died in 1976) and handed a petition to the hospital superintendent.

The petition called for, among others:

- a unitary health service, centrally planned and democratically controlled, adequate and accessible to all;
- immediate suspension of own and general affairs legislation applying to health services and immediate desegregation of all health facilities;

- an end to privatisation as a way to solve the health care crisis, since this would place such care further beyond the reach of those who needed it most;
- a moratorium on all hospital tariffs until an in-depth investigation into these had been concluded;
- any and all considerations of proposed amendments to health legislation be done in consultation with democratic and progressive structures that exist outside the state fold.

A march by Durban health workers in April had similar demands.

Some of these demands have been nurtured by the people of South Africa for more than 35 years. Enshrined in the Freedom Charter is the vision that the health system in a non-racial, democratic, unitary South Africa will have;

- 'sick leave for all workers, and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers', and;
- 'a preventive health system run by the state. Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all with special care for all mothers and young children. The aged, the orphans and the sick shall be cared for by the state. Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all'.

Today, the struggle for these rights continues, as does the struggle to have them constitutionally guaranteed.

* SAHWC: Resources Adequate

91AF0341B Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 29-31

[Text] South Africa has adequate resources to provide free and comprehensive health care for the entire population, according to research by community health experts.

This rebuttal of conventional wisdom on health resources has been made by Dr Nicky Padayachee of the Department of Community Health at the University of the Witwatersrand, also a member of the South African Health Workers' Congress (SAHWC).

His assertion is based on research carried out by both himself and Dr Tim Wilson of the Alexandra Clinic on the provision of health care for all in the Johannesburg area. Extrapolating from this research, Padayachee has shown that South Africa has more than the required number of hospital beds, health personnel as well as money, to provide health for all immediately.

Padayachee cautions that the figures he uses might not be absolutely accurate, because such accuracy would need access to official government documents. But he believes experience in the public health sector and checks for consistency ensure his is a fair reflection of what is possible with existing resources.

Padayachee starts from the following assumptions:

- there will in future be a unitary health system—all health workers will work under a single national department of health;
- the national health system (NHS) will be based on primary health care;
- the NHS will promote equity and all citizens will have equal rights to the best health care the country can provide;
- health care will be accessible and there will be points of first contact close to where people live and work;
- health services will be affordable to all and no one will be denied health care simply because of not being able to pay for it;
- the NHS will provide community participation and fundamental to its approach will be decentralisation of day-to-day decision-making;
- the NHS will be based on existing resources in the health sector, although there will be the need for affirmative action and redistribution of resources to primary health care;
- the NHS will encourage innovative management styles and the maximum use of resources as well as the development of all types of health workers to achieve their full potential; and
- the NHS's aims will take precedence over that of development of the private sector and the teaching institute.

On these assumptions, Padayachee believes the backbone of the NHS would be a network of community health centres (CHU). If the primary health care approach were seriously applied, the community health centres and those that control them would have a major say in what hospitals and medical schools provide and how they do so.

Many of South Africa's present health facilities are already close to where people live, fully staffed, owned by the government and waiting to be used properly. Such facilities would be the building blocks for the future national health service.

According to Padayachee, the distribution of community health centres throughout South Africa and their sizes would vary depending on what was available, the local population density, ease of transport and the distance from other facilities.

In general, however, there should be at least some health facility for every 25,000 people and a bigger facility (plus two or three satellites) for every community of 200,000 people. In South Africa about 150 community health centres were needed and about 450-600 smaller neighbourhood clinics. At present there are about 2,424 such community health centres and neighbourhood clinics in the country.

Community health centres and neighbourhood clinics would both need to run basic outreach, outpatient and extension services.

Outreach services would include the immunisation of children, environmental health and control of toxic

hazards, health education, sexual health education, health and welfare services for the elderly, nutritional surveillance and support and home visits to identify those most in need of health care.

Outpatient services would include ante- and post-natal care, family planning, pregnancy testing and diagnosis, and management of common acute and chronic illnesses in children and adults, child abuse and sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS.

Extension services would include health related teaching and research and support for other groups and organisations in the community.

These services, claims Padayachee, can be provided immediately to everybody in South Africa from existing facilities, using the existing staff and within the budgets of existing services. All that is needed is to bring the public facilities under one authority, reallocate some staff, recruit some more full-time or part-time doctors and reorganise the way resources are used.

Training of staff will be very important because the changes proposed by Padayachee would depend to a large extent on changes in the attitudes of health workers and the communities they serve. However, he believes that with clear goals and political support, the task is not impossible.

In certain areas, such as Johannesburg, where an adequate structure already exists, an embargo would have to be placed on extension and development of these until rural areas with inadequate services have developed to a similar level.

Larger community health centres [CHC] could be used to provide more cost-effective services if they included in their range of services a maternity delivery unit and a 24-hour casualty service.

Of the current community health centres, only the Alexandra Health Centre has a full casualty and maternity service. Adding these to other CHCs would take the pressure off hospitals. Although 24-hour services are expensive, compared to other primary health care services, they can be cheaper than most hospital costs.

Quoting the Alexandra Health Centre, Padayachee showed that 30,000 people used the centre in 1989 at a cost of R[and] 50 per person—cheaper than the cost per patient at any of the teaching hospitals and similar to the cost per outpatient at the Transvaal Provincial Administration clinic in Soweto.

Presently, he said, South Africa spent about R200 per person per year for health care. To provide a comprehensive 24-hour, seven-days-a-week service to the whole population, only 25 percent of the present health budget would be required.

There were enough hospital beds—4.8 beds per 100,000 people—provided these were complemented with an adequate and comprehensive national primary health

care service, health services were desegregated and the proper class of hospital bed ratio was established.

There were also already sufficient skilled health workers employed in the public primary health care sector. For every 10,000 people in South Africa there are at present a total of 73.7 health professionals. These include doctors, nurses, pharmacists, dentists and paramedics. The breakdown is as follows:

Doctors	7.8
Dentists	1.3
Pharmacists	2.8
Paramedics	7.7
Nurses	54.0
Total	73.7

Padayachee found that in developing countries there were about 9.9 health professionals for every 10,000 people and in developed countries there were 102. The present number of health professionals compares favourably with these figures.

If the joint staff of the universities and the provinces working at teaching hospitals in South Africa were required to commit 10 percent of their present staff time to providing services and teaching at community health centres, 140 community health centres would be fully staffed.

Moving Towards a Primary Health Care Policy

The ANC discussion paper on health says present conditions are a threat to the health of the majority of the people in South Africa.

It suggests a primary health care approach, as adopted by the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Children's Fund, should guide the development of health policy.

The underlying principles of this approach are:

- Health is a basic human right. In particular, the right to free health care should be part of a future constitution and bill of rights and it should be legally enforceable;
- there should be political commitment to improve the quality of life for all South Africans, especially those who have been denied political power and the fruits of their labour; and
- resources should preferentially be allocated to promote health care of the most vulnerable sections of the community.

The goals that should guide health policy in a post-apartheid South Africa are:

- The promotion of good health;
- the creation of a healthy living and working environment;
- social and economic development;

- provision of adequate living conditions, including the provision of housing, clean water, sanitation and adequate public services;
- healthy working conditions;
- the creation of a comprehensive national health service that will be unified and non-racial, accessible and affordable, give priority to those most in need, and focus on removing and controlling the major diseases, such as malnutrition, tuberculosis, measles, polio and AIDS.

* Urban Foundation Land Reform Paper Criticized

* Perpetuation of Privilege

91AF0343A Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 44-46

[First paragraph is WORK IN PROGRESS introduction; italicized words as published]

[Text] *The Urban Foundation-backed Private Sector Council [PSC] released a major policy document, 'Rural Development—towards a new framework,' in September. The council claims the document 'is one of the most comprehensive studies ever on how South Africa should begin to reconstruct its rural areas as non-racial development regions.' It provides a neat, often useful synthesis of some of the key problems of land and agrarian reform—but Tessa Marcus takes issue with its assumptions and recommendations. She argues that it is a recipe for maintaining the privileges of the few and exploitation of the majority in our countryside.*

There are three types of problem with the Private Sector Council's recommendations for rural development. The first relates to the timing of the report, the second to the process which produced it, and the third to its content. Together, they betray the character of the report and its intentions.

Released just two weeks before President F.W. de Klerk announced the state's intention to repeal the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the document can hardly be considered instrumental in prompting this partial reform measure. In fact, the timing of the report's release raises questions which are very important in judging the integrity of its claims.

Why had the PSC/Urban Foundation remained silent on an issue so fundamental to democracy and human rights when the political climate was not favourable to such reform? Not because of a lack of evidence nor because of an absence of pressure for urgent reform, but rather because rural reform was not conceived of as a means to influence the pace of change in the country.

The report is a thrust into political debate when 'a future non-racial development strategy has not yet been thoroughly thought through in government circles...(and) when there is great uncertainty as to the future of urban, regional and rural development policy.' This suggests that they chose to intervene in order to influence the

direction of the reform, a conclusion substantiated when we look at both the process and the content of the report.

The problem of process arises from how the report was compiled and the claims it makes within it. The PSC commissioned 39 papers from a variety of academics who had to sign a secrecy clause as a condition of contract. Instead of encouraging a free intellectual debate as the findings became available, it seems the PSC adopted a military-style intelligence-gathering operation to arm itself for the 'offensive.'

The PSC also carried out an extensive literature search drawing on the work generated over the past two decades by the handful of democratically minded scholars, field workers and activists who have engaged with the problems of apartheid restructuring in the South African countryside. Whilst this is normal scientific procedure, it is also normal (and ethical) to attribute the source of your ideas—something the report does not do consistently.

Further, the report claims that 'the summary of research and policy proposals put forward...can be seen as the contribution of the private sector and community based leadership' to the problem of rural development. In other words, the report implicitly claims that it is not just the standpoint of the PSC but also of unspecified popular democratic organisations, or their leadership.

Instances of plagiarism and, more importantly, the secrecy surrounding the research beg the question: to what type of consultation process was the report subjected?

What seems most likely is that the process of discussing with particular individuals and organisations was misread as consultation and, worse, as endorsement of the report. This is not a minor issue in the context in which this report is presented, since, for the PSC report to take hold, it has to have the backing of the majority of South Africans.

This is something of which the authors are painfully aware. Thus, they explicitly state that it is not a 'blue-print for unilateral imposition' (who every thought it could be?) but rather that it is offered as 'a contribution to a vigorous national debate.'

The issues raised about timing and process reflect the main problem in the content of the report—its classist perspectives.

'Rural development—towards a new framework' is a singularly classist statement by monopoly capital. It might seem a little discordant to emphasise this aspect at a time when the national effort is directed towards neutralising the most reactionary, reform-resistant elements within the ruling minority. But when it comes to reform and the future it is the different class interests which come to the fore—as this report clearly displays.

Not only does the report uninhibitedly present the point of view of big business, it is also concerned to project this

view as 'objective' and 'neutral,' and as being grounded in science. Yet, both the definition of the problem and the solutions proposed hardly originate from a disinterested and impartial perspective.

In making this criticism, I am not dismissing their ideas and arguments out of hand. Rather I aim to highlight their limitations and shortcomings in so far as the problems of land and agrarian reform in South Africa are concerned.

The PSC rural development report makes some important and (in terms of their origins) ground-breaking assumptions.

South Africa is considered to mean the geographic entity established in 1910. And, whilst the report deals with so-called 'black' and 'white' rural areas, it emphasises the connectedness of these areas, and the common conditions of poverty and the poor quality of life enjoyed by the majority of black people living there.

Of particular interest is the suggestion that *all* rural areas are characterised by underdevelopment. This is contrary to most thinking—popular and academic—about white-owned rural areas: these areas are generally characterised as 'modern' and developed.

What are we to make of this suggestion? 'Modern' production can indeed be 'backward' when it is built upon super-exploited labour, as I have argued elsewhere. Yet there is nothing in their analysis or policy proposals to suggest that the underdevelopment of white-owned commercial agriculture stems from an examination of production relations in the sector.

Indeed, since they are advocates of growth—and South African commercial agriculture displays features of growth—it would seem that what they mean by underdevelopment are the impoverished conditions of life which most black farm workers and dwellers experience. Moreover, they hold, this impoverishment is not a structural condition of the way production is organised in the sector.

Certain logical consequences flow from this problematic position—both in the way the report further defines the problem and in the solutions it proposes.

One is to identify legally created racial barriers as the primary obstacle to be overcome.

The report presents a strongly argued case for the abolition of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts and the Group Areas Act which determine racial ownership and occupation of land in the so-called white areas (and in the so-called homelands). This has been a long standing call which dates back to the very enactment of the 1913 Land Act—and certainly most of South Africa's population does not need to be convinced on the desirability of their repeal.

The problem, however, is that over time the law has been used to entrench a *de facto* white monopoly of ownership. This will not be swept away today merely by the removal of these statutes.

In 1990, '84 percent of households in the rural and dense settlement areas received incomes below the Minimum Living Level' and in 1983 average per capita income per month on white farms was R12. Further, in 1985 'the average investment in a commercial farming unit was in excess of \$650,000.'

Black rural poverty and the high price of commercial farm land that these statistics underscore begs the question: how many among the black rural population will be able to be counted amongst that new category of farmers the report speaks of—those 'who have sufficient resources to purchase existing commercial farms?' My point is: a non-racial land market will not be created simply by removing moribund racial laws.

The report recognises this fact, in part, by suggesting the creation of two other new categories of black farmers. These are 'emergent' small scale arable or intensive livestock farmers without sufficient resources to purchase existing 'farms' and 'communities wishing to lease state-owned grazing land in extensive pastoral farming areas.' Thus, the drops of private black land ownership will be made, with state assistance, into puddles of mostly small-holders submerged in a sea of white monopoly.

In part, the answer is said to lie in the restimulation of all forms of tenancy—with due legal protection. But not only is tenancy in a private land market a very unequal and insecure relation, this proposal also begs the question: why should land be owned by those who do not work it? If people are to be made tenants why should they not be tenants of the state? Why should the rent they pay for land be uncontrolled and used as a source of profit by private landlords rather than being effectively channelled into the social wage essential to give substance and meaning to an affirmative action programme?

There is not much non-racialism in a countryside where land ownership remains mostly in the hands of whites and tenancy is mostly black.

Another logical consequence is to place the creation of a black farming class at the centre of the proposed solution. Black farmers—resourced or 'emergent,' owners or tenants—are to be stimulated through extensive 'farmer support programmes,' to be absorbed into the agricultural production system as it exists.

This is problematic for two related reasons.

Firstly, because commercial agriculture is underdeveloped despite increased production. The poverty of the rural areas not only stems from the racial division of labour but also from the social division of labour, and

especially from the labour forms and social characteristics of the agrarian working class.

Labour in the sector centres on a small stabilised core of on-farm male workers and their families supplemented by a large migrantised and casualised work force drawn from off-farm labour pools. Most of these workers are women and children. In addition, small pockets of labour tenants and a sizeable number of prisoners work in commercial agriculture.

In other words, the profitability of the sector as it is presently structured, depends on the relative cheapness and rightlessness of the workforce. If the structure of production is unchanged then, as the PSC correctly observes, farmers will continue to substitute capital for labour to counteract efforts to improve conditions in the sector.

While the report recognises the problematic nature of 'the economic and political structure' of commercial agriculture, this remains little more than an observation. Its implications are not followed through in the report's policy proposals. In turn, this undermines the weight of its call for the inclusion of agricultural workers in the Labour Relations Act—which, again, comes when the state has already indicated its intention to do so.

The PSC report would have it that black emergent farmers should be absorbed into this milieu of exploitation. They should apparently emulate or even exceed the white example in order to survive in conditions in which they are notably resource-poor and at a disadvantage in comparison to their white counter-parts.

But even then it is an open question as to whether these emergent black farmers would survive given the centralisation, concentration and capital intensity of production in the sector.

There is a second problematic aspect to the concentration on creating a new black farming class: its composition. Surely the focus should fall on the needs and rights of the majority of people who presently work the land—farm workers. This is not to suggest that they have exclusive rights to the land. But their rights cannot be made supplementary or even incidental to a rural reform programme, not least of all for economic reasons. Farming jobs disproportionately influence both the geographical distribution of the population, (as the PSC report points out), and the social conditions of the countryside.

And what about the women? In the report there is a total absence of any reference to women. Yet, as we all know, the racial and class divisions of the South African countryside are further complicated by a gender division which systematically relegates African women to among the most disadvantaged. They make up the majority of rural occupants and the majority of people engaged on the land—either in sub-subsistence farming or mostly as 'casualised' and sometimes as full-time farm workers.

The legacy of patriarchy which pervades much intellectual thinking does not satisfactorily explain the authors' failure to address the problem of gender. Assuming their reforms were gender neutral was mistake enough. But there is a further point. The facts necessitate that redressing inequalities arising from the oppression of women (particularly African women) must be a central consideration of any rural reform programme.

Lastly, we need to look critically at the concepts underlying proposals to carry out the report's recommendations. The 'how' has two components.

The first refers to the theoretical means by which the goal of rural development is to be achieved. The problem here is that equity or fairness does not mean equality. Thus, a rural development strategy which aims for 'growth with equity,' as nice as that sounds, does not presume to redress the inequalities of the countryside. Moreover, the primary 'redistributive' mechanism is assigned to the market, which as we have already seen is structurally loaded against the majority of South Africa's rural population:—black and poor and largely female.

The only redistributive tendencies that market forces display is towards the rich and empowered. In this context, we also need to treat with caution the particular interpretation the report gives to the call for 'growth through redistribution,' which it considers as a supplementary measure.

The other refers to how policy is to be translated into practice, how it is to be implemented. The PSC report has taken the 'cargo' notion of policy on board in full. Policy is viewed as a package (from outside), to be delivered in a given fixed space/time framework (a project), and then evaluated to iron out inevitable 'short-comings.' This approach, although mainstream 'state of the art' and in the mode of thinking of such heavyweights as the World Bank, IMF, most states and many non-governmental organisations, is also highly problematic and needs to be publicly debated.

In sum, the PSC strategy for rural development rests on the creation of a small black farming class, to be absorbed into the predominant system of agricultural production, without impinging on the economic, social and racial privileges of dominant farming interests. Although the proposals make small inroads into racial inequalities, key class, gender and racial issues which affect the majority of South Africa's rural inhabitants remain outstanding.

* Report Uses 'Outdated' Models

91AF0343B Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Nov/Dec 90 pp 47-48

[Article by Aninka Claassens; first paragraph is WEEK IN PROGRESS introduction; italicized words as published.]

[Text] *Aninka Claassens gives a second opinion on that 'comprehensive' Urban Foundation report, and concludes: It's well-researched, alright—but often way off target.*

The Urban foundation's document on rural development has been long awaited. For over five years people working on land issues have heard of the many studies on rural demography, white farmer attitudes and agriculture commissioned by the foundation.

Some years ago we saw a draft policy document which was then put on ice. These documents constitute a unique resource base in the under-researched area of rural development and land issues.

Finally, the results of all this research are published and distributed as a major input to the land reform debate. The foundation calls for the repeal of the Land Act, the Development Trust & Land Act, and other pieces of racially discriminatory legislation.

Barely two weeks after the report is published president F.W. de Klerk announces that the acts will be repealed and stresses the importance of a non-racial land market in a future South Africa.

There is common cause that these Acts must go; they make the right to property subservient to race; they have been used to evict black tenants from their homes and to create the terrible racial inequity in land ownership which exists in our country.

Where dissenting parties differ, is in the necessity and extent to mechanisms and processes to undo the legacy created by the Acts. In this regard it is interesting to look at the Farmer Settlement Programme with which the foundation concludes its rural development programme.

This is the most detailed proposal in the document, with a broken-down budget and a comparison of how existing state funding could be re-channelled to implement the scheme. It is proposed that the state acquire large farms and convert them into small farms for settlement by black tenants. The budget includes the costs of external planning and management. The scheme is expensive and 'would need to be aimed at a relatively small and sophisticated farming population...'

The scheme necessitates that the would-be tenant farmers move from where they lived before to the newly acquired land.

What we have here, essentially, is a centrally planned, externally managed, expensive model which requires the physical moving of people onto what is de facto nationalised land. This kind of approach to rural development has failed and is discredited all over the world. In South Africa, institutions such as the Development Bank have rejected it after burning their fingers and causing irrevocable damage to rural communities.

The scheme contradicts the Urban Foundation's stated principles of bottom-up approach which relies on community participation and takes account of 'regional complexity, diversity and advantage.'

The Urban Foundation has posed the problems of rural South Africa accurately and well. It has set itself impressive guiding principles. Why then does it proceed to fall back on a discredited, outdated model of rural development which, at best, does not address the problems it has posed, and at worst, contradicts the principles it has set itself?

I believe the answer lies in the fact that the foundation has chosen to sidestep the burning issue of the illegitimacy of present property relations in South Africa. Instead of starting from the land claims of dispossessed South Africans, whether they be farmers who were never allowed to rent or buy land, farmers whose land was expropriated on the basis of race, labour tenants who work for no wages to maintain occupation of farms they inherited from their great-grandparents, or people removed from farming land and dumped in the Bantustans, the foundation chooses to start from the assumption, like De Klerk, that existing title deeds must be protected.

Existing white title deeds are the result of a system of property law which prohibited blacks from buying land, leasing land, or protecting what land they had. Our property law legalised forced removals, farm evictions, and the expropriation of black land 'in the public interest.' Political considerations of race have overridden the 'sanctity of private property' for decades.

Now, suddenly, within two weeks of each other, we have the state and capital both expressing deep concern about the unfairness of the Land Act. The timing is significant. The system whereby the whites own most of South Africa needs to be legitimised before a majority government comes to power. Laws which prohibit one section of the population from land ownership on the basis of race, do not bode well for the prospects of white landowners under a black government. Everyone is aware that few blacks have the money to buy land at current prices, and that whites will be reluctant to sell rich farming land. Something has to be seen to be done to alleviate rural poverty and to give black farmers a chance, but not anything which calls into question the validity of white title deeds.

The Urban Foundation has provided extremely valuable material which shows the disjuncture between patterns of land occupation and land ownership. They, more than any other group, have shown that blacks are in *de facto* occupation of land which is nominally owned by whites in the rural areas. In the urban areas they have documented how little effect white laws of property or eviction have had on the demand for, or expression of, rights to land and housing by African people. African people, having been excluded from the terms of apartheid land law, have claimed and expressed their rights to land by

their physical presence and their tenacity in staying put. They have developed systems of tenure and local 'laws' for transacting land which operate in the vacuum created by apartheid land law.

In many cases African people have real rights to land which, while they have been denied by apartheid law, can be upheld in terms of the general principles of property law. The basis of common African claims to land, whether these be birth, inheritance, occupancy, or contractual rights such as purchase or tenancy, are also the basis upon which the system of private property is upheld and defended.

We need to develop mechanisms and legal proposals which confirm existing rights of occupation and land ownership and so heal the disjuncture between the formal legacy of apartheid law and the reality on the ground, and confirm the beliefs and values of all South Africans.

We must consolidate the work already begun in the development of a new system of registering existing rights to land, whether these be by occupation or other forms of ownership. Furthermore, we need to develop processes to adjudicate conflicting claims to land. The registration and adjudication must be linked together so that land transactions cannot be registered until the process of confirming existing rights and solving disputes has been completed.

As long as the 'free market' reigns, land will be bought and sold according to who has money—notwithstanding historical and occupational claims. To say we must have a land claims court is mere rhetoric unless there is provision in the registration process that all contentious transactions be referred to the court.

The Urban Foundation has access to the best expertise in these matters, all of which need to be developed further. But it did not take advantage of the imminent repeal of the Land Act to pursue this direction. Instead, it builds a policy on the debased and racial legacy of existing title deeds. We need to undo the legacy of apartheid land law, not entrench it. To pretend that it can be de-racialised by merely extending it to cover wealthy blacks is cynical and dishonest. It leads to a denial of the very principles of free enterprise, secure ownership, and non-racialism which the Urban Foundation publicly upholds. This makes plain how it is that the foundation reaches the somewhat bizarre position of advocating perpetual tenancy and nationalised land for black farmers.

* Homeland System Blamed for Natal Violence

91AF0346B London THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST in English Oct/Nov/Dec 90 pp 34-38

[Article by Mzala: "The Bantustan System is at the Centre of Natal Violence"]

[Text] From the Drakensburg to the Indian Ocean, the once great and historic hills now stand desolate, as the

earth and the human spirit have torn away like flesh. Down in the countryside valleys women are scratching the red earth for a livelihood as well as burying their dead. Maize hardly reaches the height of a man, much as children no longer grow into old age. In Natal, the soil and the Bantustan politics cannot keep the people alive any longer.

When the late Alan Paton wrote his famous novel "Cry the Beloved Country" in 1948, he spoke of Natal as one of the fairest valleys of Africa, with its rolling hills that were once so grass-covered that one could not see the soil; valleys where one could still hear the forlorn crying of the titihoye (one of the birds of the veld); but valleys which, however, had fallen victim to the processes of deterioration both natural and political. His lament might well have been a forecast of the tragedy that has developed in the country forty years later.

The titihoye does not cry here any more, only the sounds of pangas and gunshots provide the lightning to the dark and cloudy sky.

Looking back now over the past forty years, it seems inevitable that the Bantustan policy of the Nationalist Party should have led to a disaster for the country. The violence that currently characterises Natal, violence which has been used by the government as a pretext for not lifting the state of emergency, is essentially the climax of the apartheid policy of the Bantustans.

Economically designed to keep within their territories all those who are superfluous to the immediate labour requirements of the white industries, and allowing them out only when their labour is required by this or that branch of production, the Bantustans have, as predicted, ended up as overcrowded, eroded and fragmented rural and semi-urban slums without any economic viability of their own except as leisure resorts for tourists seeking the thrills of gambling, pornography and prostitution which are banned in "white" South Africa. The overall social effects of this political experiment on the black people are incalculable.

At the political level, the government had hoped that all the African people would be stripped of their South African citizenship by belonging to different ethnic nationalities, each locked in an "independent" state, in which they would then exercise "their right to self-determination." This strategy has essentially ended up as a disaster, too, except for its side-effect, which has been to create a tiny collaborative black puppet stratum whose entire political existence rests on the survival of the apartheid system. It is this surrogate political force which, over the years, has been the visible channel through which the South African government has unleashed its extreme repression against the rising challenge of the democratic movement.

KwaZulu

KwaZulu, which was among the last of the Bantustans to be accorded the "self-governing" status, has proved to be among the foremost in serving the grand objective of the Bantustan strategy.

If the political design or side-effect of the Bantustan system has been the consolidation of ethnic chauvinism and the corresponding development of an intolerant attitude towards national unity among the oppressed, as well as hostility to their democratic organisations, then neither the Matanzima brothers nor Mangope has surpassed the KwaZulu government leadership in that regard.

It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine how the Natal violence, now claiming thousands of lives, would ever have occurred in the first place if the KwaZulu Bantustan had not been established by the government. The undeniable fact that several leading members of Inkatha's Central Committee have been detained, charged or sued for activities linked to the vigilante actions against the democratic movement, while not a single leader of the ANC [African National Congress], UDF [United Democratic Front], COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] or SACP [South African Communist Party] has ever been in such a position, only serves to demonstrate that even at the Central Committee level of Inkatha's structure there exist individual personalities or undefined organs which are committed to the perpetration of violence in Natal.

Although often presented by its leadership as something of an exception to the Bantustan scheme, the KwaZulu government has in every respect, and for all strategic intents and purposes, been at the service of the apartheid system. While the formal declaration of "independence" might be regarded as the best and, perhaps, the final proof of a Bantustan's collaboration with the apartheid system, this is not the decisive test. Crucial to the apartheid government's political strategy is the division of the oppressed people into ethnic groups as well as the repression of the organisations that seek to unite them in their struggle for liberation. The KwaZulu government fulfilled this role par excellence, without the need to ask for "independence."

With all their "independences" as well as varying degrees of repression of the democratic movement, the Transkei and the Ciskei never turned the country into mass killing fields in the manner in which Natal has become the 'Valley of a Thousand Deaths'.

Popular Rejection

When in the early 1950s the government first introduced the idea that the Zulu people, like other Africans, were to be administered as an exclusive ethnic entity by government-appointed chiefs, the implementation of the project aroused such fierce popular opposition that, without exaggeration, an open revolt in districts such as

Thokazi, near Nongoma, turned these areas into semi-insurrectionary zones. These events were followed by mass public trials and deportations of non-collaborating chiefs. Chief Albert Lutuli, then President of the ANC, was one of those chiefs who were removed from office for refusing to collaborate with the government in the implementation of this policy.

Contrary to several public statements uttered by Chief Buthelezi to the effect that he "stomped the length and breadth of KwaZulu" leading the campaign to oppose the Bantu Authorities Act, the facts of history show that he never took up a position that challenged this government policy at the time. In a letter written to the NEW AGE newspaper (December 17, 1959) Chief Buthelezi admits that he never "ever declared any hostility to the establishment of Bantu Authorities" and "I have never opposed the Government either by an act of commission or omission."

Yet the Bantu Authorities Act had been one of the six laws which had been selected by the ANC as the focus of protest by the 1952 Defiance Campaign. It would seem, therefore, that Chief Buthelezi's non-hostility to such a repressive law, a law that sought ultimately to deprive the Zulu people of their South African citizenship, provided the basis for the government's initial trust that he would be one of those chiefs who, unlike Chief Lutuli, could be relied upon to shoulder the unpopular task of convincing his people about the need to accept such an Act.

Chief Buthelezi has also argued that he only took up the role as a leader of the KwaZulu government because, following the Rivonia arrests, there was no other chance of serving his people in politics except through the Bantustan system, which alone offered an avenue for criticising the apartheid system without the risk of arrest. Now that the Rivonia prisoners have been released and the political organisations unbanned, implying the opening up of possibilities to oppose apartheid outside of the Bantustan system, the question must be asked why Chief Buthelezi continues to operate within the KwaZulu government structure.

Dismantling Bantustans

It is within the context of these questions that the democratic movement needs to place the call for the immediate dismantling of the Bantustans at the head of the agenda of the campaign to stop the vigilantes in Natal. This matter must ultimately be presented in a manner that goes beyond an exercise in dealing with effects, such as whether or not Chief Buthelezi, or any other Bantustan official for that matter, occupies this or that post in the system.

It is the KwaZulu Bantustan that provides the social facilities and the protection machinery for the vigilantes. As the effective ruling party in KwaZulu, Inkatha functions only through the structures of this Bantustan. And as long as those structures fit into the apartheid strategy like a plug into a socket, Inkatha will continue to

transmit the violent apartheid current that has caused the deaths of so many people.

Central to any strategy dealing with the Bantustan question is the mobilisation of the rural masses and their organisations as a mighty force of resistance against apartheid. Results may not be quick and easy, but a basis will be laid for irreversible progress on the path towards the dismantling of apartheid.

It is this sense, and perhaps in this sense alone, that Bantustans should be regarded as terrains of struggle.

Gatsha's Police Chief

Meanwhile an inkling of the apartheid regime's intentions in KwaZulu has been provided by the recently appointed KwaZulu police chief Jac Buchner in an interview published in the SOWETAN newspaper (July 31, 1990).

Speaking to a small group of foreign journalists in his office at Ulundi, Buchner said that before coming to KwaZulu he had spent 23 years fighting the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations. He was a leading state witness in trials of "black revolutionaries." He had a dossier on every member of the ANC, he boasted.

"I was chief of Pretoria's terrorist research centre and it was my task to do as much as I could to disrupt the ANC and spoil their attempts to bring South Africa down."

The SOWETAN report goes on:

"Buchner says the ANC and the Communist Party set out to destroy the Zulu nation and its leaders because they feared the seven million Zulus could form an all-powerful alliance with South Africa's five million whites, dominating a handful of smaller tribes.

"The only way you can destroy that (possibility) is to sideline the zulu nation," he said.

"Buchner believes in the potential of a whites-Zulu alliance. He says South Africa's future is forming along tribal lines and the Zulus traditionally form the biggest and most solid ethnic grouping.

"He recalled being told as a child: 'The man who holds the Zulu by the hand controls South Africa.'

"I don't know if I'm in the right place or the wrong place," he added. "Maybe this is just being facetious but if Buthelezi becomes president, maybe he'll look after me. I think I'm in the right place."

KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of Inkatha, which has just converted itself into a 'national' political party, is also Minister of the KwaZulu Police and Buchner's boss. The SOWETAN comments: "Perhaps his most difficult task under the circumstances is to win recognition as an impartial administrator of justice."

SACP Views Economic Policy Options

91AF0346A London THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST in English Oct/Nov/Dec 90 pp 20-33

[Article by Phineas Malinga: "Nationalisation or Free Enterprise?"]

[Text] In its programme adopted in 1989, The Path to Power, the South African Communist Party declares [SACP]:

"It must be one of the basic policies and aims of the national democratic state to raise the living standards of the people and, in particular, eradicate the centuries-old injustices perpetrated against the black majority. This applies to wages and job opportunities, education, housing, health and other amenities.

"In order to satisfy the needs of the people and ensure balanced and rapid development of the economy, it will be necessary to ensure popular control over vital sectors of the economy. This will entail the continual strengthening of the state sector in the mining, heavy industry, banks and other monopoly industries. The national democratic state will define the general parameters of economic activity. In addition, it must ensure that workers in particular and the people in general play an important role in the running of enterprises and that the necessary cadres are trained and deployed to serve the national interest. To fully eliminate the system of colonial domination, it will be necessary to ensure democratic ownership and control over decisive aspects of the economy. At the same time, the state will protect the interests of private business where these are not incompatible with the public interest.

"This applies equally to land distribution: there is an imperative need to restore land to the people. This will take a variety of forms, including state ownership of large-scale farms, distribution of land among the land-hungry masses and state assistance to them, the setting up of co-operative farms and guaranteeing the freedom of movement and settlement. It will also entail the task of overcoming the enormous economic underdevelopment of many rural regions."

In these words, our Party programme summarises the policies which we believe should be adopted in the economic sphere at the stage of the national democratic revolution. These policies fall into place in the broad scheme of our programme. Since we do not believe that socialism is the objective of the national democratic revolution, the economic policies which we propose for that revolution fall far short of being socialist. They are, obviously, compatible with our aim of moving on from the stage of national democracy to that of socialism. They are not, however, devised with the sole aim of facilitating that future transformation. It is our aim that the national democratic revolution should itself confer real benefits on the people. Though national democracy

is not our final goal, it is nevertheless a goal which has its own validity, not simply a stepping-stone to something else.

The Freedom Charter

The question of economic policy has also received the attention of the broad liberation movement. The Freedom Charter contains the following well-known section.

"The People Shall Share In the Country's Wealth!"

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to the people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people; All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions."

The broad thrust of this formulation is clearly compatible with our Party programme. The Charter, however, is a short document which can only lay down basic principles. These principles have served the movement well during a period of more than thirty years. They are as fresh and as valid today as when they were first written. The movement has now, however, entered a period in which basic principles have to become the foundation of detailed policies. There are details to be filled in, general ideas to be concretely defined, practical questions to which principles have to be applied.

Some work towards these ends has already been done. The Constitutional Guidelines approved as a basis for discussion and consultation throughout the movement by the NEC [National Executive Committee] of the ANC in 1988 contain the following propositions under the heading "Economy":

"The state shall ensure that the entire economy serves the interests and well-being of all sections of the population. The state shall have the right to determine the general context in which economic life takes place and define and limit the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership and use of private productive capacity.

"The economy shall be a mixed one, with a public sector, a private sector, a co-operative sector and a small scale family sector.

"Co-operative forms of economic enterprise, village industries and small scale family activities shall be supported by the state. The state shall promote the acquisition of managerial, technical and scientific skills among all sections of the population, especially the blacks.

"Property for personal use and consumption shall be constitutionally protected."

The function of the Constitution Guidelines is to explain and amplify the Freedom Charter, not to change or supersede it. Nevertheless, the Guidelines were written with the benefit of thirty years of experience since the Charter was written and it would be surprising if there were not some difference of emphasis between the two documents. The difference of emphasis which does appear can be summarised by saying that the Guidelines are more cautious than the Charter about the role of the state in the economy.

The reason for this caution is no mystery. In Africa, Europe and Asia alike, the experience of the last thirty years suggests that state control of a national economy is not as simple a matter as it appeared to be in the middle years of this century. This experience has produced a variety of results. It lies behind the fashion for "privatisation" first set by the Thatcher government in Britain and now being followed in South Africa among other countries. In China it has led to a retreat from certain forms of state control. The Soviet Union has already made important changes in the methods of management of nationalised industry and there seem to be further changes to come. Throughout Africa there is a trend toward reconsideration of the respective roles of the public and private sectors of the economy.

Nationalisation

During the months since February 1990, the question whether, and to what extent, the ANC proposes to nationalise industry has received endless attention. Not only South African businessmen but also foreigners are fascinated by this question—for the obvious reason that their interests are at stake. The amount of attention devoted to this point is excessive but some discussion of it is unavoidable.

Neither the Freedom Charter nor the Constitutional Guidelines actually uses the word "nationalisation" but the sentence in the Freedom Charter dealing with "transfer to the ownership of the people as a whole" has been generally understood to mean nationalisation.

Nationalisation, however, is not a simple concept, as an examination of the three categories of property singled out by the Charter for "transfer" will soon reveal. The first of these is "the mineral wealth beneath the soil" and it has obviously been given this prominent position because of the great importance of the mining industry to the South African economy. The authors of the Charter clearly had in mind that the mining industry generates enormous quantities of wealth, the distribution of which is a matter of social importance, and that the control of the mining industry confers upon those who exercise both economic and political power.

It is, however, important to bear in mind that "the mineral wealth beneath the soil" is not private property under existing South African law. This is an important point of difference between South Africa and many other countries. In Britain, for instance, a landowner is considered to be the owner of minerals found beneath his

land. Therefore the British coal mining industry had to pay "royalties" to landowners, and many aristocratic families of feudal origin received a new lease of life in the nineteenth century for this reason. The purely parasitic position occupied by these landowners was a long-standing grievance among British mineworkers and the nationalisation of the coal industry in 1947 had as one of its major objectives the ending of this system.

In South African law, however, minerals have never been the property of landowners. They belong to the state, which grants mining leases to the companies who operate mines. These leases involve a payment to the state and a redistribution of the proceeds of mining could be achieved without nationalisation, by a change in the terms on which mining leases are granted.

The Chamber of Mines

This, however, would leave the power of the Chamber of Mines substantially intact. That power has long been distrusted, not only by our liberation movement. The programme of the Nationalist Party include a proposal for the nationalisation of the gold mines for some years before they come to power in 1948. That part of their programme was never implemented because they came to see that their aim of increasing the role of Afrikaners in the management of the mining industry could be achieved by other means and that big capital was perfectly willing to enter into an alliance with them.

Forty years later, there is no shortage of hints that big capital would be prepared to enter into an alliance with the ANC if its position in South Africa were to be left substantially intact. The objective of obtaining a fair share of jobs in the mining industry for Africans is probably also attainable by means short of nationalisation. A certain degree of Africanisation of the upper ranks of the work force would be gladly undertaken by at least some of the mining houses. It might not take a great deal of pressure to push them further, into a vigorous campaign of affirmative action to redress the consequences of a century of racial discrimination in the industry.

If that were so, would it be an acceptable basis on which to leave the mining industry in the hands of its present owners? The answer has to be no. The power of the Chamber of Mines has been and is excessive. It has been and is being abused. To the century-old problem of the oligopolistic organisation of the mining industry has been added in recent decades the overwhelmingly dominant position of a single company—the Anglo American Corporation. The relatively progressive views held on several subjects by Anglo American do not alter the fact that its position is one which would be considered intolerable even in the heartlands of capitalism. When Standard Oil threatened to dominate the U.S. oil industry, the U.S. government intervened under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to break it up. No company occupies a position in the British, French, German or

Japanese economy comparable to that occupied by Anglo American in the South African economy.

Does it then follow that the gold mines must be nationalised? Before answering this question, we must note that nationalisation can take different forms. What might be described as the classic form is that adopted in the Soviet Union, in the East European people's democracies other than Yugoslavia, by the British Labour Party and by a number of African and Asian governments, some avowedly socialist and others not. This involves the state taking over an entire industry and then running it in a centralised fashion, either under the direct control of a ministry or through the medium of a corporation created and controlled by the state.

Many Problems

This form of nationalisation has produced problems. Firstly, the sheer size of the organisations involved tends to lead to bureaucracy and lack of flexibility. Secondly, the officials who run such organisations tend to think that, having abolished the profit motive, they have also abolished the need for accountancy. They set themselves targets in terms of quantities of goods produced, on the plausible assumption that the more goods are produced, the more the wealth of the community is increased. They pursue these targets single-mindedly and are congratulated when they achieve them. Meanwhile, the question of the cost of production is swept under the carpet. The fact that the same, or better, goods could be produced with less labour and less raw materials is ignored.

The Soviet Union has suffered severely from these problems. In recent years, efforts have been made to solve them by decentralisation, offering economic incentives to separate enterprises and subjecting all enterprises to the rule of "full cost accounting." These solutions are making progress but it is as yet too early to say that an entirely successful system exists.

Meanwhile, the British electricity industry has thrown up a vivid illustration of the tendency for costs to be concealed under a system of centralised state administration of a large industry. For decades the nationalised British electricity industry worked on the assumption that nuclear power was cheaper than power produced by burning coal or oil. The political origin of this assumption is clear—successive British governments wanted to have a nuclear power industry for military and prestige reasons. But when the Thatcher government decided to privatise electricity and the real sums had to be done, in public, it turned out that nuclear power is in fact considerably more expensive.

A crucial fact about the South African gold mining industry is that it produces a commodity which has to be sold on world markets at a price which the mines can perhaps influence by their marketing tactics but certainly do not control. The welfare of the industry—not only its owners but also its workers—and its contribution to the national balance of payments depend on its ability to keep production costs per ounce of gold below the

market price. Does the ANC possess an alternative cadre of senior management who could be guaranteed to improve upon the performance of the present management in this respect? The answer is no. What then would be achieved by changing the structure of the industry from near monopoly to complete monopoly and putting civil servants in charge? The answer is doubtful. Therefore the application of the classical form of nationalisation to the gold mines is a project of doubtful worth.

Worker Control

An alternative form of nationalisation, associated particularly with Yugoslavia, is that in which enterprises retain their separate identities and freedom of action but are controlled by their workers (in practice this means that the management are elected by the workers under standard procedures laid down by law). This has attractions: it is a democratic system which avoids excessive bureaucracy, allows enterprises to operate flexibly and ensures that they are accountable for the costs of their operations. On the other hand, it fails to facilitate the rational planning of the economy as a whole and is open to the danger that the workers in a particular enterprise may become a vested interest, behaving in ways contrary to the interests of consumers and of the community in general.

A third problem of nationalisation is typified by France. The original postwar nationalisations were carried out neither by the Communists nor even by the socialists but by General de Gaulle. His motives were mixed and pragmatic. In the financial sector, he wished to give the government a sufficient grip on the economy to enable it to guide the process of post war reconstruction. In certain other cases, firms were nationalised because of the role which their owners had played in collaborating with Nazi Germany.

Nationalised enterprises, as a general rule, retained their identities and had to compete with others which remained in private hands. The make-up of particular sectors has thus been able to change over the years. In the car manufacturing industry, for example, there was one large nationalised company—Renault—and three smaller private companies—Peugeot, Citroen and Simca. The three have since merged, to give a sector divided between one public and one private company. In insurance, the four largest companies were nationalised and for over thirty years those four continued to occupy the first four places in the industry league table. Recently, however, a privately-owned company has expanded to such an extent that it now ranks second.

Though this system has been the subject of much controversy between the parties of the right and those of the left, it has remained substantially intact and has on the whole worked well. By giving the government an active and weighty presence in key sectors of the economy, it makes national planning a more practical proposition than it would be in an economy wholly in private hands.

At the same time it avoids unwieldy state monopolies and ensures that nationalised industries are subject to financial disciplines.

Breaking Up Monopolies

Alongside French-style nationalisation it is interesting to consider the use of "anti-trust" legislation to break up monopolies. This is a subject which has received little attention among Marxists. We have tended to dismiss such legislation as an irrelevance which, of course, it is if one is thinking in terms of the transition of socialism. Laws to stimulate competition and break up monopolies cannot remedy the faults of capitalism, neither can they eradicate the tendency towards monopoly which is built into capitalism. The task of a Monopolies Commission or similar authority in a capitalist country is rather like that of a builder of sea walls in a low-lying country threatened by floods. The job has continually to be done again and in the long term it is probably doomed to failure. That, however, does not necessarily make it a waste of time. In the short term it can prevent some of the grossest abuses, improve the position of the consumer and sharpen the performance of the economy.

An immediate programme for the mining industry might therefore be based upon three proposals—

1. revise the terms of mining leases so as to increase the state's share of the proceeds of mining
2. use anti-monopoly legislation to break up the largest of the mining finance houses
3. nationalise one or more, but not all, of the resulting smaller groups.

If this could be achieved by agreement with the business community, it would enable the new South African government to break decisively out of the international isolation to which apartheid has condemned South Africa and to embark with confidence on the enormous economic tasks which confront us.

A similar approach might be the correct one in the banking sector. As the channel through which capital flows, or fails to flow, to all other sectors of the economy, banking is of primary importance. The Reserve Bank plays an important role in regulating and guiding the sector but it alone does not constitute a sufficient state presence. On the other hand, to nationalise the entire sector would be to throw down a gauntlet not only to the South African bourgeoisie but to the whole capitalist world. It would involve the new government in a conflict which would drag on for decades and which, given the present balance of power in the world, South Africa would be unlikely to win. Moreover, it would risk placing this crucial and complex sector of the economy under management which would lack the necessary experience and skills. Therefore the solution may be first to use monopoly legislation to break up undesirable ties between banks and other enterprises and then to nationalise one bank.

To put the whole question of the nationalisation or otherwise of existing enterprises into perspective, it is vital to remember the extent to which the present situation relegates South Africans to a subsistence economy lying outside the whole system of industry, commerce and cash-crop agriculture. Because the population is expanding but the economy is not, the situation is getting steadily worse. Some economists estimate that the number of actual earners of significant money incomes is as low as thirty percent of the total of potential wage earners in the population. The other seventy percent are either subsistence peasant farmers or urban unemployed. The economic policy of a democratic South Africa must address the plight of these people as a matter of the greatest urgency.

Enlarging the Cake

The terms in which the political debate has been conducted over the years have given the left certain reflex actions which are not to be trusted. The left (not only scientific socialists but social democrats and others as well) is rightly concerned with the redistribution of wealth and the elimination of inequality. The right seeks to discredit this objective and divert attention from it by saying "Never mind how the cake is cut up; the important thing is to increase the total size of the cake." The left believes that rational planning and clear political objectives can make things possible which are not possible under capitalism. The right tries to pour cold water on such ideas by asking "Where is the money going to come from?" The result has been that many people on the left have come to think that "Where is the money going to come from?" is a question which ought not to be asked and the increase of the total wealth of the nation an objective which ought not to be emphasised.

These are errors. Redistribution of wealth is important but it is not enough. This is particularly true in Africa at the present time because of the relentless pace at which the population increases. Recent calculations by the United Nations indicate that the population of Africa will more than double between now and 2025. Unless present rates of economic growth are substantially improved, this implies a steady deterioration in standards of living. South Africa is, on the present trends, no exception.

Therefore the overriding duty of a democratic government of South Africa will be to ensure that the economy grows at a rate which will not only keep pace with the growth of population but substantially exceed it, so that the large section of the population which is at present left out of the productive economy can be brought into it.

How is this to be done? There is no magic formula. The history of our century is full of examples of governments which decided to impose some master plan involving the reconstruction of a whole nation on a uniform pattern. Time after time, such experiments have had to be abandoned. We should rather try to advance upon many

fronts, using a variety of methods, working with the grain of the people's traditions and habits, not against it.

This is what the Constitutional Guidelines have in mind in speaking of "a public sector, a private sector, a co-operative sector and a small-scale family sector." The state, it is suggested, should not go beyond determining "the general context in which economic life takes place" and should support "co-operative forms of economic enterprise, village industries and small-scale family activities." This is an explanation, not a contradiction, of the statement in the Freedom Charter that "all other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people."

Control is a variable concept. All governments control trade and industry in some degree. Both the absence of any control and the exercise of total control are dogmatic illusions. In the past, South African governments have exercised a relatively high degree of control but for the wrong purposes. The present government, with its irrelevant privatisation schemes, is veering towards the illusion of no control. The policy documents of the ANC do not embrace the opposite illusion of total control but correctly define the purpose of control and make it clear that the state should not hesitate to play an active role.

Overseas Capital

The necessary expansion of the South African economy will undoubtedly require the investment of large amounts of capital. Where is this to come from? We can unhesitatingly say that as much as possible should be mobilised internally. South Africa has not been immune from the tendency, so marked in recent times among the advanced capitalist nations, for the owners of finance capital to use it for speculation in preference to productive investment. This tendency must be corrected, not only by means of controls but also by the positive action of the state through its presence in the banking sector.

There is also room for the diversion of funds from conspicuous consumption by the upper and middle classes to productive investment. This can readily be achieved by means of taxation, but the ease with which it can be done should not lead us to think that there are no pitfalls. The rich in South Africa are not numerous and the amounts which can be raised by tax increases are not large by comparison with the numerous competing needs for investment in different types of activity and different parts of the country. Nothing is easier than to sink large sums of money in prestige projects which do little good at the end of the day.

A democratic South African government will have to develop hard-headed and realistic criteria for investment projects. Since unemployment is the greatest problem, there will be an obvious requirement that investment must create jobs—the more the better. The trouble is, however, that labour-intensive methods of production are often less productive than those which make use of advanced technology. If the consumer ends up paying more for inferior goods, the community as a whole is not

enriched. Therefore we cannot make a fetish a labour-intensiveness, neither can we reject technology, including imported technology. Alongside the criterion of job creation must stand that of consumer satisfaction and the long-term viability of projects in the context of both national and international competition.

The reference to international competition raises the question—to what extent should a democratic South African government allow South African industry to be subject to international competition? At present, South Africa is a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) but not of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Membership of OECD would involve a commitment to virtually complete free trade, with no possibility of protecting nascent industries against the full rigours of international competition. Nobody has suggested that South Africa should join OECD and that probability can be ruled out.

Membership of GATT involves less rigorous commitments and includes the majority of developing countries. A revision of GATT is currently being negotiated and the developing countries, led by India, Brazil and Egypt, are working strongly for a proper recognition of their special needs. South Africa's current diplomatic isolation means that no contribution is being made to this debate. A democratic South Africa could play an active and prominent part and could add valuable weight to the arguments of the developing countries.

Some on the left would prefer to see South Africa withdraw from GATT. They argue that acceptance of any treaty commitments to free trade restricts the ability of a democratic government to give priority to indigenous development and gives openings for foreign capitalists to profit at the expense of the South African people. Though these arguments are not without merit and might indeed prevail in the period of transition to socialism, the balance of advantage in the immediate future seems clearly in favour of remaining in GATT. By doing so, markets for South African exports can be significantly improved, while the strength of the developing country bloc in GATT ensures that the price will not be too high.

Foreign Control

We have digressed from the question of capital for economic growth. The domestic sources of such capital are, we have said, important but limited. To what extent should a democratic South Africa seek overseas capital? This has been a perennial and difficult question for all developing countries (indeed, it has recently become a difficult question for yesterday's principal exporter and today's largest importer of capital, the United States of America). The dilemma is simply stated. A poor country can, by importing capital, make developments possible which would otherwise be impossible. If, however, the importation of capital takes the form of investment in

the poor country by multinational corporations, the result is that key productive facilities in that country are in foreign hands.

This result is unpalatable and in recent decades many newly independent developing countries have gone to considerable lengths to avoid it. Government borrowing has been seen as a preferable alternative to inward investment by the private sector. Unfortunately, government borrowing has been allowed to assume absurd dimensions. Especially in Latin America, but not only there, governments have borrowed such huge amounts that the entire foreign exchange earnings of their countries are insufficient to pay the interest, never mind the sums borrowed. In many cases, little or no benefit has been derived from these loans. Sometimes the money borrowed has simply been stolen by corrupt dictators or the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In other cases it has been wasted on grandiose, ill-chosen projects, on armaments or simply on conspicuous consumption by a wealthy minority of the population.

Today, some governments are trying to extricate themselves from the mess by "debt for equity swaps." This means privatisation of state-owned industries and payment of the government's debts by allocation of shares in such industries to the creditor banks. It is certainly a worse solution than allowing foreign capital to establish industries in the first place.

Foreign Investment Is Welcome

Dogmatic opposition to foreign investment therefore seems an unpromising line to pursue. The ANC is in fact not pursuing it; in the course of his epic world tour in June and July 1990, Deputy President Nelson Mandela gave clear indications that foreign investment in the future democratic South Africa would be welcome. This is a position with which we can agree.

It is, of course, necessary for foreign investment to be carefully monitored. Three issues can be identified in this connection. First, the total volume of foreign investment needs to be monitored, so that the economy is not dominated by it. In this respect, the evolution of recent decades has been favourable. The South African economy was dominated by British and American capital in the first half of the twentieth century. Since then, there has been deliberate action by South African governments to reduce that domination, combined with some repatriation of capital by foreign investors in response to sanctions campaigns. The present role of foreign investors is considerably less than it was forty years ago and there is some room for an increase.

Secondly, the nature of foreign investment needs to be monitored. If left to please themselves, multinational companies may wish to set up so-called "screwdriver plants" in a country such as South Africa. These are simple assembly operations which take advantage of low wage levels in a developing country to site the semi-skilled work of assembling components there while the highly skilled work of making the components is still

done in the home country of the multinational country. Though even an operation of this kind may have something to offer to a developing country with high unemployment, it is a much inferior alternative to the transfer to that country of a whole manufacturing operation, with all the technology involved. A democratic South Africa will have considerable attractions to multinationals as a base from which to penetrate the African market as a whole. Its government should be in a position to insist on a high level of transfer of technology.

Thirdly, the source of foreign investment should be monitored so as to prevent any one foreign company or country from establishing an excessively powerful position. Britain had such a position in the past but for a considerable number of years the trend has been for the British share of foreign investment in South Africa to diminish. Britain has now only a limited ability to export capital and there is no need for any special precautions against the re-establishment of British hegemony. The world leader in capital export is now Japan and the question of commercial relations with Japan should receive more attention than it has done up till now.

A danger of Japanese hegemony does exist, if only in the long term given the modest levels of Japanese investment in South Africa to date. Therefore vigilance is necessary. On the other hand, Japan has much to offer, including the most advanced technology and an egalitarian, up-to-date approach to the organisation of industrial enterprises. The introduction of new Japanese capital could also contribute towards the breaking up of the monopolistic structures at present characteristic of the South African economy. Therefore the ANC might be well advised to adopt a positive attitude towards Japanese investment, while at the same time making it clear that there are clear criteria as to the quality of investment and clear limits on its total quantity.

National Debate

This article represents an attempt by one individual to expand upon some themes drawn from the policy documents of our movement. Decisions are not for the author but for the people, acting through our Party, through our national liberation movement and, eventually, through a democratically elected South African Parliament. These matters need to be debated up and down the country, the most important theatre of debate for the immediate future being the preparations for the national conference of the ANC. The time is not far off when the people's representatives will have to assume new and formidable responsibilities. They must be adequately prepared. It is the author's hope that this article may make some contribution to the process of preparation.

* Significance of New Teachers Union Analyzed

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[Article by Mandy Sanger; first paragraph is WORK IN PROGRESS introduction; italicized words published in italics]

[Text] *These are the words of one of the 1,500 delegates who converged in Johannesburg on 6 and 7 October to launch the South African Democratic Teachers' Union [SADTU]. The optimistic and politically assertive mood that characterised the conference is reflected in the organisational structure, resolutions and strategies adopted at the launch of the new union.*

The structure adopted by the new teachers' union differs significantly from the usually bureaucratic and too-heavy structures of professional bodies. From the structure of the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) it is clear that, in addition to a commitment to internal democracy, accountability, membership control and participation—principles absent from most professional bodies—the new teachers' union is gearing itself for a militant defence of its members' interests.

Like any other union SADTU has the sites in which union members gather—in this case the schools—as the basic units of the organisation.

Unlike professional organisations where there is an individual approach to problems, SADTU proposes a collective way of resolving issues which affect teachers. Instead of approaching the principal who then contacts the circuit office, a teacher who does not receive a cheque or who has any other grievance will have to lodge his/her complaint with the representatives of the teachers, called the SADTU school committee—a structure that resembles a factory shop-steward committee. This style of organising teachers is new in this country. It shows that SADTU views itself as a trade union rather than a professional body.

This style of organising is not only reflected in the organisational strategies and structure of the new union, but also emerges in the resolutions adopted at the launch and in the campaigns SADTU proposes to take up. The conference proposed as part of SADTU's programme of action that the union immediately fights for 'recognition from the Minister of National Education as the only teachers' union representing teachers on a non-racial, national basis.' As a recognised union SADTU sees its role as formulating and negotiating a single and acceptable contract for all teachers.

The conference also decided to campaign for a 'living wage for all educators in South Africa.' This campaign is seen as being linked to the struggle against the temporary status of many teachers. The campaign for permanent status and job security is part of a broader 'jobs for all' campaign. Consistent with the resolve to struggle for jobs for all teachers, the new National Executive Committee (NEC) was given a mandate to ensure 'that all newly qualified teachers be given posts in 1991.'

But more important in SADTU's attempts to take up the bread and butter issues which affect teachers is the resolution on women teachers. The launch conference demanded an end to discrimination of women teachers, demanding:

- immediate full parity in salaries between men and women;
- immediate full maternity benefits for all women teachers; and
- immediate fully paid accouchement leave for all women teachers.

The resolution did not only focus on the discrimination women are subjected to in the teaching profession, but also raised the need for an end to sexual harassment and victimisation within the organisation. The conference decided to encourage the full participation of women teachers in SADTU structures and to embark on an affirmative programme to ensure such participation. It was also decided to convene a conference that will focus on the plight of women teachers.

It would have been ironical had the conference been silent on political issues such as the need for one education department; the need for a free, equal, democratic and non-racial system, etc. Teachers, located in a politically charged arena, have two options: either they support the people or the ruling class. Clearly SADTU has chosen to be with the people.

The first myth that SADTU has attempted to expose is the demand by the authorities that teachers be politically inactive. In its conference the union has resolved that '...every teacher must have the right to be informed and politically active and to express his/her personal opinions in public without fear of victimisation.' This is a direct challenge to the 'code of conduct' which the education authorities demand teachers stick to. The teachers are not only adding their voice to the call for the right to be politically active without fear of victimisation, but are asserting that they must not be excluded from the political processes that will emerge from the present talks about talks between the ANC [African National Congress] and the state.

As part of its programme of action, the union resolved 'to organise a campaign for a Teachers' Bill of Rights and Teachers' Charter.'

In addition to the call for one education department, SADTU committed itself to developing curricula that 'serve the needs of the people.' The conference noted that, as with the concept of people's education, the development of such a curriculum is not the prerogative of teachers, but must involve parents, students and community organisations. As its contribution to attempts to resolve the education crisis, SADTU decided to convene a conference to address the chaos in our schools and in the present education system.

From the mood at the conference and in terms of the organising approach adopted by SADTU, it is clear that there has been an intense radicalisation and politicisation of teachers in the last few months. Although not politically aligned, SADTU's preparedness to take political positions is attested by the resolutions adopted at the launch conference. The strata known for its political conservatism is beginning to assert itself. The confidence

shown at the conference is a result of the unity that has been built over the past few months. It is the culmination of the bitter struggles fought by teachers.

But this path to unity within the teachers sector has not been an easy one. It has been long, thorny and acrimonious.

Given the context of organisation-building which we have witnessed in the last two decades, the coming together of 12 teacher organisations with a collective membership of 100,000-150,000 may be seen by those unfamiliar with the history of teacher organisations in this country as just another example of different organisations uniting to form a new body.

The history of teacher organisations—characterised by division, factionalism and provincialism—vividly illustrates the significance and special nature of the formation of SADTU.

No other sector has been as divided as the teaching sector. The divisions in South African society and the racially fragmented education system have led to the existence of various federal, provincial, ethnic and local teacher organisations. Before the launch of SADTU more than 30 teacher organisations existed in this country. Most of these were provincial or racially specific organisations linked up in a federalist manner with ethnic bodies such as the African Teachers' Association of South Africa (ATASA); the 'coloured' United Teachers' Association of South Africa (UTASA); the 'Indian' teachers' Association of South Africa (TASA) and the 'whites only' Teachers Federal Council (TFC).

What is more striking however is the fact that since time immemorial there has been talk about the need for teacher unity. The more splits occurred, the more the talk of teacher unity intensified. Whenever this much-talked-about unity happened however, it never went beyond a paper agreement or a consultative relationship amongst the leaders of the different organisations. The 'deals' at the top fell far short of transcending the racial categorisation of teacher organisations in this country.

The establishment of SADTU is a culmination of a long process which has its origins in the April 1988 conference in Harare hosted by an international association of teacher organisations, the World Confederation of Organised Teaching Profession (WCOTP) and the teacher's wing of the African Continental Trade Union Centre (OATTU)—the All-African Teachers' Organisation (AATO). Also present at the meeting were South African organisations such as COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions], the ANC and SACTU [South African Congress of Trade Unions]. It has taken more than two years for these organisations to implement the conference recommendation of establishing a single, united teachers' union to which they had committed themselves.

This has not been an easy task. There have been times when the prospect of bringing the different teachers'

organisations together have seemed very bleak. There have been many fights, stoppages and breakdowns along the way. As recently as April this year one of the teachers organisations, the Western Cape Teachers' Union (WECTU) which has not gone into SADTU wrote in its newsletter: 'Sadly, the unity talks having been in process for more than two years, have not brought us closer to the formation of a single organisation. Some participants in the talks are determined not to be part of a single, non-racial organisation.'

In this newsletter WECTU went as far as attacking the two participants in the unity talks—UTASA and ATASA—and posed WECTU as the vehicle for teacher organisation in the Western Cape: 'The reluctance of UTASA and ATASA make it more imperative for progressive teachers to be organised into WECTU.'

Even on the eve of the launch sharp divisions emerged which meant that four of the organisations—the Transvaal United African Teachers' Association (TUATA); the 'whites only' Transvaal Teachers' Association (TTA); the Natal Teachers' Union (NATU) and the 'whites only' Natal Teachers' Society (NTS)—that had participated in the unity talks, are presently not part of the new teachers' union.

TUATA, which claims to represent about 35,000 teachers, had reservations about signing the unity agreement which stipulates that all the constituent organisations should be dissolved within a year after the launch, and that assets will then have to be transferred to the new union. Although TUATA has begun to raise the need to consult its constituency and 'the partiality of the new union to COSATU' as the association's concerns, it is widely believed that the massive assets which the organisation has is the underlying source of contention. It has since become apparent that NATU is also mouthing the same charges as TUATA.

Both the TTA and NTS had problems with the unity agreement signed by the different teacher organisations on 30 September. According to the NTS the clause compelling constituent organisations to disband within a year and the demand that affiliates do nothing to contradict SADTU between the launch and the next conference, would infringe on the NTS's constitutional standing. Echoing the same sentiments the TTA said the clause stating that TTA members would have to work for SADTU is something that the organisation would not be able to justify in terms of the Industrial Relations Act. As far as the TTA is concerned the law has determined that its members cannot be compelled to do SADTU work.

But more disturbing was the announcement of the formation of a NACTU aligned teachers' union—the National Teachers' Union of South Africa (NATUSA), just before the launch of SADTU.

The examples cited here have not been raised merely to illustrate the way in which even the launch of SADTU has been marred by differences and divisions. The point being made here is that the bringing together of 12

teachers' organisations with different traditions has been a great achievement, despite the difficulties.

The unity talks have gone through different phases and has had many ups and downs.

A few months after the Harare conference the first meeting was held to discuss the principles that were raised by the participants. All organisations reported that the 15 principles had been well-received by their members. This process of consultation took the rest of 1988. In 1989 the unity talks went into limbo. At the end of the 1989 NECC [National Education Crisis Committee] conference, the 'teacher unity' commission, although calling for the talks to continue, acknowledged that the establishment of a single teachers' organisation would take longer than initially expected...

The banning of NEUSA [National Education Union of South African] in 1988 and WECTU and DETU [Democratic Teachers' Union] in 1989, together with the repression meted out against the more militant teachers' unions and their members, meant the unions that had been spawned in the 1984/86 uprisings could not play their role in bringing together the different teacher organisations. This is an important factor if one considers that, despite their smallness in terms of membership if compared to the recognised organisations such as Atasa, Utasa and Tasa, the emergent unions had a more political approach to organising.

The other factor which affected the unity process was the divergent views on the new organisation. While all organisations agreed on the need for a single teachers' organisation, the form that this organisation should take raised many debates and much discussion, which more often than not led to paralysis in the unity talks. These debates did not filter down to the rank-and-file teachers and never really hastened the process of unity.

The two issues that were hotly debated were:

- whether the union would be a trade union or a professional body;
- whether the structure of the new organisation would be federal or unitary.

These two questions led to a crystallisation of two blocs within the teachers' unity forum. A bloc of the established and officially recognised organisations on the one hand and the bloc comprised of the new, small but politically assertive union such as WECTU, DETU, NATU [Mamelodi Teachers' Union], NEUSA and others. The latter grouped themselves as the 'progressive' bloc within the unity talks and has maintained, since its emergence, that it views and conceptualises the prospective national teacher organisation as a trade union that would affiliate to COSATU.

It was clear to this bloc that teachers, on their own, will be unable to sustain any form of radicalisation on a consistent basis. However in order to make a significant contribution to the unfolding struggle, teachers have to

maintain a relatively consistent level of radicalisation. The extent to which teachers participate alongside other sectors and strata of society will ensure and guarantee that the national teachers' organisation remains radical in outlook and practice.

But this belief is not as a result of hotheadedness on the part of the 'progressive' bloc. The emergent unions pointed to the conditions which affected teachers such as long hours of work; low wages; job insecurity and victimisation as necessitating a trade union organisation.

Only an organisation with a militant approach to these problems will be able to change the working conditions of teachers. The 'progressive' bloc felt that a teacher trade union will fulfill the task of taking up the bread and butter issues which affect teachers.

It was also important to this bloc that an organisation with a democratic character was built. For the 'progressive' bloc what the thousands of unorganised, disorganised and loosely organised teachers throughout South Africa need, is leadership that is vigorously accountable, and that facilitates democracy at all levels.

A trade-union identity would incorporate local branches, democratically elected shop-stewards, regional and national executive elections which would perfectly suit the fulfilling of the democratic tasks that face teachers. In addition to this, regular branch, regional and national congresses would ensure the continued accessibility and, therefore, accountability of structures, to the rank-and-file teachers.

Although not opposed to the idea of teachers being organised under a union, the established and officially recognised teacher organisations wavered on this question. They felt the union approach adopted by the emergent unions was not catering for the 'professional interests' of teachers. No strong political counter was forwarded by the established organisations to the idea of a teachers' union. The concern became the need to find a balance between the 'professional' and 'union' responsibilities of the new organisation.

The fact that teachers had been excluded from the 1956 Labour Relations Act [LRA] was also raised by the officially recognised organisations. Thus the UTASA booklet used the following extract from the Labour Relations Act in support of its argument against a trade union: 'This act shall not apply to persons...employed by the state in respect of their employment such as...nor to persons who teach, educate or train other persons at any university, technikon, college, school or any other educational institution maintained wholly or partly from public funds.'

But this was not a strong argument, particularly in the context of the struggle to have the LRA changed, so that all workers are included under one labour legislation.

The 'progressive' bloc vigorously opposed all notions of federalism as it merely entrenched the apartheid structures of education. As far as the 'progressive' bloc was concerned a federal structure would mean that the union would remain loosely co-ordinated and that by and large teachers would remain affiliated to essentially racially-defined organisations.

As it was important, politically, for unity to be forged from the bottom and not from the top, the 'progressive' bloc argued that an important component of the bottom-up process was non-racialism.

At a workshop on teachers' unity held in Cape Town under the auspices of COSATU and involving the CPTA [expansion not given], DETU, TASA, WECTU and the Peninsula African Teachers Association (PENATA)—an affiliate of Atasa, one of the members of the 'progressive' bloc had this to say: 'If we are serious about contributing to the formation and construction of a new South Africa that is non-racial, democratic and distinctly non-exploitative, then our structures and operations must reflect this. We cannot continue to exist in our separate and racially defined teacher structures on the one hand, and on the other, expect to undermine the state's racist and exploitative education system—let alone contribute to the broader liberation movement for fundamental change in South Africa.'

So, for political reasons we need to form a unitary teachers' structure that can fight in a focussed way against the single but federal South African education system. We must begin to undermine the structures that they have imposed on us and the whole of South Africa.

But it is not only for political reasons that the 'progressive' bloc called for a unitary structure. The proposal for a unitary structure went hand-in-hand with the conception that the new organisation should be a trade union. The emergent unions strongly argued that only a unitary structure can take up the day-to-day problems of teachers.

Although they agreed with the need for a unitary teachers' organisation, the established associations felt a federal structure must be used as a stepping stone to what is an ultimate goal—a new teachers' union with a unitary structure.

The established unions felt it would be premature to disband the existing organisations, as this could lead to dislocation and effective renegeing on the important task of looking after the interests of the teacher members.

What the established organisations feared most was the possibility of losing official recognition. This, they felt, would be a disservice to their members.

It was the teachers' struggles that erupted after 2 February which gave the unity process a jolt. In the aftermath of the unbanning of organisations and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela we witnessed teachers taking to the streets in their thousands throughout South

Africa. Teachers from the ranks of established teacher organisations like ATASA, TASA and UTASA—many of whom had previously worked hand-in-glove with the government—joined teachers from the ranks of the emergent and more radical teacher unions in marches, mass rallies, chalk-downs and awareness programmes.

We have also seen a joint delegation taking the demands of teachers throughout South Africa to National Education Minister Gene Louw, with the support of thousands of primary and secondary teachers as well as trainee teachers from the colleges.

The teachers' strikes in the first half of this year gave life to the National Teacher Unity Forum (NTUF) and the unity process. It was in a meeting called in April, in response to the strikes and the education crisis, that a timetable towards the establishment of SADTU was adopted.

Thus, thousands of teachers throughout South Africa were drawn to the idea of a single teachers' union through their own spontaneous strikes and marches. This groundswell of activity which sometimes occurred outside of the ranks of NTUF 'structures' very often happened despite NTUF rather than because of its influence.

The drafting of a memorandum of demands and the delegation to the minister, as well as the propagandistic effect of the march, served to centralise the focus of teacher frustration nationally and placed NTUF at the head of all teacher struggles. For the first time the process of teacher unity took on a national and grassroots character.

After the April 'emergency' meeting things moved swiftly and the new union was launched in October 1990. What sceptics called a dream was attained.

But this was not an easy task. Many compromises were made along the way. Until next year SADTU will remain an organisation with affiliates—something which contradicts the desired unitary structure. The question of affiliation to a trade union federation has also been postponed until next year.

As a result of the compromises and the attempts to accommodate everyone, the launch conference took the form of a consensus conference where the adoption of the unity agreement and the constitution and the election of officials were unanimously agreed upon.

The national executive committee consists of representatives of all the teacher organisations that signed the unity agreement. It was agreed that this will be a transitional executive which will see SADTU through the first year during which branches and regional structures throughout the country will be set up.

Just how justifiable these compromises are is to be determined by what happens in the future. What cannot be denied however is that concessions have been made by the parties involved. Another critical problem is the

fact that the unity which has been agreed upon still remains a paper agreement which has been entered into at the top.

1991 is going to be crucial in determining the character of SADTU. It can either develop into a top-heavy and bureaucratic structure or a democratic and mass teachers' union with an accountable leadership.

The way SADTU goes about building democratic, non-racial, politically vibrant mass branches is vital for the organisation. The danger exists that the unity which has been cemented at the top can disintegrate and that SADTU will become nothing else but a consultative body for racially specific organisations and localised structures.

If SADTU is to develop into a union that can begin to address the dynamic economic, educational and political needs to teachers and society at large, then the gains of the launch need to be built on and developed. The major tasks in this coming year are covered by the resolutions thrashed out and adopted at the conference. SADTU must make sure these resolutions don't just become mere rhetoric, but are used as a guide to a programme of action.

If SADTU accepts that women make up more than 60 percent of the teaching corps in this country then its only hope of being mass-based lies in its ability to organise women teachers.

The fact that the Transitional National Executive Committee only contains one woman is a reflection of the lack of active involvement of women on the ground.

The regional programmes of action must make women's issues such as maternity leave with full pay, equal pay for equal work at a living wage, sexual harassment, etc. the main issues around which teachers are mobilised. In order for this to become a reality, regional women's groups/committees have to be set up which are open to all members and which must ensure that women's issues are taken up in a programmatic way and that women become a dynamic part of SADTU.

The programme of action will have to take into account the very real differences that exist among teachers. Even though we have achieved the formation of a national, unitary structure the teachers who are part of this come from very different backgrounds and traditions.

What is needed is a style of organisation that will begin to weld activism and grassroots participation with the ability to maintain and represent a sizeable membership.

We cannot just continue to organise teachers on an overtly political basis. In a period of intense crisis this is possible and necessary—but when the toyi-toying dies down we need to be in a position to hold onto the thousands by involving them structurally in the day-to-day running of the branches.

A union approach has to incorporate organising teachers around the issues that affect them directly, as well as maintain a strong sense of accountability and democracy throughout the ranks.

The only guarantee for a democratic teachers' union lies in the ability of that union to become mass-based and not top-heavy with the leadership in a position to take arbitrary decisions. The life-blood of SADTU must be the most oppressed and exploited teachers and not those who hold powerful positions in the school.

It is also important that the new union clearly defines its trade union role. The situation that prevailed with those organisations in the 'progressive' bloc where claims of membership were made without being able to verify this in terms of paid-up membership, must be curtailed.

The struggle for recognition will go a long way in solving this. The new union must fight for stop-order facilities with the education authorities.

It will be even more crucial for the union to take up the debate on affiliation to a trade union federation. In order to improve their conditions teachers need the power of the whole working class.

As the president of the new union, Shepard Mdladlana, said in his address at the launch rally: 'Unity; organisation and struggle should be the watchwords of the organisation!'

*** Growth of Private Armies, Weapons Build-Up Seen**

91AF0395B Cape Town THE ARGUS in English
27 Nov 90 p 25

[Article by Esmare Van Der Merwe: "The Soldiers of Misfortune"—first paragraph is THE ARGUS introduction]

[Text] One disturbing sign of the growing militarisation of the South African society is the alarming growth of "private armies", writes ARGUS correspondent Esmare Van Der Merwe from Johannesburg.

"An unarmed Boer is a dead Boer," goes a catchy right-wing slogan.

But there is disturbing evidence that—despite high hopes of the "new" South Africa—growing numbers of South Africans across the political spectrum seem to believe that an unarmed man is a dead man.

In recent months, ironically since the government and the ANC [African National Congress] have started talks, there has been a massive build-up of weapons inside the country.

Those who are physically, logistically and emotionally preparing themselves for confrontation range from individuals to organisations across the political spectrum.

The security firm industry and private arms dealers experience a boom, as individuals seek to secure their property and lives.

War Talk

And on the political front, war talk from both the extreme left and right has made nonsense of the general optimism that a political settlement might soon be reached.

The registrar of the Board for Security Officers, Francis Lubbe, estimates the number of registered private security firms at between 3,000 and 4,000, representing 100,000-plus private security officers who make a living from patrolling and securing properties, installing alarm systems and safes, and transporting valuables between destinations.

Police statistics of registered weapons show that 123,415 new licenses were issued last year, bringing the total number of registered licences to almost 2.9-million.

The number of unlicensed weapons is anyone's guess. Last year 7,760 weapons were reported missing, and less than half of those (3,678) were recovered.

Potentially more explosive are the number of politically-motivated armies, collecting arms and training "soldiers" for some expected bloodbath if—and in some cases even if not—peaceful negotiations break down.

The accompanying graphic, which does not claim to be comprehensive, gives a broad indication of the extent of private armies which for the purposes of this article are defined as any group of people which operates in a vigilant or aggressive capacity. It this excludes the official state security machine embodied in the SADF [South African Defense Forces] and SAP [South African Police].

The graphic encompasses the most prominent groups which are believed to be active. Groups have been categorised merely for clarity's sake, since little information is available on their exact nature due to secrecy.

Private armies range from shadowy sub-divisions within the official state machinery—such as the Civil Cooperation Bureau and "kitskonstabels"—to neighbourhood watch schemes and street and area committees in the townships.

Gangs

Professor Mike Hough, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, believes a new category is emerging—armed groups which do not necessarily report to any political organisation, and criminal gangs which are increasingly using weapons such as AK47s for non-political crime such as bank robberies.

One expert who has tried to estimate the number of "soldiers" under the command of the main para-military groups is political risk consultant Wim Booyse.

He believes the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation] may have about 22,000 members—6,000 outside the country's borders, 6,000 trained soldiers within the country and an additional 10,000 "marshalls" who mainly play a preventative role but could be used as a "rapid deployment force."

The Pan Africanist Congress's military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army [APLA], has an estimated 1,200 members and the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania's [BCMA] military wing, the Azanian National Liberation Army, about 250 trained men.

His estimate of right-wingers under the command of para-military organisations range from 12,000 to a maximum of 45,000.

Even less is known about emerging private armies in the homelands, apparently being deployed to protect their governments as the homeland system nears collapse and black political parties vie for power.

Private Armies in South Africa—A Broad Guide

Registered Private Security Firms		
3,000-4,000 security firms, e.g. Fidelity Guards, Coin Security Group		
Estimated 100,000 plus private security officers		
Para-Military Groups		
Cultural-Based Vigilante Groups	Military Wings of Former/Current Liberation Movements	Right-Wing Groups Which Have Been Linked To Acts of Violence in Recent Months
Inkatha's 'impis' mainly in KwaZulu	Umkhonto we Sizwe (ANC)	Wit Wolwe (White Wolves)
Secret army linked to Ximolco Xa	Azanian People's Liberation Army (PAC)	Wit Kommando (White Commando)
Rixaka in Gazankulu	Azanian National Liberation Army (BCMA)	Wit Bevrydomsleer (White Freedom Army)
Mbokotho vigilantes in KwaNdebele		Orde van die Dood (Order of Death)
		Orde Boerevolk (Order of Boer Nation)
		Boere Weerstandsbeweging (Boer Resistance Movement)
		AWB's* Wenkommando (formally Aquana)
		Boere Vryheidsbeweging (Boer Freedom Movement)
		Boereleer (Boer Army) intended as umbrella organisation for right-wing groups
Self-Defence Units		
Township-Based Vigilante Groups	Organised Township Units	Quasi-Political Neighbourhood Watches
Witdoeke in Cape Peninsula	Civil protection units (to be established by black local authorities)	Blanke Veiligheld (White Security) in Welkom
Streets and area committees (run by anti-apartheid groups)	Para-military self-defence units (proposed by SACP**, supported by ANC and UDF***)	Brandwag in Brits
		Blanke Front (White Front) in Pretoria
		Flaminke (Flamingoes) in Odendaalsrus, Virginia, Potchefstroom

Research: Esmare Van Der Merwe, Graphic: Gail Irwin

*[Afrikaner Resistance Movement]

**[South African Communist Party]

***[United Democratic Front]

Impis

Inkatha's "impis" are regarded by many organisations as a separate force which could be linked to the KwaZulu security forces.

In Gazankulu, a secret army is said to be trained in guerilla warfare tactics and armed combat. It is reportedly linked to the cultural movement Ximoko Xa Rixaka which is led by the homeland's leader, Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi.

And in KwaNdebele, the Parsons Commission into the 1986 violence in the homeland has found that hundreds of people have lost their lives at the hands of the notorious Mbokotho vigilante group.

Since February, right-wing groups have mushroomed. Their command structures are vague and many groups seem to either overlap or have members who are active in more than one organisation.

Experts believe many of the organisations which have claimed responsibility for the recent spate of arms thefts and acts of violence probably don't really exist.

Commented Mr Booyse: "Between July and August this year, some 50 telephone calls have been made to newspapers claiming that the Wit Kommando has been responsible for acts of violence. But there is no evidence that this organisation exists.

"It is impossible to make any sense out of the right-wing organisations. Some seem to have as few as three members who operate on an ad hoc basis. They are nothing but a few lunatics who have organised themselves into some Trompie-style gang.

"But other armies are believed to run into thousands. Of considerable force seem to be the AWB's Wenkommando and the Boerestaat Party's military wing, the Boere Weerstandsbeweging."

In a detailed document on extreme right-wing organisations, the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression says militant extra-parliamentary groups which have shot to prominence since President De Klerk's February 2 speech range from relatively harmless intellectual think-tanks to "shadowy, ultra-militant armies" intent on urban terrorism and, ultimately, a "Third Freedom Struggle for the Afrikaner."

The Board says the biggest obstacle in the way of a concerted right-wing terror campaign might be the fact that the political Right is broken up into so many disparate groups, mainly due to personality clashes and power struggles.

"Also, it should be kept in mind that cross-organisational affiliations are rife, and that individuals might support a parliamentary party such as the Conservative party in an election, claim membership of the AWB, and commit deeds in the name of the Wit Wolwe," the Board says.

Other right-wingers, incensed by the legalisation of black protest marches through town centres, have organised themselves into armed neighbourhood watches. Most prominent among these is Blanke Veiligheid in Welkom.

Mr Booyse believes some of these vigilante groups fall under the command of political organisations, while others could easily be "hijacked" by the politicians.

Professor Hough stresses that while many neighbourhood watch schemes are becoming increasingly militarised, others have no ulterior political motive and merely act as protectors of property and preventors of crime.

Another area of potential conflict is between "self-defence units" in particularly the townships.

Concerned about continuing state violence against political activists, and in an apparent attempt to pacify radicals who are disillusioned with the ANC's suspension of the "armed struggle," the SACP has proposed the establishment of para-military self-defence units. This concept has been endorsed by the ANC and the UDF.

On the other hand, the state has sanctioned the creation of civil protection units under the authority of embattled black local authorities. This could lead to major conflict in the volatile townships.

* Pretoria Council to Privatize Facilities

91AF0393D Johannesburg BEELD
in Afrikaans 28 Nov 90 p 21

[Report by Sonnette Lombaard: "Pretoria City Council will Privatize Nine Swimming Pools"]

[Text] Pretoria's city council is going to privatize 9 of its 13 municipal swimming pools.

Negotiations on the purchase of one of those swimming pools—the Tjaart van Vuuren pool in Vleria—are already at an advanced stage.

At the end of last year the city council appointed a committee composed of NP [National Party] and CP [Conservative Party] city council members and officials to initiate a thorough investigation into the privatization of some of the services of the council. Already at that time it was speculated that municipal swimming pools would be one of the services which would be privatized first.

In a news statement yesterday, the council announced that it is inviting people to make bids for the total takeover, development, and management of several of its pools.

Those are the Deon Malherbe pool in Wonderboom, the Gert van Schalkwyk pool in Danville, the Hercules, the Innesdal, the Les Marais, the Pretoria-North, the Pretoria-West, the Central in Trevenna, and the Tjaart van Vuuren pool in Vleria.

Therefore, the property involved will be rented out to private developers with a view to a total takeover, further development where necessary, and the management of those swimming pools.

All of the pools already have dressing rooms and entry gates.

The quality of workmanship, design of buildings, as well as the layout and aesthetic considerations of planned

developments must agree with the currently existing character in each of the various swimming pool areas.

Further particulars as to requirements will be available upon request. The information is available during office hours at room 303 in the Valforum building on the corner of Proes and Van der Walt streets.

The bids must be submitted to that office by noon on 29 March 1991.

—A businessman of Pretoria, Mr. Harry Johnson, already started negotiating with the city council four years ago on the takeover of the Tjaart van Vuuren pool.

Mr. Johnson, the owner of the Waverley gymnasium—the largest gymnasium in Pretoria—wants to turn that swimming pool area into a recreation and amusement center for about 6 million rands.

He said that two of the country's largest financial giants are anxious to become involved in the project.

Besides the Olympic-size swimming pool, that area is the largest municipal swimming pool area in the country. It serves the northeastern part of Pretoria.

The project, which will be approached in phases, includes amongst other things water slides and a large building complex of four stories, part of which will hang over the swimming pool and in which a giant gymnasium and four squash courts will be located. Mini-golf courses, running tracks and barbecue areas are also being planned.

Mr. Johnson said yesterday that he is happy and positive that his negotiations with the council, which are already in an advanced stage, will succeed.

He has already rented the swimming pool for the entire month of December as a trial for what he is planning.

*** Afrikaner State Opts for Self-Sufficiency**

91AF0460B Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
5 Dec 90 p 11

[Article by Sarel van der Walt]

[Text] A total of 92 families have already settled in the northern Cape Province, where they hope one day to establish a new white Afrikaner homeland, Orandee.

Jobs there—in places such as Upington, Prieska, Kuruman, and Olifantshoek—are scarce. Nevertheless, the Orandee Development Corps (OOK) hopes that around 250,000 whites will move there in the short term. As a matter of fact, they intend to request self-government for Orandee by the end of next year.

Sarel van der Walt, BEELD's man in the far northern Transvaal, who was the first person to report on the northern Transvalers moving to Orandee, went to take a

look at how things are going in Olifantshoek, where 38 souls from the so-called "Messina Trek" have settled.

In the accompanying articles, he talks about the dreams that they are dreaming there these days...

The Orandee Development Corps (OOK) hopes that around 250,000 Afrikaners will settle in Orandee (which currently has 60,000 whites) next year.

Then, the Afrikaner will be a majority there, and Orandee will be able to petition the South African government for self-government.

"We are not prescriptive. The scientific facts stipulate that Orandee is the only area in the country where we can be in the majority in a short period of time," says Mr. Andre Putter, contact person for the OOK.

He is full of confidence that within 10 years approximately 2.5 million Afrikaners will make Orandee their home.

"The so-called white Afrikaner who wants to govern himself will have to move—to Orandee. There is no way for us to get a country other than by majority settlement and self-activity," says Mr. Putter.

Without its own territory, he adds, the Afrikaner nation will not be able to realize its right to self-determination and its autogenous survival as a nation of people. Moreover, it is unfair for a minority to rule over a majority—especially once the majority starts refusing to accept the minority's laws pertaining to them.

"For the sake of our survival as a nation, the Afrikaner cannot even think about allowing himself to be won over by nice-sounding words like power-sharing, protection of group rights, or a federation of states. He can settle for nothing less than general freedom—in his own territory," Mr. Putter believes.

He makes it clear that the OOK does not speak on behalf of all the whites in the country. "We identify only with that part of the white Afrikaner nation that wants very much to have its own territory.

"Like it or not, our country, South Africa, has become a white country with a black population. It doesn't help to close our eyes to reality. This happened without us being able to do anything about it, and if we do not quickly and purposefully begin to work on our own state, we will lose everything before long," he believes.

In his opinion, negotiations between the government and the ANC [African National Congress] are quickly being set in motion. But other parties are simply being ignored. This situation is largely due to politics.

But every nation in the world has the inalienable right to govern itself. Talk to the effect that this is not feasible in South Africa is not based on reality, and is bunk. "There simply must be a place somewhere, or one must be created."

The world must take note of the fact that Orandee is going to be the new home of the Afrikaner nation, and that no one will deprive it of this right. Every day, Afrikaners are told that there has never been such a thing as a "white South Africa."

"Our Orandese agree with this, since 'whites' are not a nation"

At present, a major effort is under way to draw up a constitution, which will be submitted for approval at a congress in Upington next March.

According to Mr. Putter, approximately 150 developers will announce their plans for how Orandee should be developed at that congress (see accompanying report). Job programs for the thousands of people expected in Orandee will also be announced.

Although the Bank of Orandee will be opening its first five branches in January, the bank will not be officially opened until the congress. At this stage, Mr. Putter prefers not to comment on where they will get the money to create the bank.

According to him, they have "a great deal of starting capital," which will result in "unrest in Azania." (The Orandese believe that South Africa's name will be changed to Azania in the future once a black government takes over the country.)

A total of 26 buildings, he says, have already been identified for future sites of bank branches.

Mr. Putter has assured the approximately 265,000 coloreds in Orandee that they will certainly not be kicked out of the country, as some people are alleging. Nor will blacks be driven out of Orandee.

"It is ridiculous to think that you are going to create an absolutely exclusive Afrikaner national state. That is impossible, and it is racist to believe that they will disappear," says Mr. Putter.

If they want to go, they are free to do so. But if they want to stay, they are welcome. "We will certainly not displace them. If they are willing to stay, and we are in the majority, then we will protect their rights.

"But, should non-whites decide to move, the Orandese are willing to help settle them wherever they want to be. In Bloemfontein and Kimberley in particular, the Orandese want to establish industries in the future with the exclusive goal of creating work for the colored who now live in Orandee.

"To the Portuguese and Greeks who want to become Orandese and cast their lot with us, we say welcome."

They are good farmers and businessmen, Mr. Putter says...

In a later article: What do the current residents have to say about the Orandese's plans?

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28 Feb 1991

